THE
NEW YORK REVIEW

VOL. II MARCH-APRIL, 1907 NO. 5

THE DAWN OF EUROPE

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A fussy manufacturing town in the north of England. In the centre a block of civic buildings, and among them a public library where the weary mechanic may absorb the latest betting news, or, if of a romantic turn of mind, may commune soul to soul with Miss Corelli. The building is of the Ionic style; and on the sculptured pediment stands Pericles with the Greek philosophers and poets all about him. He is there by right, standing as he does for so much that the library represents,—for so many strands that are woven into the texture of our national life, however much certain features of that life would have astonished him. Yet to the average pedestrian or rider in the electric tram beneath, Pericles might appear somewhat remote. Enquiry would elicit the fact that he lived more than twenty centuries ago, and was an influential person in a small Greek city whose citizens, though well pleased with themselves, would be outnumbered by the worthy burgesses of our Lancashire town: and further, that the city in question flickered out of importance within a couple of centuries after it had flared up into celebrity. The conclusion might be drawn that Pericles may stand for our library, but that emphatically he does not stand for our manufacturing centre, and that his presence in that place only emphasizes the break between the old and the new. He is in fact an anachronism, and he pleads the lost cause of archeology,—a distressing word, suggestive of extension lectures and dull pedantry.

But Pericles returns the gaze of curiosity with an imperturbable and almost stony stare. There is little of the apologetic in his bearing, which is suggestive rather of proprietorship. It is very perplexing. Here is an unabashed Athenian sitting in our high places and claiming

in the most embarrassing fashion to have taught us most of what we know,— most, too, of what we have learned and forgotten and must learn again. "You will come back to me" he seems to say. "You *must* come back to me from time to time,—unless indeed, (as seems possible) your commercialism is going to debase you to depths from which your spirit cannot rise." "For Greece," as a recent writer has admirably put it, "Greece rears aloft, waving and glittering before us, an unrealisable ideal of superhuman intelligence. It appears and disappears and reappears, always with the same extraordinary power of deflecting, dissolving, recreating the life that it touches." The Western world is always coming back to Greece and finding in it an unfailing stimulus and an insoluble enigma.

The Greek spirit, doomed to vanish from Europe for a thousand years, was sure to come again. And when it returned, it came, so to say, baptized or at least a neophyte. It came as one who had already found a home within the church in earlier days. And the Church did not fear its second advent as she might have done had she not known it in the past. Rather did she welcome it, as we know who have learned to discriminate between classical renaissance and religious revolt. True, the prodigal proved unruly at times, and even imported some frivolity into the discreet household of the Faith, long accustomed to soberer and more Latin ways. Incidentally he extended the limited and feudal outlook of his stay-at-home brother, impressing at last his personality with such vigor upon the ancient estate that it is an effort now to recall what must have been its condition during his absence.

Greece, then, we must accept. Even to interpret our own generation aright demands that we should go back to her. And once we have grasped this, what a significance every page of her history has for us. How that wonderful people comes to stand out against the sombre background of their savage neighbors. We see grace and restraint encircled by barbaric squalor or Oriental extravagance; a calm and graceful reasonableness discoursing in pleasant groves or brilliant meeting-places, while the rest of the world is a welter of struggling humanity. This is surely no bad heritage. And for Catholics the interest is twofold. Greece, baptized at length, in spite of St. Paul's cold reception on the Areopagus, nurtures the early Church and tempers the Hebrew distrust of human nature. The gaberdine takes on an Attic grace, and the infant Church assimilates a nutriment which would have sorely perplexed the apostle St. James the Less. And there is

something in our blood that makes us thankful for this infusion of Attic sea-water into the Hebrew wine.

Yet Greece, familiar as she seems, is, in more senses than one, an insoluble enigma Not only is her spirit baffling and elusive, but her origin would seem miraculous. She first appears before us full-born, like Athene from the head of Zeus, and we cannot feel quite at home with her until we know something of her antecedents. What is the prolegomenon to that brilliant fifth century before Christ? Dark ages, grim stories of tyrants, and, earlier still, of shifting tribes and dim groping peoples. Were this all, we might acquiesce, and think that nature, by some strange alchemy had fused these unpromising materials into the splendid product that we know. "True, evolution is at fault," we should say, "Here is a people that has sprung from darkness into light at a bound. We see it happening and must accept the fact." But this is *not* all. Greece herself modestly points, if not to a pedigree, at least to memories of her parentage. "There are traditions current," she says, "of a great civilization which preceded me. And there are certain Homeric poems which tell of it."

Yet, these, unfortunately, do not carry us much further. Homer is circumstantial enough, but how can we fit his golden palaces and refined men and queenly women into the dark centuries that preceded the dawn? What are these broken lights that peer through the gloom of early Greece? Do they really tell of a vanished civilization, or are they reflections from a later glory, a projecting backwards of Hellenic ideals? Until thirty years ago no man could tell. All we could do was to go to our libraries and strive to piece together the legends, and to make Homer tell his own tale, without any possibility of checking it. The result, as seen for instance in the third volume of Grote, was not entirely satisfactory.

But at last Providence raised up a child-like enthusiast named Heinrich Schliemann, who, most fortunately, was foolish enough to believe every word that Homer wrote. For him the Iliad was a sober chronicle of fact, and the Odyssey a Baedeker. "Homer," he said in effect, "talks of golden cities and buried kings. They must be there. Let us read no more books but go and dig."

This prepossession of Schliemann's was no passing whim. It was part of the man. Few stories in the annals of archeology are more interesting than his, and we may be permitted to recall a few points in it.

His earliest years (he was born in 1822, in Mecklenburg-Schwerin) were passed in an atmosphere of romance. He delighted in legends, and his earliest enthusiasm was excited by the story of the fall of Troy. At the age of seven he had a passionate desire to visit the city of Priam. His playmates did not share his enthusiasm, and his only sympathizer was a little girl of his own age, one Minna Meincke, who promised to marry him one day and help him to discover Troy. As a matter of fact, when, nearly twenty years later, he was in a position to offer her his hand, he found that Minna had married another. When he was fourteen, family misfortunes compelled him to become a grocer's assistant. Yet it was in these unpromising circumstances that his passion for the language of Homer was first aroused. A miller's man who had taken to drink and come down in the world, walked into the shop one day and proceeded to recite a hundred lines of the Homer which he had learned in better days, "observing the rythmic cadence of the verses."

"Although I did not understand a syllable, the melodious sound of the words made a deep impression upon me, and I wept bitter tears over my unhappy fate. Three times over did I get him to repeat to me those divine verses, rewarding his trouble with three glasses of whiskey, which I bought with the few pence that made up my whole wealth. From that moment I never ceased to pray God that by His grace I might yet have the happiness of learning Greek."

The next years are a record of illness and destitution. He becomes a cabin-boy, is wrecked off the coast of Holland, and enters service as an errand-boy in a Dutch warehouse. He now proceeds to educate himself, and learns English and French in a twelvemonth; then Dutch, Spanish, Italian and Portuguese in the incredibly short space of six weeks each. Then we find him in Russia as a commercial agent. He finally founds a mercantile house of his own, and, owing to his superb talent for organization, creates an important business. By the year 1863 he finds himself possessed of a fortune which enables him to abandon commerce and devote himself entirely to his work of archeology.

The great work of his life, the excavation of Troy, was not begun until the year 1870. In the face of the best archeologists of the day, he decided that the ancient city must stand on the hill of Hissarlik, rather than near Bunarbashi, further inland. The event showed him to be right. After many months of patient labor, and in spite of a most overwhelming difficulty, he at last penetrated through the various layers of superincumbent cities, and found the ancient walls,

the great gate, and the countless gold ornaments of what he believed to be Priam's Troy. With regard to the gold ornaments (the great treasure) his method of procedure was characteristically direct. Observing one morning a faint glimmer of gold amid the excavations which were being conducted, he promptly ordered all the workmen off to their breakfast, and began to investigate on his own account with a large knife. His wife came to his assistance, and together they carried off the treasure in her shawl. He thus evaded his compact with the Turkish government, according to which half of any such find was to be surrendered to the authorities. The treasure is now safely housed in the museum at Berlin. Dr. Schliemann's comments on the whole transaction are delightfully naive. He had no more misgivings than had Aladdin. The treasure was saved to science. That was all! The Turkish Government, however, did not view the matter in the same spirit of scientific detachment. Schliemann had to pay 10,000 francs as compensation. And although he sent five times this sum as a *douceur* to the Ministry at Constantinople, he found his work henceforth much hampered by the authorities.

This was not the only way in which his naiveté proved an obstacle to the recognition of his great work. With child-like enthusiasm he persisted in giving Homeric names to his discoveries. His gold find was "Priam's Treasure," his entrance the "Skaian Gate," his largest building was "Priam's Palace." Archeologists replied with a peal of Homeric laughter, and the science of the spade fell into some disrepute.

In 1876 Dr. Schliemann, for whom Hissarlik was now too hot, began to dig for Agamemnon within the fortress of Mycenae. Here again archeology was against him. The graves of the house of Atreus, if anywhere, he was told, would be outside the citadel. For answer he unearthed the five rock-hewn graves, containing a number of corpses literally smothered in gold ornaments. Millionaire as he was, he had probably never before seen so much gold together. Gold goblets weighing four pounds, masks and breast-plates, diadems and bracelets of the same material, to say nothing of ivory, alabaster, bronze and silver,—all these may be seen in the Athens Polytechnicon to-day. A telegram from this Kaiser of archeology bore the message to King George of Greece, and reported that he had found "Agamemnon."

As usual the discovery raised more questions than it answered. When Schliemann, the following year, gave his account of all this to the world in his volume entitled *Mycenae*, a furious discussion

began to rage. The German, as usual, seized upon minute points of seeming connection between tradition and his discoveries. Was not the "half shut eye" of one of his male corpses (doubtless Agamemnon) due to the indecent haste with which Clytemnestra had him interred? Mr. Gladstone (who contributed the preface to the English edition of the work) was even more circumstantial than Schliemann, and transformed conjectures into certainties in a manner familiar to readers of his Homeric lucubrations. But the world was unconvinced, and the facial contortion of the corpse in question (due after all to the collapse of the grave-roof) was assumed by archeologists also, whenever the subject was mentioned. Yet sober critics to-day will allow that these graves are probably the very ones described by Pausanias; that is to say, they are the graves attributed by antiquity to the house of Atreus.

These, however, are academic questions. Of far more general interest was the broad fact that here was evidence for an early civilization of which the world had known nothing. Here was a beginning to Greece, and, in some sort, to Europe. For the objects rescued from the graves at Mycenae were quite unlike anything else with which archeologists were then familiar. This fact was clearly pointed out at the time by Charles Newton, whose essay on the subject is still worth reading, though it scarcely does justice to the undoubted artistic merits of many of the new treasures.

Efforts were of course made to find a lineage for these strange products. Stephani, a Russian archeologist, regarded them as Gothic work of the Third Century A. D. Others whispered Byzantine. But we may reserve our consideration of the artistic importance of these finds until we have seen something of the discoveries which followed.

When once the experts had been put, so to say, on the scent, certain other unconsidered trifles in the way of previous archeological finds began to have a new interest. The next field of excavation was the basement of the British Museum. There, accumulating dishonoured dust, were a number of objects which had been presented by Mr. Ruskin. They had been found by Mr. (later Sir) Alfred Biliotti in 1868, at Ialysos in Rhodes, but had been relegated to the cellars seemingly because they were so indecently abnormal. No self-respecting pottery with any creditable antecedents would, it was thought, indulge in the reckless polypes and fantastic algae which formed the decorations of these embarrassing aliens. But with the discoveries

of Schliemann came a day of deliverance. The vases were seen to connect with a very early and remarkable civilization, and they were installed with honor in the First Vase Room, where they may now be admired.

Henceforward the pace became hot, Schliemann himself remaining foremost in the field. Together with Dr. Dörpfeld he excavated at Tiryns, and unearthed a palace of which we shall presently have to speak. Dr. Dümmler (1886) went, spade in hand and Thucydides in pocket, to the Cyclades, bent on showing that (as Ross had insisted forty years earlier) the Carians were to be credited with the making of the earliest Aegean civilization—a supposition which, as we shall see, has since been rendered quite untenable. It soon became evident that Mycenae was more or less typical of a very wide and ancient civilization, and so, by an unfortunate accident, the name 'Mycenaean' came to be given to the whole type of products, of which in fact the finds at Mycenae itself were a somewhat provincial variation.

Remains conforming more or less to the new type were found all over Greece, and northwards into Central Europe. Egypt and Libya on the south, the Palestine coast to the east, and even western Italy and Sicily brought plentiful evidence in the same direction. It would take us too long even to give a complete list of the sites involved. We must be content to select a few items from it which are for various reasons specially significant.

Attica has proved especially rich in Mycenaean finds. At Menidi we are fortunate enough to find a continuous series of pottery ranging from true Mycenaean to the familiar red and black figured vases of classical times. Thoricus, again, connects the late Mycenaean with its earlier monochrome prototypes.

The Peloponnesus, too, is well represented. At Vaphio a bee-hive tomb was excavated in 1889, showing a *dromos* or approach nearly a hundred feet long, and containing a gold treasure which included the beautiful cups figured in so many school-books. These cups (exact replicas of which may be seen in an Oxford jeweler's window) represent scenes from a wild bull hunt, and are remarkable for their naturalistic strength of treatment, which marks them off at once from Egyptian or Assyrian workmanship. They show, too, a curious convention in the matter of perspective, —a kind of combination of elevation and plan. Thus the bull which would appear to stand on its head is to be conceived of as merely facing the observer; while the distant rocks are represented as hanging from the sky.

In Arcadia little has been found. Hence it would seem difficult to identify the Mycenaean people with the Pelasgians, as Prof. Ridgeway would have us do. For the tradition which makes the Arcadians to be pure Pelasgians is probably correct.

Aegina is interesting as the scene of another piece of archeological sleight-of-hand, similar to that which, as we have seen, was performed by Schliemann at Hissarlik. Visitors to the British Museum will find in the gold room a fine treasure which includes necklaces, diadems and rings, taken from a very late Mycenaean necropolis, explored some fifteen years ago. Besides some excellent Mycenaean work, it contains articles showing Egyptian influences, about which something will be said presently.

In Boeotia we have the great Orchomenos tomb, excavated by Schliemann in 1880, with its fifteen foot lintel-block still *in situ*. The tomb was known of old as the "Treasury of Minyas." Pausanias (in whose time the *tholos* was evidently open) calls it "not a whit less wonderful than the pyramids of Egypt." The beautiful schist ceiling bears a remarkable resemblance to known Egyptian work.

The Islands have yielded remarkably valuable treasures, far too numerous to be specified here. The graves in many of them show evidence of a civilization which, as Dr. Tsountas tells us, is scarcely to be distinguished in its fullest development from the Mycenaean. Melos has been the scene of remarkably successful explorations conducted by the British School at Athens. Mr. Cecil Smith, the then director, began to excavate at Phylakopi in 1896, and the results of the next few years' work were described in a handsome volume published in 1904. Four superincumbent settlements were found, the earliest going back to the very primitive times of rough incised pottery. Then appear regular buildings with plastered walls and stone thresholds and potteries painted a lustrous black. City walls appear at the third stage with painting on stucco and a naturalistic art treatment. Here we find the beautiful fresco representing flying fish (blue, yellow and black on a pale ground) executed with a delicacy and elusiveness which reminds us of Japanese work. The work of this period would appear to be genuine Melian. It is not till the fourth stage is reached that we get late Mycenaean work imported from abroad and driving out the native fabrics. We are thus carried back from late Mycenaean to a very early Cycladic civilization. As we shall see, Knossos was to carry back the story to still earlier times,

and to give points in the matter of antiquity even to the lowest strata of Hissarlik.

The chief importance of Melos in the ancient world arose from its practical monopoly of obsidian,—a volcanic glass, easily flaked, and hence much prized by a people with primitive resources for cutlery. It gives a capital edge, and is, we believe, used by barbers in South America to-day. At Melos it was stocked in cellars like coal, and exported in large quantities and to great distances. Obsidian, certainly from Melos, is found almost all over the eastern Mediterranean. The obsidian found in pre-dynastic Egypt, may possibly have the same origin. If so, Mediterranean commerce is taken back some fifty centuries before the Christian era.

About Thera (the "Beast Island") a perfect storm of controversy has raged. At some remote period, it was blown to pieces by a volcanic eruption. A French mission under M. Fouqué was sent there to investigate the matter in 1862. Under 30 feet of pumice were found many interesting objects, including vases of a form which would seem to be transitional between the primitive Aegean culture and the fully developed Mycenaean age. The question at once arises as to when the eruption took place. M. Fouqué puts it two thousand years before our era. Mr. Torr and others dissent with vigor. The question is not likely to be settled definitely, geological evidence in such matters being notoriously unreliable.

Cyprus contributes a most important series of links to the chain. Here again British explorers have been fortunate. At Enkomi (near the ancient Salamis, said to have been founded by Teucer) an ox while ploughing, put his foot into a Mycenaean tomb. Further investigations revealed about a hundred tombs. *Excavations in Cyprus*, published by the British Museum in 1900 is an eminently readable volume. The late Mr. A. S. Murray, who was in charge of the Enkomi excavations, there delivers himself of views which, if accepted, would result in the complete modification of generally adopted theories. The facts are simply these. Mr. Murray found a number of objects at Enkomi which could be demonstrably connected with eighth or seventh century work found elsewhere. Yet these objects are Mycenaean! Hence, he argued, we are not warranted in assuming an earlier date for the Mycenaean civilization elsewhere. With this question we shall deal presently. It will suffice to say here that the comparatively late date of Mycenaean objects found in Cyprus is explained by the fact that this civilization only reached the island

at a late period of its development, and lingered on there after it had practically disappeared elsewhere. The Dorian incubus never settled on Cyprus, and the Mycenaean imported styles ran on until they were corrupted into the strange *Mischkultur* half oriental, half Greek, which has been such a puzzle to archeologists.

Asia Minor is curiously destitute of Mycenaean remains. Not so, however, Syria, where we find genuine importations side by side with the botched spirals and clumsy forms which tell of native imitations. The same may be said, in the opposite direction, of the shores of the Adriatic, where we find daughter-schools of Mycenaean art as well as actual Mycenaean remains. Sicily, Sardinia and even Spain show a similar influence, and connections have been found with early Libya.

We have yet to speak of two of the most important fields of Mycenaean exploration, viz. Egypt and Crete. The former has enabled us to construct Mycenaean chronology; the latter has supplied some of the most admirable art products as well as very striking evidence of the continuity of the Mycenaean tradition.

When Mr. Flinders Petrie first announced from Egypt that he, too, had found pottery belonging to the newly discovered type, a fresh stage in the history of archeology may be said to have been reached. The Mycenaean treasures, like dead men, had told no tales. They bore no direct evidence of their date But found in conjunction with Egyptian remains, of which the dates were ascertained with tolerable accuracy, they might enable us to reckon the periods at which they were made.

And so the event has proved. There is abundant evidence to show that one great period of the Mycenaean development corresponded with the XVIIIth Egyptian dynasty (c 1700 to 1400 B. C.). Thus at Tel-el-Amarna (a town which we know to have been abandoned after the XVIIIth Dynasty) there is a vast rubbish-heap some hundreds of feet in diameter and averaging a foot deep. It probably contains about twenty million sherds. Scattered among these have been found over thirteen hundred pieces of Aegean pottery, about a hundred of which bear an actual date. Another striking piece of evidence is that afforded by the famous Rekhmara tomb (Tothmes III, c. 1600 B. C.) where we find unmistakable representations of Mycenaean objects brought as tribute by "the nobles of Keftiu and the islands in the midst of the very green." Scarabs, again, of Amenhotep III and his wife Thii have been found at Ialysos and Mycenae

respectively. And so of numerous other correspondences. For this date then the evidence is overwhelming. It represents a somewhat decadent stage of Mycenaean art.

Another Egyptian dynasty also closely connected with the Mycenaean civilization is the XIIth (c. 2500 B. C.) as we may see at Kahun and elsewhere. Before this the evidence is less satisfactory. Certain objects at Knossos would appear to take us back to the IVth Dynasty, and Mr. Petrie has found vase fragments which certainly belong to the 1st Dynasty (4600 B. C.), and which are, he contends, of undoubted Aegean manufacture, though we think it possible that they may be referred to Syria. Passing now to later times we find Mycenaean objects which may be correlated with all the Dynasties from the XVIIIth to the XXVth,—thus bringing us to the year 700 B. C. (the Cyprian evidence proving especially valuable for the later years) and connecting us with a series of datable Dipylon vases.

We have to conclude that there was a considerable amount of intercourse between the Egyptians and the Mycenaeans, especially at certain periods. Dr. Evans contends that a direct sea route between Egypt and Crete existed at the time of the XIIth Dynasty. Others think that communication must have been effected by coasting. What is certain is that the Mycenaeans were not merely importers of Egyptian goods, or slavish copyists of Egyptian models. The Aegean civilization was vigorous enough to assimilate all that it took.

The last page of this record of discovery has been nearly as exciting as the first. It was in 1900 that Mr. Arthur Evans purchased land at Knossos in Crete, attracted thither by the find of some steatite bead-seals with linear characters. By degrees a great palace came to light, and every year since then has brought its revelations. We have yet to wait for Mr. Evans' book on the subject, but he has already given a full description of his finds year by year in the "Annals of the British School at Athens," and elsewhere. His lectures, delivered from to time time at Oxford, in which he has narrated the progress of his work, and illustrated it by lantern slides, awakened an amount of interest in the University which will long be remembered. The general results are beginning to filter into school-books and manuals and there is no need to summarise them here. It will be enough to select a few features which may illustrate the connection of this strange civilization with historic Greece, and thus with ourselves.

And first as to the general unity of these Knossian finds. Taken in conjunction with discoveries elsewhere they cover an immensely

long period of artistic development, and show how, out of the primitive culture common to the whole of the Mediterranean and far beyond it, there developed in the Aegean basin alone highly elaborate and specialised forms of workmanship. We are able to trace, with the ascending strata, the progress from the sun-baked and entirely undecorated mud-pie to the most gorgeously coloured and gracefully shaped vase. We begin in the lowest strata at Knossos with neolithic deposits, anterior to the influence of metal shapes or other cyladic features. At this stage we find no walls at all. We are taken on without a break to the sub-neolithic deposits and here find, for the first time, a correspondence with early Cycladic ceramics, viz. the chalk-filled incisions on a dark hand-polished ground, and also typical early metallic forms. It would seem from this that Crete takes us much further back than do even the lowest strata at Hissarlik and that the Aegean civilization was created by native neolithic people, and not by immigrants from Caria, as Thucydides has led some to suppose. The excavations of Messrs. Myres and Paton have left no doubt on the latter score. Caria has nothing of importance to show for itself before the seventh century B. C. The Carian thalattocracy succeeded the Mycenaean, and itself disappeared during the later part of the sixth century. Its historical importance in the Ionic revolt and the Delian League, together with Thucydides' vague statements about the contents of the Delian graves have sadly misled archologists. It is now clear that the Carians were responsible neither for the early Aegean nor for the later Mycenaean civilization.

It is interesting to watch the development of pottery forms in these early days. The artist, as we have said, begins with mere scratches. For these he sometimes substitutes strips of clay which he works on as ornament. Early attempts at spirals take the form of rude concentric circles.[1] He tries his hand at marble, too, but works under the influence of pottery forms at which he is gradually becoming expert. Indeed, few peoples have known better than those old Greek workmen what are the possibilities of clay. Their vessels combine qualities which are often sadly to seek in the modern milk-jug. They stand firmly, hang gracefully, and pour out without spilling. They contain the maximum of capacity with the minimum

[1]It has been thought until lately that the spiral form was derived from Egypt, where it is found in great abundance during the XII dynasty. It is now probable that we should look in the direction of Butmir, and some interesting evidence from South Russia is adduced by Mr. Evans.

of weight. This last feature has given rise to a curious delusion. It was long thought that the clay of which they were made was of a specially light weight. This is not the case. But the vessels have a bulgy look and suggest the idea that they must be full of liquid. We consequently expect to find them heavy when we lift them up, and our muscular association misleads us into saying that they are made of a light clay.

The next step in development is the advent of the potter's wheel. A revolution of forms now takes place; and we get symmetry about an axis. The comfortable and convenient shapes of the homely old vessels now disappear, as usual, with the progress of mechanical contrivance. A third advance is the application of paint, the varieties of which would fill a volume. We can do no more than select a few examples, typical of different stages.

Strikingly beautiful is the Kamares ware, named after a cave in Crete, but found in different parts of the island. This is the old common Cretan ware, later driven out by the Mycenaean properly so called. Its makers are evidently familiar with metal-working, as appears from their treatment of both form and design, the latter being executed in a dull powdery white or red on a black glaze background. These vases are often as thin as egg-shell, and some of them anticipate the later Mycenaean forms, and furnish another proof of the unity which pervades the whole series.

At the west court of the palace Mr. Evans found an extraordinarily interesting series of pottery forms. By careful comparison with other finds we are able to classify the various strata. At the bottom we have some six metres of neolithic remains. Above these we may mark half a dozen distinct steps of development, all coming under the generic name of Minoan, and including some remarkably handsome types. We see enormous *pithoi* which might have served to conceal the forty thieves. Some of the polychrome work of this period is incredibly beautiful. We find a fresh and sympathetic naturalism here which will attract many minds far more than do the products of classical Greece. Their appeal is direct.

The Mycenaean style, properly so called, is marked by a lustrous glaze not to be found outside the Mediterranean area. Here again there are subdivisions with which we shall not trouble the reader. The point to notice is that it grows out of the Minoan, and in its turn, has connections with the Dipylon period, as may be seen in the famous Warrior vase, figured in so many school-books, and dear to the juvenile

reader by reason of the exaggerated noses of the warriors thereon depicted. By this time we are within shouting distance of early Hellas.

The points, then, to notice are first the continuous evolution of the whole series, and secondly the realism and vigor which characterizes it, especially at the Minoan stage, thus marking it off from the products of the Egyptian or the eastern mind. We are eye to eye with the artist always and never feel baffled. The roots of European art, we feel, are here.

Yet it must be admitted that, if we isolate an earlier step of this development and confront it with the art of Classical Greece, we are struck by the dissimilarity. It is only when we take a general view of the whole series that we grasp its essential unity. The fact is that we are now called upon to give a considerable extension to our connotation of the term "Greek art." Hitherto we have been tempted to reject as un-Greek anything that did not conform to the highly elaborate classical canons. Hence it is not surprising that when isolated specimens of Mycenaean art were first discovered, they were ruled out of court and dubbed Phenician, Carian, Byzantine as the case might be.

We now have to remember that the classical canons refer only to a small and highly specialized section of Greek art—to a time when, by a singular combination of circumstances, a dozen different influences combined to produce a single type,—a type of singular value, it is true, but still a narrow type, highly idealized and, to Philistine ways of thinking, somewhat chilling. Certain elements were left out in this classical mixture for which some of us have a sneaking preference. Thus Mr. Chesterton complains that "the conception of physical beauty has been narrowed down to mean a certain kind of physical beauty which no more exhausts the possibilities of external attractiveness than the respectability of a Clapham builder exhausts the possibilities of moral attractiveness." "It is extraordinary," he observes, "to watch the gradual emasculation of the monsters of Greek myth under the pestilent influence of the Apollo Belvedere. The chimæra was a creature of whom any healthy minded people would have been proud: but when we see it in Greek pictures we feel inclined to tie a ribbon round its neck and give it a saucer of milk."

Mr. Chesterton would be reassured if he would study some Mycenaean types. We recommend the eerie decorations of the Ialysos

vases, or the truculent bulls of the Mycenaean artists. For an unidealized type of physical beauty he may study the frescoes of Mycenaean ladies, dressed in Parisian fashion and evidently gossiping with all the *abandon* of the Pioneer Club.

Indeed, certain features of this early civilisation seem to be more directly related to ourselves than to the Classical Greeks. On looking at some of their spiral work, for instance, we find it strangely familiar. "Why, it is simply Keltic!" we cry. And so it may be. For a branch of the Keltic stock came, during the course of its wanderings, into contact with the Illyrian or Venetic culture, itself imbued with Mycenaean tradition. And so the old Greek motives, the returning spiral, the triquetra and the like, passed to the Belgae, and thence to the British islands, where, being imitated by native workmen, they became part of our own tradition. This is but one example of the way in which our civilisation has its roots in an Aegean culture scores of centuries old.

We might know considerably more of this extraordinary people if we could read their script. Examples of it are abundant enough. Knossos produced scores of clay tablets bearing outlandish characters, some of them resembling fantastic vegetables, to say nothing of engraved seal-stones and the like. Moreover we distinguish two varieties of script, one pictographic and the other linear. The latter again is subdivided into an earlier and a later variety. But here our knowledge stops. All attempts to puzzle out the scripts have failed, although the problem has been approached from many sides. Klüge has in vain endeavoured to connect these signs with the Greek alphabet. Hittite offers no assistance; Hieratic Egyptian has been thought to be more suggestive. We must hope for another Rosetta stone.

Mr. Evans' discoveries illustrate in a very striking manner the value and methods of what has been called the lesser archeology, or, as Mr. Hogarth puts it, "the science of the treatment of the material remains of the human past." It cannot give us history: this requires literary documents. But it can supplement history to a very remarkable extent. Egyptian remains without Manetho are comparatively uninstructive: but Manetho has gained much additional value from the study of the remains. We need not discard our Thucydides for potsherds, but our potsherds may throw much light on Thucydides. In the present case, indeed, one side of the equation is missing. We have no Mycenaean Manetho, though Homer, as we shall see,

might put in a shadowy claim to the title. Yet, though we have not a Mycenaean history, we know much of the Mycenaeans, and this is due, in great part, to the perfection which archeological methods have reached of recent years. Schliemann was after all, an inspired vandal. He made for striking results and dramatic discoveries, driving relentlessly through anything which he considered to be lacking in interest. To modern excavators nothing is lacking in interest. Every fragment of pottery is carefully preserved and tabulated, and many of the most sensational generalisations have been arrived at from a mass of evidence each fragment of which, taken by itself, was as dull as ditchwater.

What, then, is the upshot of all this spade-work? Simply this, that we have to prefix to our history of Europe a new chapter which covers a longer period of time than that which has elapsed from the days of Pericles to our own age. If this chapter cannot yet be written at least we have the materials for it. We know that the Mediterranean area was first covered with a neolithic civilisation bearing many points of resemblance to that found elsewhere, as, for instance, in early Italy. From this there sprang a slowly differentiating type of culture, centred chiefly in Crete and mid Aegean, and employing copper in various distinctive ways. At the next stage copper suddenly gives place to bronze, a change which is accompanied by a rapid increase of gold, and the development of new house and tomb types, the old cist-graves being reinforced by spacious chamber-tombs. The centre of gravity has now shifted from Crete to the mainland, though the Minoan dynasty long survives its neighbors. This new period (Mycenaean in the narrower sense of the term) is marked moreover by a coarsening of the art styles. Naturalism declines and a fussy Georgian spirit is abroad. The Lords of the Mediterranean have taken to commerce, it seems, and decorate their palaces with objects of which we are sometimes inclined to say as did Mr. Walter Pater to a lady who showed him an ornate wedding present, compact of ormolu and malachite: "Oh, very rich, very handsome, very expensive, I am sure. *But they mustn't make any more of them.*"

But retribution followed, as it must always follow a surrender of ideals, and a preference for expensive luxuries. The northerner was coming down with *iron weapons*! The lean and wiry hound, as Plato would say, was going to try conclusions with the overfed house dog. The result was a foregone conclusion. The brilliant civilisation of the southerners was simply knocked to pieces. A

great wedge was driven through it from the north west, and a huddled mass of fugitives scattered to Rhodes and Cyprus and elsewhere to carry on their tradition awhile as best they might, and afterwards to return to Greece, and add their indispensable contribution to the mixture out of which was to crystallize the classical Greek style. Meanwhile the invader had played the part of the bull in the Mycenaean china shop. He had conquered because he possessed a superior weapon-material. Iron, as usual, had driven out bronze. And it is probable that he had little use for the luxurious apartments and appurtenances which his foe had just deserted. The break was complete,—for the first time in the history of the Aegean. The newcomer realized the fact,—realized, too, that he must keep his hardihood and wiry vigour if he was to retain his new territory, so he covered the ruins up discreetly, and begged his kinsfolk not to mention them again. Some vestiges of this instinctive aversion to southern culture may be traced in the history of Sparta. The 'Lycurgan' rhetrae against written laws and coined money seem to point to a people who fought shy of the outward signs of the Mycenaean spirit. Their enemies used writing in abundance: they would not thus sophisticate themselves. Or perhaps they thought, with Plato, that to write laws makes laws unstable:—what has been codified may be recodified—and it is better to depend on ethos. As to the coined money,—well! there was no coin in those early days, but there was gold and silver in the lump which was used as a medium of exchange, and the Dorian may have dreaded its sophisticating influence. So again of the Lycurgan injunction about using only the axe and the saw in building. It was a protest against the elaborate architecture of the people who had gone under.

Yet in spite of this self-denying ordinance, the new masters must have let their imaginations wander among the Mycenaean remains which they were so anxious to ignore. Thus it was, perhaps, that they told of the deeds of violence and mystery which had been enacted amid those splendid scenes. The Knossian palace with its many corridors and frequent symbol of the double axe (λαβρυς) became the Labyrinth, where the Minotaur (yes, they had seen it on the frescoed walls) waited for his horrid meal.

Conquerer and conquered, indeed, had markedly different types of mind. The Mycenaean looked at man as *in* nature (κατα φυσιν): his art was naturalistic, and he clung to the world. It was a garden of sunshine to him. His culture led him to glorify the body and the strong

brilliant qualities which the Homeric heroes admired. He loved the visible and palpable, and disliked a mystery. When he died he was put in a spacious chamber, with his worldly gear all about him. The body was clung to till the last.

The northerner who came down upon him was supra-sensuous and rugged. His old men dreamed dreams and his young men saw visions. He delighted in symbol, in geometric art. He practised a strict *askesis*. He burned his dead, despising the earthly clay from which the imprisoned spirit had escaped. Man to him was *above* nature. Mr. Pater, in his fascinating essay on Lacedaimon, would have us believe that the Spartan combined with his austerity all the Athenian sensibility to nature. Had this been the case, Plato need not have written his Republic, but might have achieved his purpose by transferring the Academy to Lacedaimon. For this was just Plato's quest,—how he might infuse into the languishing city-state some of the spiritual virility of Dorianism. He saw the danger of the Ionic fluidity and versatility,—the Heracleitean flux by which public life and private morality were disintegrating in Athens.

This double strain never really fused. In later days we get Stoics and Epicureans who, though they often end in substantial agreement, start from opposite premisses,—the one striving to be-above nature, the other eager to take all the honey that nature gives. It has persevered still, that duel of North and South, and we see its antagonism in the European mind to-day.

We left Pericles standing upon his library pediment while we offered some reflections upon the archeology of early Greece. To Pericles himself all these discoveries would have been vastly interesting; for he, poor soul, must have dismissed as Phenician or Cyclopean such Mycenaean remains as he was acquainted with. We may imagine that his first thought would be to question Homer (also on the pediment) and to ask how much the blind poet knew of all this. Was he the Walter Scott of his generation, vividly reconstructing a romantic past which he had never seen, but of which the traditions still lingered? Or did he (as Schliemann thought) actually live among the surroundings which he described?

It is here, perhaps, that the controversial battle rages most fiercely. On the one hand there are many striking coincidences between the civilisation uncovered by the spade and that described by Homer. Yet, on the other, there would seem to be many important divergencies.

The classical Greeks seem to have regarded Homer's civilisation as very similar to their own. On their vases they paint Homeric heroes arrayed in fifth century hoplite armor. This, of course, proves nothing. The tendency in art to provide the ancients with modern accessories is universal. We need not go beyond the stage-directions of Shakespeare for illustrations.

Now if we take a glance at the two civilisations,—Mycenaean and Hellenic,—we shall find it difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Homeric period belongs to the former rather than to the latter. Take, for instance, the matter of geography. The centres which were important in Mycenaean days are just the places with which Homer was familiar. He knows of towns which had lost their importance in Hellenic days, such as Egyptian Thebes and Bœotian Orchomenos. He says little or nothing of places which only became prominent in Hellenic times,—Athens, Bœotian Thebes, Hellenic Sicily, Ionia. He makes Miletus a Carian town. He has nothing to say about the Cyclades. His geography, of course, presents its difficulties, (where, for instance, is his Ithaca?) but if it corresponds to any known stage of ethnic distribution, that stage is the Mycenaean.

Or again, take the plan of the conventional and hellenized 'Homeric' house as found, say, in Sir Richard Jebb's book on Homer, and put by the side of it the ground plan of the palaces found at Tiryns and Mycenae. Then take the poems and see how the story of Odysseus' revenge on the suitors will work out, according as it is supposed to take place in the one type of dwelling or in the other. The present writer can testify by experience to the excellent training in method and the increased interest both in Homer and in archeology which may be afforded to a class of young students by such an experiment. It will be found that, were the scenes enacted in Professor Jebb's house, the characters would have to perform feats resembling that which Mr. Sam Weller very reasonably regarded as impossible, namely direct vision through walls and staircases. Mr. J. L. Myres has worked out the whole question very admirably in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies* (vol. xx).

We might illustrate this point at length from the armor, the dress, the art, and other matters wherein striking parallels between the Mycenaean and the Homeric civilisation may be traced. In two points,—religion and the disposal of the dead,—we find serious divergencies between the two. These divergencies however are not

as absolute as might be supposed, though space prevents our discussing them here.

The general trend of the evidence, then, would seem to be towards the conclusion that the Homeric poems were, in the main at least, composed within a few generations of the last great period of Mycenaean civilisation. It was still possible, when these poems were written, to reconstruct from tradition a picture of the culture which knew the court-yard house, the inlaid metal-work, the big shield, and the like, without being altogether distracted by the new Dorian régime. We may feel fairly confident that in reading our Homer we are reading a substantially accurate account of a period which marked the decline of a long civilisation.

The establishing of such a connexion is of value to the "lesser archeologist," for the written text may help to elucidate or to supplement the material remains. To the Homeric student the interest is even greater, for he may now reconstruct Homeric palace and gear and furniture with far greater probability than formerly. We do not now think of Achilles' shield as Flaxman portrayed it. We have seen something like Nestor's cup with the doves atop. The Homeric helmet with projecting tubes we picture from the Warrior vase. Crete gives us the "mulberry earrings," an ornament at which our imagination had previously boggled. And so of numerous other instances where the Homeric student is enabled to focus many of his pictures after a walk through the Athens Museum.

But even to the general reader who is neither an expert archeologist nor a minute reader of the text of Homer, the points of resemblance between the results of spade work and book work cannot fail in this case to be of deep interest. The material remains of the men who made Western civilisation have now been uncovered: and if Homer helps us to interpret these remains, then we are at once allowed a deeper insight into those fundamental characteristics which mark us off from Japanese and Jew. We are enabled to trace, in some sort, the workings of that distinctive type of mind which has elaborated our complex civilisation. We may see our institutions at their birth, our art in its inception. The knowledge thus gained is not merely interesting as a piece of anthropology. It is interesting and vitally important as a condition of solidarity and progress. It is our proper study, and one which we are most concerned to pursue. If we would live we must understand ourselves: and we cannot understand ourselves unless we see how we began. After all, cosmopoli-

tanism is not life. Cosmopolitanism is of the nature of the boundless, the formless, whereas life is always sharply defined. To be cosmopolitan is to cultivate a negative and barren spirit, and in so far to be narrow-minded. The broad-minded man is the man who studies his limitations. The nation which endeavours to adopt foreign methods without reference to its own past is a narrow-minded nation. And our specific type of Western civilisation as a whole can only realize itself by attending to the lines along which it has already developed.

CHARLES PLATER.

THE DATE OF THE EXODUS

F. Hugh Pope, O. P.

This is a familiar Biblical problem, and is often said to be quite as insoluble as the details of the route adopted by the Israelites in their migration to Canaan.

Ever since the days of Bunsen a view has been current which now finds a place in nearly every work treating of the subject. Bunsen conjectured that Rameses II was the Pharaoh of the oppression, and his son, Merenptah, the Pharaoh of the Exodus. There was certain *prima facie* evidence in favor of this view. Rameses was one of the greatest builders amongst the Pharaohs, and hence, would have employed the *corvée* on a large scale; he also reigned an exceptionally long time, sixty-seven years, and thus fulfilled the requirements of the story in Exodus, where we read that "after a long time the King of Egypt died,"[1] thus enabling Moses to return from the land of Madian, where, according to St. Stephen he had sojourned forty years. Two subsequent discoveries tended to corroborate this view. In 1883, M. Naville began his excavations at Tell el-Mashkuta, and found that the name of the place had originally been Pi-Tum, "the abode of Tum," and was thus to be identified with the Pithom of Exod. i, 11 which with Ramesses was one of the "store-cities" built for the oppressor by the Israelites.

The second discovery was that of the mummies of all the important kings of the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth dynasties: one only was missing, and that was the mummy of Merenptah.[2] It was felt by many that a curious confirmation was thus afforded of the supposed destruction of the Pharaoh in the Red Sea, though it should be noted that the Bible does not explicitly state that the Pharaoh himself was drowned. Groff, however, believed at the time of the discovery, that a mummy supposed to be that of Akhenaten or Amenophis IV, was really that of Merenptah, and this is now, we believe, the generally accepted view.[3]

But if this identification of Rameses II and Merenptah with the Pharaohs of the oppression and the Exodus respectively, be adopted,

[1]Exodus ii, 23.

[2]*Egypt Explor. Report* for 1897-8, p. 18.

[3]Petrie, *History*, vol. iii, p. 104

a grave chronological difficulty at once presents itself. The nineteenth dynasty is computed to have lasted from approximately B. C. 1328-1202, and Rameses II is stated to have reigned from 1300-1234, and his son, Merenptah, from 1234-1214. We should be obliged then to put the Exodus about 1230 B. C. But the Biblical scheme of chronology would put it in 1491 B. C. Most Egyptologists disregard the Biblical chronology and decline to be influenced by it in any way, and this is quite intelligible when it is a question of a few years only. Here, however, it is a question of 260 years, and consequently of a complete dislocation, not merely of the whole scheme of Biblical chronology up to Solomon's reign, but also of the main events which are assigned to the period between the Exodus and the reign of Solomon. It becomes impossible to fit them in.

Three possible courses are open to us, and we must perforce choose one. (1) We may surrender the Biblical chronology. (2) We may refuse to pin our faith to the dates assigned by Eygptologists to the nineteenth dynasty. (3) We may decline to see in Rameses and Merenptah the Pharaohs of the oppression and the Exodus.

We shall take these three positions in order, and shall endeavor to show that (a) the Biblical chronology has at least for this period, good claims to be considered sound. (b) That the commonly accepted Egyptian chronology though also probably sound, yet needs in places considerable modifications; (c) that even with these modifications the dates assigned to the nineteenth dynasty are irreconcilable with the period of the oppression and the Exodus. Finally, we shall endeavor to assign a likely period in Egyptian history for the events described in the last chapters of Genesis, and the opening portion of Exodus.

The question of Biblical chronology has always been a vexed one; everybody knows, for example, that it is impossible in the present condition of the text to make the two series of kings in Judah and Israel dovetail into one another. No one questions the corrupted state of the text in certain places, and it is generally conceded that the Septuagint and the Massoretic text have, at least in the earlier portions, independent systems of dating. But even after all such allowances have been made, we think we can give good ground for holding to the chronology afforded us for the period between Solomon and the Exodus, and this is really the point at issue.

In III Kings vi, 1, we find the emphatic statement: "And it came to pass in the four hundred and eightieth year after the children

of Israel came out of the land of Egypt, in the fourth year of the reign of Solomon over Israel, in the month Zio (the same is the second month), he began to build a house to the Lord."

The statement is precise and detailed. Have we any reason to question it? No variants are recorded.[4] Whatever view we may hold as to the date of the composition of the books of Kings this date will remain one of the earliest explicit statements we have. And it is corroborated in a way which seems to compel our assent. Jephte (Jud. xi, 26), says that Israel has been in possession of the land East of Jordan three hundred years; in other words, that three hundred years have elapsed since the death of Moses. If this statement and that of III Kings vi, 1 quoted above are correct, one hundred and eighty years will cover the period between Jephte and the fourth year of Solomon's reign. Now the definite periods which are indicated during that time are:

Jephte	6 years.	.....	Jud. xii, 7.
Abesan	7 "	.....	" xii 9.
Ahialon	10 "	.....	" xii, 11.
Abdon	8 "	.....	" xii, 13.
Apostasy	40 "	.....	" xiii, 2.
Samson	20 "	.....	" xv, 20; xvi, 31.
Eli	40 "	.....	I Sam. iv, 18.
Samuel	(?) 30 "	.....	" " vii, 2.
Saul			
David	40 "	.....	II Sam. v, 4.
Solomon	4 "	.....	III Kings vi, 1.

This means 205 years exclusive of Saul, to whom 40 years are allotted in Acts xiii, 21, thus bringing up the total to 237 years. With-

[4]Critics have expended a great deal of ingenuity over this verse. The Septuagint has misplaced it and Wellhausen (Die Composition des Hexateuchs und der historischen Bücher des A. T., 1889. p. 267) takes advantage of this fact to argue that it is the work of a later editor. He supports his view by the fact that in this verse a different word חדש is used for "month," whereas in vv. 37-38, which he with the Septuagint would put in the place of v. 1 of the Massoretic text, the word ירח is used. Others v. g. Bertheau and Noeldeke, argue that the number 480 is artificial and really made up of 40 multiplied by 12, viz. "twelve generations." Burney (Notes on the Hebrew Text of the Book of Kings, p. 60. Oxford, 1903) suggests in all seriousness that since the total of the reign of the kings of Judah as given by RD amounts to 430 and with the additional 50 (sic) years of the Exile to 480, the compilers endeavored to make the sum of the years between the Exodus and the foundation of the temple equal to the total of years between the latter date and the Restoration. The ingenuity is amazing and so is the criticism!

out entering into a detailed discussion of the precise significance of the term 40 years in the Bible, where it undoubtedly stands at times for anything above 20 years,[5] it is not difficult to bring this number down approximately to the figures demanded by Jud. xi, 26 and III Kings vi, 1. Samuel and Saul partly coincided, and the same may be said of Samuel and Eli. It is highly probable, too, that some of the judges were contemporaneous. But what is of importance for us to note is that nothing leads us to suppose that III Kings vi, 1 errs on the side of exaggeration. Josephus[6] makes the number still larger, and S. Paul,[7] if we accept the reading of the *Cod. Bezæ*, Gig. and the Syriac text, makes the period of the Judges cover 450 years approximately. Yet on the view that the dates assigned by Egyptologists are correct, and that Merenptah was really the Pharaoh of the Exodus, we should have to reduce the period of the Judges to considerably under two hundred years.

It might be argued, however, that it is rather the date of Solomon which should be brought lower. But this we cannot do. Up till recent years the chronological data of the Bible had to rest on their own intrinsic probability, but thanks to modern discoveries they can now be quite satisfactorily checked at certain definite points. According to IV Kings xvii Samaria was besieged by the Assyrians, and the date of its capture falls, according to the data deducible from the text, in the year 721 B. C. Again, according to III Kings xiv, 25, Roboam was defeated in his fifth year by Sesac, King of Egypt. Here we have two events separated from each other by a distance of more than two centuries, for the fifth year of Roboam would be 970 B. C. Now both these dates can be checked, the former by Assyrian history, the latter by Egyptian. If these two extrinsic sources of information corroborate the Bible account, it follows in the first place, that the Biblical system of chronology is guaranteed, and in the second place, that Solomon's reign must approximately, at least, have occurred at the time commonly assigned to it, viz. between 1015 and 975 B. C.

The testimony of Assyriologists regarding the date of the fall of Samaria may be regarded as practically unanimous. It coincided with the accession of Sargon, who succeeded Salmaneser IV. This event is referred by all to the year 722 or 721 B. C. In George Smith's *Eponym Canon* will be found a series of attempted chronological

[5]For a full discussion see Sayce *Early History of the Hebrews*, p. 450 ff.
[6]*Antiquit.* VIII, iii, 1 and X, viii, 5.
[7]Acts xiii, 20.

schemes put forward by the then leading Assyriologists, and though they all differ in various points, they all agree as to the date of the capture of Samaria by Sargon. But 722-721 B. C. is also the date assigned to this event by the Bible.

The second instance mentioned was the capture of Jerusalem by Sesac, in the fifth year of Roboam, son of Solomon. Sesac is unanimously accepted as Shashang, the first king of the twenty-second dynasty, for the Hebrew form of the name is Shishak. This Pharaoh has left us a record of his invasion of Palestine. On the southern wall of the temple of Amen at Karnak is engraved a gigantic figure of Shishag striking his foes; a list follows of one hundred and fifty-six captured towns and districts, many of which are Palestinian. Jerusalem is not mentioned, but it may well have been named in the portions of the list now mutilated.[8]

According to Petrie the twenty-second dynasty lasted from about 952 to 749 B. C. Shishag was its first king, and Petrie maintains that he cannot be put earlier than the year 952. The Bible would put the date of his capture of Jerusalem in the year 970, B. C. Without insisting on the fact that the Egyptologist's dates are by no means certain, we claim that they corroborate very fairly indeed the dates assigned by the Bible to Solomon and his son Roboam. Taking this in conjunction with the date of the fall of Samaria, we may well ask why we should deny all value to the Biblical declaration that three hundred years elapsed between the death of Moses and the time of Jephte. But it might be reasonably argued that if we use the dates afforded by Egyptologists to confirm the Biblical dates, we ought also to reverse the position and allow that the Biblical dates confirm those arrived at by Egyptologists. This is perfectly reasonable, but it is always hard to understand why the assumption that the Bible is an inspired book challenging disproof should make scientific investigators so often forget that it is also a literary monument, and that its value as such is quite equal to that of monuments and inscriptions. When the Bible and the monuments corroborate each other their mutual testimony is a strong argument for the truth of their statements, but when the monuments contradict the Bible, we should not at once jump to the conclusion that the Bible is wrong. After all, it may not be so much the monuments which contradict the Bible as our decipherment (often only tentative) of the monu-

[8]Driver, *Archæology and Authority*, p 87.

ments which contradicts our interpretation (often short-sighted) of the biblical narrative.

The date assigned to the nineteenth dynasty is, as we have seen, 1328-1202 B. C., and the Exodus would, if it took place during this dynasty, have to be assigned to about the year 1230 B. C. But the Bible, and we have twice tested its chronology, refers it to about 1490. It seems to us that the only logical course is to argue that the Exodus did not take place under this dynasty. The two main arguments relied on by those who uphold the view that Rameses II was the Pharaoh of the oppression are, as already mentioned, the length of his reign, sixty-seven years, which would thus concur with the periods of Moses' life, as mapped out by S. Stephen; and the discovery of Pithom bearing the same name as the store-city built by the Hebrews and declared by M. Naville, its explorer, to have been founded by Rameses II. And amongst negative arguments which appear to favor this view, may be placed the fact that in the great Hittite campaign conducted by Rameses II no mention is made of Israel.

But against this view there are certain facts which, taken singly, might be discounted; but which, taken together, seem to us to afford a very strong argument for pushing back the story of the Exodus to the period indicated by the Bible.

The facts are the following: In May, 1896, Mr. Flinders Petrie announced that he had discovered in the temple of Merenptah at Thebes, the largest stela yet known. Originally inscribed by Amenophis III with an account of the offerings he had made to Amen, it had been utilized by Merenptah to inscribe on the other side a Hymn of Victory over the Libyan confederacy, which it is well known had swooped down upon Egypt in the fifth year of his reign, viz. 1230 B. C. The flight of the Prince of Libya, the head of the confederacy, is thus described:

> "They were come, their face in front;
> They were turned backward.
> Their legs did not stay firm, but fled;
> The archers threw their bows away.
>
> "The wretched conquered Prince of Libya fled,
> Under cover of the night
> Alone, without the plume upon his head."

A list of conquered peoples and places follow, and among them we read of the Kheta, of Ascalon, Gezer and Yenoam. The last lines read:

> "The people of Israel is laid waste—their crops are not;
> Khor (Palestine) has become as a widow for Egypt"

The above is Spiegelberg's translation.[9] It should be noted that though the word rendered Israel is, when transliterated, *Ysiraar*, yet it has the determinative before it which signifies a people, not a country, and that it is much more like the word Israel than would at first appear, for the last portion—*aar* is transliterated—*el*, in several words.[10]

Petrie's own comment is interesting: "The name of the people of Israel here is very surprising in every way: it is the only instance of the name Israel on any monument, and it is four centuries before any mention of the race in cuneiform: it is clearly outside of our literary information, which has led to the belief that there were no Israelites in Palestine between the going into Egypt and the entry at Jericho; whereas here are Israelites mentioned with Yenuamu in North Palestine at a time which must be while the historic Israel was outside of Palestine. The only likely conclusion is that there were others of the tribe left behind, or immediately returning, at the time of the famine; and that these kept up the family traditions about sites which were known in later times."

Are we expected to accept this? Supposing a document dating from, let us say the eighth century B. C., were found to state that the Exodus took place in 1500 B. C., would not every archeologist jump at it? Yet no sane critic will deny that at least two of the documents from which the Pentateuch is maintained to have been formed were in existence in the eighth century, and their testimony to this date is repeated again and again, indeed the early books of the Bible are practically incomprehensible without it.

The story of the Tell el-Amarna Tablets is too familiar to be told here. Briefly, they contain a large number of letters dating from Palestine, Babylonia, and what we may, roughly speaking, term Mesopotamia. These letters are written to the reigning King of Egypt, and may be divided into three classes: (a) the Royal letters, viz. those from the kings of Mitanni, Alashiya, and Babylonia, to the Kings of Egypt; (b) the letters from the Egyptian governors to the Pharaoh, describing the northern Syrian wars; (c) letters from the Egyptian governors to the Pharaoh describing the southern Syrian war. The letters in these two last classes clearly indicate that owing to the weakness of Egypt, Syria had risen in revolt; the vassal chiefs and Egyptian officials send piteous appeals to the Pharaoh Amenophis

[9]Given in Benson and Gourlay's *The Temple of Mut in Ashes*, 1889, p. 224.
[10]Cf. Griffith *Egypt Explor. Rep.* 1895-6, p. 31.

IV for support. The Amorites and the Hittites are the source of danger in the North; while a people called the *Khabiri* cause the trouble in the South. Everything turns on the interpretation of this latter name and also on the correct reading of it in various letters. Prof. Petrie[11] summarizes the letters, and we find the mysterious *Khabiri* appearing both in the northern and southern Syrian wars. Colonel Conder[12] on the other hand, maintains that the name does not occur in the letters touching the northern war.[13] He maintains that the sign rendered *Khabiri* in the northern letters should be really rendered "allies," while in the southern letters alone is the word written in a way which could be transliterated *Khabiri*, and which Col. Conder maintains means "the Hebrews." We may leave this question, however, for a moment in order to consider some of the passages referring to these *Khabiri*. In letter 102 (Berlin) Adonizedek, King of Jerusalem, writes to the Pharaoh: "The tribe that has ground me in this place is very rebellious to the king. . . . I say to the Paka (resident) of the king, my Lord, 'Why should you tremble before the chief of the 'Abiri and the rulers fear the end?'" Towards the end of the same letter we read that: "The 'Abiri chiefs plunder all the king's lands." They are mentioned again twice in letter 106 (Berlin), and in letter 103 (Berlin) they are said to have captured Gezer and Ascalon, and Jerusalem is said to be in danger. In letter 104 (Berlin) Adonizedek of Jerusalem says: "Behold Zimsidi of the city of Lachish. The slaves have subjected him" and again, in 104 (Berlin), he says: "They have fought against me as far as the lands of Seeri," which is probably Seir or Edom, and may be taken as indicating that the *Khabiri* came from Edom, as was indeed the case with the Hebrews. When we read Jos. x, it almost seems as though we were furnished in these letters with an account of the campaign from the point of view of the vanquished. It is as much a parallel to the story of Josue as the Moabite stone is to Achab's and Joram's wars with Moab.

"The same day Josue took Maceda and destroyed it with the edge of the sword, and killed the king and all the inhabitants thereof: he left not in it the least remains. And he did to the king of Maceda, as he had done to the king of Jericho. And he passed from Maceda with all Israel to Lebna, and fought against it and the Lord delivered it with the king

[11] *History of Egypt*, ii p. 259, 321 (1899).

[12] Confer *The Tell el-Amarna Tablets* 2nd edition 1894.

[13] And so far Prof. Sayce appears to agree with him. Cf. *Records of the Past* vol vi, New Series.

thereof into the hands of Israel: and they destroyed the city with the edge of the sword, and all the inhabitants thereof. They left not in it any remains. And they did to the king of Lebna, as they had done to the king of Jericho.

"From Lebna he passed unto Lachis, with all Israel: and investing it with his army, besieged it. And the Lord delivered Lachis into the hands of Israel, and he took it the following day, and put it to the sword, and every soul that was in it, as he had done to Lebna. At that time Horam king of Gazer, came up to succor Lachis: and Josue slew him with all his people, so as to leave none alive. And he passed from Lachis to Eglon, and surrounded it and took it the same day: and put to the sword all the souls that were in it, according to all that he had done to Lachis.

"He went up also with all Israel from Eglon to Hebron, and fought against it: took it, and destroyed it with the edge of the sword: the king also thereof, and all the towns of that country, and all the souls that dwelt in it: he left not therein any remains: as he had done to Eglon, so did he also to Hebron, putting to the sword all that he found in it.

"Returning from thence to Dabir, he took it and destroyed it: the king also thereof and all the towns round about he destroyed with the edge of the sword: he left not in it any remains: as he had done to Hebron and Lebna and to their kings, so did he to Dabir and to the king thereof. So Josue conquered all the country of the hills and of the south and of the plain, and of Asedoth with their kings: he left not any remains therein, but slew all that breathed, as the Lord the God of Israel had commanded him."[14]

If, however, Prof. Petrie is right in regarding the *Khabiri* as figuring in the North Syrian wars, this need not prevent us from considering them to be also the Hebrews under Josue for the story of the conquest, as given in the book of Josue, clearly indicates a northern as well as a southern campaign. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the Northern war, as depicted in the letters, tells of a rising of the Amorites, and they do not appear in the South. If we turn to Numbers xxi, we find that before the conquest of the West of Jordan the Israelites under Moses drove back the Amorrhites, who had taken possession of the land of the Moabites, and we should, in consequence, expect to find the Amorites in the North at the period of Josue's invasion.

Readers of F. J. Bliss' "A Mound of Many Cities," viz. Lachish, and of Petrie's monograph on the same site, will remember the remarkable bed of ashes which forms a distinct stratum at a depth of between thirty and forty feet in the mound. These ashes are thought to have been spread by the wind, but the cause which led to their original depositing, has been variously assigned. Petrie attributes them to Alkali burners who occupied the mound; Bliss thinks that

[14]Jos. x, 28-40.

they are due to furnaces which he found in the stratum beneath. Yet Bliss himself points out that they reached in places to a depth of between three to seven feet. Is it credible that such a vast deposit of ashes could be due to alkali burners or any kindred cause? Is it not far more probable that it was due to a destruction of the city by fire? The means of dating this ash-bed are furnished by the objects found in the strata above and below it, viz. cities iv and iii respectively. Is it a mere coincidence that the Egyptian scarabs occurring in both these cities should belong to the eighteenth dynasty, and that it is under this very dynasty that we seek to place the conquest? That the Israelites were commanded to burn these heathen cities with fire is well known (cf. Deut. xii, 3; xiii, 6), and that Josue burnt Jericho and Hai is explicitly stated (Jos. vi, 14; viii, 19, 28).

When we put side by side these two facts, in the statement on Merenptah's stela about Israel—a statement which is perfectly clear and universally accepted, and the witness of the letters found at Tell el-Amarna, and when in addition we remember that no mention of Israel is to be found under Rameses II, does it not seem morally certain that the only view which will fit in with these three data is that Israel had left Egypt some considerable time before the date of Merenptah? The disturbance, then, in Palestine during the latter part of the reign of Amenophis III, and during the reign of Amenophis IV was due, it would seem, to the weakness of Egypt the suzerain, to the conquest of the Amorites by the Hebrews and the subsequent attacks of the former on the cities of the North, and to the invasion of Palestine by the Hebrews themselves. Merenptah's stela on the other hand shows us that the Israelites were in his time a settled people whose crops the Pharaoh rejoices in destroying.

But if we decide to give up Rameses II and Merenptah as the Pharaohs of the oppression and the Exodus, we must cast about for some Pharaoh under whom these events might have taken place.

The Bible seems to demand the date 1491 B. C.—let us call it for convenience sake 1500 B. C. If we turn to Petrie's *History* to see what dynasty and what kings were then in power, we find that the eighteenth dynasty lasted from approximately 1587 to 1328 B. C. The first seven sovereigns were the following:

1. Aatmes 1587, acceded.
2. Amenophis I 1562, acceded.
3. Thothmes I 1541, acceded.
4. Thothmes II 1516, acceded.

5. Hatshepsut 1503, acceded.

6. Thothmes III 1481, acceded (he really acceded in 1503, but his aunt was regent.)

7. Amenophis II 1449, acceded.[15]

In the first place it should be noted that the expression in Exod. i, 8: "There arose a king who knew not Joseph," applies with peculiar fittingness to this dynasty since the glory of Aatmes, its founder, lies in the fact that he expelled the shepherd kings. That Joseph entered the land during one of the shepherd dynasties is practically certain, at any rate, it accords with Gen. xlvi, 31-34. It is not easy to decide from Exodus i-ii, how long the oppression lasted, and whether it is really to be referred all to one king. The early part of the reign of Aatmes was occupied in putting down a revolt of the remains of the Hyksos and in a war in Syria. But in his 22nd year we find him devoting his attention to repairing the great temples which had apparently fallen into decay under the Hyksos. We should especially notice two tablets, preserved for us in the quarries of Turrah near Cairo, and recording that these quarries were opened for building-stone for the temples of Ptah at Memphis and of Amen at Thebes. The men employed are termed the Fenkhu, a term which is thought to mean the Phœnicians. It at least illustrates the *corvée*, and the employment of foreigners on the works is illustrated on the tablets.[16]

The reign of Aatmes' successor, Amenophis I, (1562-1541 B. C.) was mostly taken up with various campaigns, and little record of his building is given. The same is the case with the next king, Thothmes I, (1541-1516 B. C.) This king was principally occupied with the conquest of Syria, but both he and his son, Thothmes II, were completely eclipsed by the glory of his daughter, Hatshepsut, who was co-regent with her father, Thothmes I, with her brother and husband, Thothmes II, and with her nephew, the great Thothmes III. This is not the place to enter into the details of her reign, and of her wonderful building enterprises, or of her famous expedition to the land of Punt.[17] We are principally concerned with her nephew, Thothmes III, whose co-regent she was for the first twenty-two years of his reign, viz. from 1503 to 1481 B. C. Can we see in him the Pharaoh of the oppression? We think it very probable. He reigned a long

[15] *History of Egypt*, ii, 29.

[16] Petrie, *History*, ii, 36.

[17] Cf. Petrie, *History* vol. ii "Hatshepsut," and for a very interesting account of all this period see Benson and Gourlay *The Temple of Mut in Ashes*, chaps. ix. x.

time, fifty-four years, he was a great builder as well as a great warrior. His annals, beginning with the twenty-second year of his reign (1481 the year of the death of Hatshepsut), give us a vivid account of yearly expeditions which continued up to his fiftieth year. These plundering expeditions poured wealth into Egypt, and by introducing great numbers of foreigners and craftsmen into the land served to considerably change not merely the art and civilization of the country, but even the physiognomy of its people. But his activity as a builder fully equalled his enterprise as a leader of campaigns. "We see," says Prof. Petrie, "the most extraordinary activity in building; and probably dozens of minor temples have passed away, which are quite unknown to us, as little suspected as the temples of Kom el Hisn, Gurob, and Nubt were a few years ago. As it is we can count up over thirty different sites, all of which were built on during this reign."[18] Thothmes III was principally concerned with Nubia, but we find him building in the Fayoum, at Memphis, and indeed throughout the length of the land. "The long-neglected Delta," to quote Prof. Petrie once more, "began to revive under his reign. At Kom el Hisn . . . is a town with many Ramesside remains, which prove it to be the ancient Amu. But the rebuilding of the temple here dates as early as Thothmes III. . . . At Heliopolis he carried out great works. A large jamb of a gateway . . . named Thothmes beloved of Tum in On (Heliopolis) . . . the two obelisks, which stood at Heliopolis, erected by Thothmes III, were dedicated to Tum of Heliopolis. Both were appropriated by Rameses II."[19]

This will not, it is true, prove that Thothmes III was the oppressor of the Israelites in the Delta, but it will go a long way to show that the main confirmation of the view that Rameses II was the oppressor is not so convincing as it at first sight appears. We have mentioned already Prof. Naville's explorations at Tell el-Nashkuta, which he found to be Pi-tum or the Pithom of Exodus, and in which he discovered many remains of Rameses II. These latter led him to conclude that it was founded by Rameses II. But the extract just given shows that Thothmes was also devout to the god Tum, that he erected two obelisks in his honor at Heliopolis, where Moses was probably instructed in "all the wisdom of the Egyptians," that he was called the "beloved of Tum," and lastly that Rameses II appropriated and marked with his own emblem the very obelisks dedi-

[18] *History*, ii, 136.
[19] *History*, ii, 126-127.

cated to Tum by Thothmes III.[20] May we not suppose that the same thing took place at Pithom? May not Rameses have been not so much its founder as its restorer? May not the "store-city" have been built by the Hebrews for Thothmes, who needed it for his Syrian expeditions just as much as Rameses did for his? But what about the other store-city which the Israelites had to build? Does not its very name "Ramesses" prove that these cities were built for a Pharaoh of that name, and therefore presumably for Rameses II?

This city has not been identified for certain, but many have held that it really was Zoan, which in several papyri is known as "Pa-Ramessu Meriamuri," i. e., "the Palace of Rameses II."[21] But it must be remembered that Zoan is mentioned in the Bible by the name Zoar. Nor does the use of the name Rameses prove that it was named after the king for whom it was built; moreover, if this argument is felt to be of force, we must take in an equally strict sense the words: "But Joseph gave a possession to his father and his brethren in Egypt, in the best place of the land, in Ramesses, as Pharao had commanded."[22] No one will maintain that Jacob, too, came into the land of Egypt in the nineteenth dynasty; this would bring down the date of the Exodus to about the time of David!

Mention of these Syrian expeditions suggests another difficulty which we referred to before. Rameses II made several expeditions against the Hittites in the North of Palestine. If on our supposition the Israelites had already been over one hundred years in the Holy Land, how comes it that we find no mention of them in the various accounts of that king's campaigns? The answer to this is to be found in the physical geography of Palestine. The Shephelah was the highway to the land of the Hittites, and an Egyptian army might pass through the land without coming in contact with Israel at all. The chosen people was sheltered in the highlands of Judæa and Samaria, and would be untouched by the invasion. This will, we think, be evident to all who have studied G. A. Smith's "Historical Geography of the Holy Land."

But, it will be urged, we have not the slightest reference to Israel in Egypt in the annals of the eighteenth dynasty. No, neither have we in the annals of the nineteenth dynasty; indeed, the only mention

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[20]Cf. *Records of the Past*, iv, pp. 21-22 "Translation of the Inscription on the obelisk of Rameses II."

[21]Driver *Archæology and Authority*, p. 55.

[22]Gen. xlvii, 11.

of Israel in either period, implies, as we have seen, that they were already in Palestine in the nineteenth dynasty.

If, then, Thothmes III was the oppressor, we must suppose that his son and successor, Amenophis II, was the Pharaoh of the Exodus. It is in vain to seek precise confirmation of this view. All we can say is that there is nothing against it. Amenophis II was an uninteresting king as far as we can determine, and little is recorded of his reign, which seems to have extended over twenty-five years.[23] The only point worth noticing is that he was not of mature age when he entered on his reign,[24] and this may explain the words of his servants which are recorded in Exodus x, 7-8: "And Pharao's servants said to him: How long shall we endure this scandal? Let the men go to sacrifice to the Lord their God. Dost thou not see that Egypt is undone? And they called back Moses and Aaron to Pharao: And he said to them: Go, sacrifice to the Lord your God: who are they that shall go?"

Another difficulty presents itself with regard to the date of Thothmes III. We have endeavored to show that the Bibl cal date 1491 B. C. is not in itself improbable, but really necessary, seeing that Solomon's date is corroborated by the two tests we applied to the Biblical chronology. But in making Thothmes III the oppressor, we have only pushed back the date of the Exodus to about 1445 B. C., for Thothmes only died in 1449 B. C., according to the now generally received dates. Since the question of Egyptian chronology is a vexed one, and yet of the highest importance, it may be worth while to formulate the principles which have guided Egyptologists in assigning the various dates. Prof. Petrie's *History of Egypt* is the standard work in England, and as he is generally recognized as the "Prince of Egyptologists," we cannot do better than quote his own words.

In the preface to the fourth edition (1899) of the first volume of his *History*, which treats of the period from the earliest times to the sixteenth dynasty, he says: "It must always be remembered by the reader that the range of uncertainty may be about *a century in the earlier parts of this volume, diminishing perhaps to about a generation by the close of the volume.* No greater accuracy than this is in the least professed in the numbers here assigned."

In chapter xi of the same volume he gives "Notes on Chronology" which explain how it comes that the margin of error is reducible in the later dynasties to about a generation: "The chronology rests

[23] Petrie *History*, ii, 154.

[24] *Ibid.*

on two modes of reckoning: (1) that by 'dead reckoning,' or adding the dynasties up one on another; (2) by certain fixed astronomical data, into the interpretation and calculation of which various uncertainties may enter. The more apart these modes can be kept the better, as they then serve to check each other."

"The fundamental fact on which all of our astronomically fixed points depend is the imperfection of the Egyptian calendar. Using a year of 365 days, it followed that the nominal beginning of each year was a quarter of a day too soon: just as if we were to neglect the 29th of February in leap years, and go on always from the 28th of February to the 1st of March. Thus every four years a day was skipped, and the nominal months of the year were begun a day too soon. In 4x7=28 years they began, then, a week too soon. In 4x30=120 years they began a month too soon; and after twelve months and five days thus slipped, or in 1460 years, they began a year too soon, and so had rotated the nominal months through all the seasons."

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"Some mode of noting the absolute months, as related to the seasonal periods, became a necessity; and, of course, the place of the sun among the stars most truly shows the exact length of the year. But how to observe both sun and stars when without any mode of time-dividing, such as clepsydra or clock, was an essential difficulty. This was got over by noting on what day a particular star could be seen, at its first emerging from the glow of the sunlight. In actual practice they observed Sirius (or Sothis), the dog-star; and as the stars all rise and set earlier and earlier every night, they observed what was the first night in the year on which Sirius would just be seen emerging from the glow of sunlight at dawn, and this was entitled the heliacal rising." Hence, from using Sothis for this observation, the whole period during which the months rotated in the seasons was called the Sothic period of 1460 years.[25] We have some definite statements as to this in Roman times. Censorinus, writing in 239 A. D., states that the Egyptian New Year's day, 1st of Thoth, fell on the 25th of June; and a hundred years before, in 139 A. D., it fell on the 21st of July, "on which day Sirius regularly rises in Egypt." Hence the beginning of a Sothic period of 1460 years, or the New Year's day falling on the 21st of July at the heliacal rising of Sirius,

[25]For the value of this argument cf. Budge *History*, i, 148.

took place in 139 A. D.; likewise in 1322 B. C., in 2784 B. C., and 4242 B. C., or thereabouts."

"From this it is plain, that, as the nominal months rotated round all the seasons once in each of these cycles, therefore, if we only know the day of the nominal month in which any seasonal event happened, —say such as the rising of Sirius, or the inundation,—we can find on what part of the cycle of 1460 years such a coincidence can have fallen."

"It is from data such as this that Mahler has lately calculated, by the rising of Sirius, and also by the new moons, that Tahutmes III reigned from 20th March 1503 B. C., to 14th February, 1449."

We have given this extract in full because it clearly outlines the position. But it is easy to see how precarious it is, and in consequence it is only provisionally accepted by Egyptologists as being an approximation to the correct date but by no means a certainty.

We noticed above that Petrie only refers to two methods of calculating the dates, viz., by the "dead" reckoning and by astronomical data, and he uses them to check each other. But we cannot help thinking that he might with profit have availed himself of a further independent method of checking his dates. We have already used the Egyptian and Assyrian records as a means of checking the Biblical dates, and have pointed out that the Bible being, quite apart from its inspired character, a very early literary monument, ought with equal justice to be used to check the data of the monuments. We are precluded, however, from so using the Biblical records here, for we are endeavoring to prove them to be correct, but why should we not attempt to check the Egyptian records by those of Babylon and Assyria?

When treating of the Tell el-Amarna records above, we mentioned the Royal letters, viz., letters from the Kings of Mitanni, of Kardunyas (Babylonia) and of Assyria to Amenophis III and IV. If we can date the writers we shall have an entirely independent means of checking the contemporary Egyptian kings. A very small acquaintance with Babylonian or Assyrian records shows us that they were kept by born chronologists who possessed means for carefully dating events, and who took great pains to do so. This should be borne in mind when estimating the value of Biblical dates, for Abraham came from both Ur of the Chaldees and from Haran. But without going into the complicated discussions which have arisen from the fragmentary state of the materials handed down to us in the king lists and other chronological material, we can arrive at the dates of certain

kings very clearly. One of the correspondents with Amenophis III was Burna-Burgash, the Kassite King of Babylonia. From the Synchronistic history we learn that he was a contemporary of King Buzur-Assur of Assyria:

5. "Buzur-Assur, King of Assyria and Burna-Burgas,
6. King of Garduniyas (Babylon) made an ordinance, and
7. common boundaries as aforesaid."[26]

The history then goes on to tell us in line 8 of a later King Assur-Yupalladh, King of Assyria. This king we can date. From various documents given in the collection of Cuneiform Inscriptions of Western Asia we can obtain the following list of Assyrian kings:

1. Assur-uballit.
2. Unknown.
3. Ramman-Nirari I.
4. Shalmaneser I.
5. Tukulti-Ninib.[27]

Now Sennacherib (705-681) captured Babylon in 689, and he tells us that he found there a particular seal of Tukulti-Ninib, which had been carried off to Babylon by some successful raider 600 years before. Nor need we regard this as merely a round number, for the same king tells us that on the same occasion he rescued the statues of the gods of Ekallate, which Marduk-nadin-akhe, King of Accad, had carried away 418 years before.[28] We can hardly be wrong then, in referring Tukulti-Ninib's reign to 1300 B. C., and consequently that of Assur-uballit to about 1400 B. C. But this Assur-uballit wrote to Amenophis IV. (Cf. Tell el-Amarna Letter 9 (Berlin). According to Petrie Amenophis IV reigned 18 years, and his father, Amenophis III, reigned 25 years, and Burna-Burgas corresponded with him. Is it possible, then, to date these two kings as Petrie does, viz., Amenophis III, 1414-1379, and Amenophis IV, 1383-1365? Moreover, between Amenophis III and Thothmes III we shall have to find room for Amenophis II, 26 years and Thothmes IV, 9 years. This makes it seem impossible to put the death of Thothmes III as late as 1449 B. C., and we feel justified in maintaining that he probably died shortly after 1500 B. C. This would tally with the Biblical date of the Exodus. And it should be noted that in upholding the Biblical date we are

[26]Sayce *Records of the Past*, iii, 29.
[27]Cf. Budge *History of Egypt*, i, 155.
[28]Cf. Rogers *History of Babylonia and Assyria*, i, p. 320.

not contending for any system of Biblical dates, but are merely urging that definite statements such as those quoted above from Judges ii, 26, and III Kings vi, 1, should not be lightly rejected.

Another possible confirmation of the date 1490 B. C. for the Exodus may be found in the following figures: St. Paul says, and he is, of course, giving the current Jewish Tradition, that the exile in Egypt lasted 450 years (Acts xiii, 20, according to the generally received reading); he also says that it covered 430 years (Gal. iii, 17), though some contend that in this latter passage he refers to the whole period between the promise to Abraham in Gen. xv and the giving of the law on Mt. Sinai. If we agree for the moment to understand it of the Egyptian exile, we get the following figures: Abraham was 100 years old at Isaac's birth (Gen. xxi, 5); Isaac was 60 years old at Jacob's birth (xxv, 26); Jacob was 130 years old when he entered Egypt (xlvii, 9); the exile lasted 450 years (Acts xiii, 20) (400 years, Gen. xv, 13; Acts vii, 6; 430 years, Gal. iii, 17). Adding these together we obtain the sum of 740 years. If we now add to this the date 1490 for the Exodus we get 2230 as the date of Abraham Between his 100th year and his 75th year (Gen. xii, 4,) we must put his probable defeat of Hammurabi (Gen. 14). Unfortunately the date of Hammurabi can be only approximately arrived at. The Babylonian king lists A and B,[29] and the chronological tablet of the first Babylonian dynasty do not absolutely agree. But they make it certain that he did not reign later than 2100 B. C. Peiser[30] puts his reign at 2139-2084, but others make him earlier still. The famous Babylonian archeologist Nabonidus has left us an inscription in which he says: "The name of Hammurabi, one of the old kings, who seven hundred years before Burnaburiash had built E-barra and the temple pyramids on the old foundations, I saw therein and read."

But this Burnaburiash was one of the correspondents of Amenophis IV as we have seen, and can therefore hardly be dated later than 1450. This would put the date of Hammurabi at 2150 B. C., and make him thus practically contemporary with Abraham.

To sum up, then, Egyptologists assign to Rameses II and Merenptah the dates 1300-1234 and 1234-1214 respectively and they consider them as the Pharaohs of the oppression and the Exodus. But the Bible in two definite statements demands a much earlier

[29]Cf. Rogers *History of Babylonia and Assyria*, i, 313-314.
[30]Cf. Hommel *Ancient Hebrew Tradition*, p. 134.

date for the Exodus, and the year 1491, which is arrived at by an examination of various passages, does not put it any too early. We have tested the Biblical chronology in two places by the contemporary Assyrian and Egyptian records, and have found that in the former passage the Bible is confirmed, while in the latter it seems to be twenty years too early. We have then shown reasons, apart from the Bible, for holding that Rameses and his son, Merenptah, were not the Pharaohs of the oppression and the Exodus, and we have suggested that these are really to be sought in Thotmes III and his son, Amenophis II, whose dates we have reason to suppose are brought down too low by Petrie and others, but should really be referred to about 1500 B. C., a date which coincides with that assigned to the Exodus by the Bible.

F. Hugh Pope, O. P.

THE HIGHER CRITICISM OF THE BIBLE:

VI. ITS OBJECTIVE ASPECT.

Francis E. Gigot, D. D.

Traditional views concerning the questions of authorship, date, integrity, method of composition, literary kind, etc., of the inspired writings, should not, either in theory, or in practice, be placed on a par with divinely-revealed truths. Obviously, they do not stand on the same level as the defined Catholic beliefs, with regard to either sacredness or certainty. However great their importance may appear, however long and wide-spread their acceptance may be, such time-honored positions are not part and parcel of a revealed doctrine. They are human opinions susceptible of alteration, and have been actually modified by the Jews of old, the Fathers of the Church, and ecclesiastical writers as well as by scholars of a later date. Hence, the proper attitude towards those "traditions" is not the more or less unthinking credulity of the ultraconservative who, absolutely wedded to the past, denies the lawfulness of any departure from them. It is the judicious temper of the true exponent of the Higher Criticism of the Bible who, prompted by the desire of promoting genuine Biblical science, claims and exercises the right of testing this, as any other source of information, and of accepting its data to the precise extent in which he finds them trustworthy.

In holding this view of the matter and in thus acting upon it, the Higher Critic of the Bible may well feel that he is complying with the first requisite for securing the objective value of his conclusions. He thereby sets aside all prejudice *for* or *against* the evidence before him. He does not trust it implicity, nor does he reject it *a priori*, in virtue of his own preconceived opinions. His frame of mind is not that of the advocate whose sole concern is to defend a position which, for practical purposes, he has assumed to be correct. It is rather that of the impartial judge who feels in duty bound to summon and cross-examine witnesses, and render a verdict based on a careful examination of them all. He is not tempted to rule out, or minimize, or, on the contrary, exaggerate any piece of evidence. He is ready to

welcome and treasure up with jealous care whatever truth he finds embodied in his various sources of information. His frame of mind is therefore the one required to reach objective truth in this, as in any other, department of human science: it prevents him from adding to the data before him a merely personal element, while it allows him to take them all for what they really are.

With this sincere desire of keeping himself free from bias, the Higher Critic of the Bible proceeds to examine the facts upon which the positions, whether ancient or modern, with regard to the authorship, date, literary kind, etc., of a particular book or portion of a book of Holy Writ, are claimed to rest. Are these actual facts? Are they all the facts of the case? Do they really bear the construction, in whole or in part, that has been put on them, in divers quarters? Can they, should they, and how must they be differently interpreted in the light of all the available evidence? Such manifestly are the general questions which confront one who wishes to draw from both the facts and the theories before him, nothing but the truth contained therein. No one is more keenly alive than the student of Biblical Criticism to the importance of giving reliable answers to those complex and delicate problems. Nor does anyone better realize the difficulty of setting forth solutions, which, by their objective characters, will commend themselve as correct to his fellow Higher Critics. In fact, any one would naturally shrink from attempting this arduous task, could he not depend on definite principles which serve to guide his every step and secure for his conclusions a scientific accuracy. In the Higher Criticism of the Bible, as in geology, history, theology, as indeed in every branch of human art and science, rules have been deduced and formulated for the guidance of the student and which serve to impart strength and security to his efforts towards objective truth. These rules have not been framed independently of experience, and as it were *a priori*, in the Higher Criticism of the Bible, any more than in any other department of human learning. On the contrary, they are the direct outcome of a careful and prolonged study of facts and theories, and they set forth the best and safest methods of treating the topics in hand. This can and must be all the more readily admitted with regard to the canons of Biblical Higher Criticism, because, as we have more than once stated in our foregoing papers, these canons are, with but unessential modifications, the very principles of literary and historical Criticism which have been applied successfully and for centuries to the study of the

questions of authorship, date, method of composition, etc., of the literary remains of pagan and Christian antiquity. Well then may the student of the Higher Criticism of the Bible take courage in the thought that to accomplish his arduous task of appreciating all the data at his disposal, he is supplied with such a powerful and constant means of success. He rightly sees that, instead of being made solely to depend on his limited power of mind, he may, and should, draw from the rules of his special branch of Biblical Criticism a valuable complement of his personal knowledge and experience. He no less rightly feels that if he only complies with the same rules, he will be effectively guarded against judging the evidence before him by the standard of any preconception of his own, and therefore be led to put forth objective conclusions.

The true exponent of the Higher Criticism of the Bible is helped in another way in his difficult undertaking. He is well aware that despite his genuine desire of reaching accurate solutions, despite his careful use of the best methods of criticism to attain objective truth, he can lay no claim to anything like actual infallibility. Human science,—Biblical or otherwise,—is necessarily imperfect for "we know in part, and we prophesy in part" (I Cor. xiii, 9). When therefore the Higher Critic has done his best to secure for his work thoroughness and accuracy, he naturally feels that his conclusions may still be defective in many respects. In view of this, he is willing to have his own positions tested and modified in various ways by other minds. So long as his views are not seriously misrepresented, so long as his grounds for holding them are fairly taken up and discussed, he may well rejoice. He has nothing so much at heart as the cause of the truth, and strict and competent testing of his positions can but forward the cause of the truth. The more thoroughly his arguments and inferences are tested by independent scholars, the oftener they are scrutinized, the surer also will he be that to the extent in which they have been able to stand that examination, they are accurate reasonings and solutions worthy of being considered as positive and permanent contributions to Biblical science. Well may he rejoice more particularly, because the contemplation of the severe ordeal which awaits his theories, is manifestly calculated to cause him to use the greatest caution and skill in framing them. At each step, he is distinctly made to feel that nothing short of a painstaking investigation of sources, impartial and thorough study of them all,

and scrupulous accuracy of statements, can earn for him a lasting reputation for sound scholarship.

Perhaps the greatest source of confidence for the student of the Higher Criticism of the Bible that his laborious work will lead him to objective conclusions, remains still to be mentioned. It is derived from the attentive consideration of the manner in which that special branch of Biblical Criticism has grown during the nineteenth century. As well stated by G. A. Smith (*Modern Criticism and the Preaching of the Old Testament*, 1901, p. 32): "Within its modern development . . . it has achieved a career as long as those of many of the historical and physical sciences. Nor, within the last century at least, has it been served by a less constant succession of able experts; while its methods have been equally without dogmatic bias, and so far as their materials go, as trustworthy and exact. Consequently, the progress of the science has resembled that of every other intellectual movement of our time which has issued in generally accepted results. It has been slow, gradual and severely contested. It has suffered from digressions, pedantries, extravagancies. It has been forced to abandon some positions which it had previously occupied with some confidence; and upon innumerable details it still exhibits among its supporters difference of opinion. But with few or no preoccupations, it has started from facts easily ascertained within the sacred text itself; each step forward which it has taken has been planted on other facts in the same field or upon reasonable inferences from these. It has suffered from, and has benefited by, the personal jealousies and ambitions of its agents, who have left few fresh proposals or discoveries undisputed; and it has issued in a large and increasing agreement upon certain main lines of conclusion." This is a concise and by no means overdrawn picture of the development of Biblical Higher Criticism during the last century. The Higher Criticism of the Bible has grown like every other science, yielding results which have been tested over and over again, and the correctness of which has been gradually recognized in face of continual opposition. Its followers may well therefore feel that in devoting their efforts to the solution of its important and difficult problems, they are pursuing a branch of human knowledge where chance and arbitrariness have very little, if any part, and where hard, conscientious, and accurate work is naturally rewarded by gratifying, (because objective) results.

The general conclusion suggested by the foregoing remarks is obvious. The Higher Criticism of the Bible has just as much right

to be considered an objective science as any other part of human learning, and should not be designated by the contemptuous name of *subjective* Criticism. It requires from its students a thoroughly objective frame of mind at the very outset of their investigation of its problems. It supplies them with rules which they must follow to do thorough work and which are no others than those fully authorized in the pursuit of literary and historical criticism. It submits their positions to the most searching examination of independent minds, and accepts as its own conclusions only such as are able to stand that severe test. In every way, it compels them, and also enables them, to reach objective results.

Francis E. Gigot.

CHRISTIANITY AND THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF RELIGIONS

Nicola Turchi D. D.

The scientific and comparative study of religions, namely that which aims at an impartial examination of the religious beliefs of the different peoples of the world in the various stages of their historic development, with a view to trace them back to their probable origins, to determine their mutual interdependence and their relation both historical and psychological to the laws governing the evolution of mankind, is of comparatively recent date. In antiquity, so far as we know, religious phenomena were never made the object of particular study or research from the strictly historical and critical standpoint and if in Greece the poets and, later on, the philosophers did attempt, something of the kind in trying to give a rational account of their mythology often so grotesque or so grossly immoral, they always assumed that their myths and legends contained a great fund of wisdom, and never seemed to suspect that the fabulous stories might have been no more than the offspring of the childish mind of primitive man.[1]

It is plain that Christianity could not at once assume a scientific attitude involving a critical examination of the various religions confounded in a crude syncretism throughout the length and breadth of the Roman empire. From the very outset the new religion was obliged to struggle against the reigning power of paganism for the bare right to exist, and it was only natural that its religious criticism should take on a polemic rather than a scientific character. The immoral legends of mythology were held up to the pagans as sad and convincing proof of the immorality of their religion; the pagan deities were identified with infernal beings, emissaries sent by Satan to maintain intellectual and moral perversion in a corrupt world,[2] and if the natural explanations of pagan beliefs were sometimes extolled and accepted with enthusiasm,—even though erroneous, like that of

[1]P. Decharme, *La Critique des Traditions religieuses chez les Grecs, des Origines au Temps de Plutarque.* Paris, A. Picard, 1904.

[2]C. Pascal, *Dei e Diavoli—Saggi sul paganesimo morente.* Firenze, 1904.

Euhemerus,—it was only because they helped in their own way to demolish the religion of the empire.[3]

It should be noted, however, that not all the Christian apologists assumed this hostile attitude which naturally became more and more accentuated with the growing diffusion of Christianity throughout the empire and the corresponding decline of paganism. And the reason of this diversity of attitude is to be sought in the diversity of conditions, economic and social and consequently intellectual, in which the Christians of the different provinces found themselves. It is well known that the various provinces were not all on an equal footing—that they did not all enjoy the same advantages under the Roman rule. Territorial expansion always meant for Rome an increase of economic benefits, especially in the case of certain provinces from which the governors generally returned extremely rich—in fact, to such an extent that they were often legally prosecuted in the capital for extortions practiced during their tenure of office. Thus, in Africa and in Asia Minor particularly, the inhabitants were subjected to fiscal exactions that amounted practically to an organized system of spoliation. Such a state of things could not fail to engender in the souls of the harassed and impoverished populations of these provinces an intense hatred of anything and everything Roman, not only in the domain of government but also in the sphere of culture and religion. In other provinces on the contrary, the fusion of the conquering and conquered elements had been accomplished on a more equitable basis and thus it became more intimate and lasting. Rome had extended to them her own laws, her military and commercial routes, her *pax Romana*; in a word a protection which made possible a high degree of intellectual culture together with a great material prosperity, and in return she received the benefit of the literary, philosophical and artistic culture of these favored provinces—a compensation to which the entire Latin literature bears witness.

In these provinces therefore, the empire was not looked upon as a vampire sucking the vital energies of the countries that fell under her sway, but as the necessary and indestructible bulwark of civilization. Now, Christianity penetrating into surroundings so diverse and having to shape the minds of its adherents to a definite attitude towards the religion of the empire, it is not surprising that this process of religious orientation should be influenced to a great extent by the already existing dispositions of the people towards the empire

[3]Cf. Clement of Alexandria, *Protrepticon*, 20.

and its civilization. Thus we find that while in some provinces the opposition of Christianity to Rome and to its religion is bitter and unvarying (Tertullian the fiery lawyer of Carthage is the most eloquent exponent of this attitude), in others we find the more educated Christian minds seeking a conciliation between Christian thought and the precious inheritance of classical culture, and with no little ingenuity they succeed in establishing a common ground between the new religion and the best intellectual speculations of the ancients. Clement of Alexandria in his copious writings extending from the *Protrepticon* through the *Pedagogue* to the *Stromata* offers us the best type of this current of thought which was destined to triumph definitely in Christian tradition.[4]

However, though on account of the above-mentioned diversity of local conditions we are unable to formulate any general or universal attitude of early Christianity towards paganism, it should be borne in mind that the opposition to mythology itself was strong, and the same in all quarters, though expressed in varying manner according to the environment.[5] And this opposition which grew rapidly in proportion as Christianity in spite of the fury of the persecutions became ever more and more firmly rooted, developed to such a point that in the fourth century we find the mutual position of the two religions reversed, and thus, while on the one hand we see Firmicus Maternus beseeching the emperors Constantius and Constans to administer the *coup de grace* to expiring paganism,[6] we find on the other, Symmachus and Macrobius at pains to keep alive the old state religion, the former magnifying its efficiency in bringing about the civil and military aggrandizement of Rome, the latter explaining its mythology in a naturalistic and philosophic sense, in a vain effort to raise it to the level reached by Christian thought.[7]

St. Augustine, after the lamentable sacking of Rome by the barbarian hordes of Alaric in the year 410, describes in the *De Civitate Dei* the intellectual and moral triumph of Christianity. He resumes in himself synthetically the spirit of all the earlier apologists, both Greek and Latin, tempering their exaggerations whether on the side

[4]E. Buonaiuti, *Clemente Alessandrino e la cultura classica* in the *Revista storico-critica delle scienze teologiche.* Anno I. p. 398.

[5]Clem. Alex. *Protrepticon.* 2-7.

[6]Firmicus Maternus, *De Errore Profanarum Religionum.* Vienna, 1867.

[7]See in Symmachus the story of the statue of Victory removed from the Senate by order of Valentinian I, and in Macrobius the *Saturnalia.* Cf. also G. Boissier, *La Fin du Paganisme,* Paris, 1903. Vol. ii, p. 231 seqq. and 201 seqq.

of conciliation or hostility, and considering not only the history of Rome, but also that of the entire world as a preparation forthe Gospel.

The early medieval period received this view as an inheritance from the great bishop of Hippo, and henceforward it became a principal factor in the traditional interpretation of history by theologians and philosophers; and indeed until the new impetus given to philosophic and historical studies in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Christian thinkers seem to have been unacquainted with any other theory whereby to account for the events of history, nor was any attempt made on other grounds to give a historical and psychological explanation of religious phenomena in the world.

From all this it is seen that Christianity never enjoyed a proper opportunity of studying the problem of religions from the scientific standpoint. Polemical preoccupation in the beginning, and, later on, the fixed tradition of the schools excluded from the discussion a vast amount of available evidence, and tolerated as criteria of appreciation of the various ethnic beliefs only such elements as the latter possessed in common with, or in opposition to Christianity, whence the apologist was enabled to deduce a reason for the more or less sweeping condemnation of them all.

* * *

But after the revival mentioned above which made the most rigidly orthodox minds capable of examining all sorts of questions with a greater degree of freedom, the attitude of thinking minds brought face to face with the problem of religion whether considered in its psychological or its historical bearings, underwent a great change. However, this new orientation of ideas was unable to produce solid scientific results in the absence of a corresponding progress in historical studies which alone would make possible the scientific reconstruction of the religious evolution of mankind on the basis of observed facts.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries immense labor was expended in the field of both the natural and the historic sciences, and very considerable were the results obtained, but the mental power and acumen necessary to carry out a subtile and discriminating critical analysis seemed to be still wanting, and thus the great geniuses of the time, so far as their constructive work was concerned, framed indeed some great and rather crude syntheses on a historical basis, but in these history was viewed more or less *a priori* from the stand-

point of each one's philosophical system. The first in the order of time and importance was John B. Vico, of Naples, (1670-1744) who in his *New Science* (1725) set himself the task of reducing to scientific principles the various opinions held up to that time concerning the beginnings of humanity and of nations, and to determine by comparison and analysis the elements which these opinions had in common, for," he says, "up to the present they do not appear to have any common foundation or starting point, nor do they exhibit any continuity or mutual cohesion."[8]

Later, on the eve of the French Revolution came the anti-religious synthesis of the Encyclopedists, together with Voltaire (1694-1778), who contributed *L'Essai sur les moeurs et l'esprit des nations* (1765), whilst in Germany, Lessing (1729-1781) and Herder (1744-1803) published respectively the *Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts* (1780) and the *Ideen zur Geschichte der Menschheit* (1784). It was not until the nineteenth century was well under way, that full use began to be made of the material accumulated by all these pioneers, and upon the basis scarcely outlined by them was constructed the solid edifice of the science of religions. The decisive turning point in the development of this science came when, towards the middle of the century, various other subsidiary disciplines, viz., linguistics, ethnology, anthropology, archeology, mythology and folk-lore received a vigorous and enthusiastic impetus, whilst at the same time, intelligent travellers and missionaries having explored regions heretofore little known, and having been in close contact with savage tribes, began giving to the public memoirs and accounts full of apposite and sagacious observations well adapted to serve as documentary material for the study of uncivilized peoples.

The merit of having inaugurated the comparative study of religions on strictly scientific lines belongs in England to F. Max Müller, and to M. Albert Réville in France. The former, a learned Sanskrit scholar and philologist, and possessing a wide knowledge of the subject matter, was also endowed with a remarkable literary activity as is shown by his various works. Among these may be mentioned the *Einleitung in die vergleichende Religionswissenschaft* (1876), in which he points out the method to be followed in studying the history of religions, and his *Gifford Lectures* in which he systematizes the results of his labors. It was he also who conceived the project of translating for the benefit of the studious public the collection of

[8]Vico, *Scienza nuova*, l. Imo. *Dello stabilimento dei principii.*

Oriental religious writings, entitled *The Sacred Books of the East*,[9] a work which was carried out under the direction of the most eminent Oriental scholars of Europe.

M. Albert Réville may be considered as the most efficient propagator of the comparative study of religions in France. He was the first professor officially appointed to that chair in the Collége de France, and he has published works which are very helpful to those wishing to become initiated into this rather difficult and complex science. Such are the *Prolégomènes de l'Histoire des Religions* (1881), and *Les Religions des Peuples non civilisés* (1883).

It would be beyond the scope of this paper to describe even in outline the rapid development of this study in other countries. Suffice it to recall the names of Tiele in Holland, Dietrich in Germany, Söderblom in Sweden, and Jastrow in America. The field of research is ever widening and the number of interested and well equipped scholars is increasing; all of which gives good promise for the future of this science which, at least indirectly, raises, and in part helps to solve, some of the most interesting and important problems with which the human intelligence has to deal.

* * *

The scientific study of religions is of great importance both *directly*, as affording a more complete knowledge of the history of mankind, and *indirectly* in connection with the complex psychological and religious problems which it helps to elucidate or at all events, to formulate more accurately. In the first place it brings to our notice the fact that the human mind follows more or less constantly the same law of development in the outward expression of its religious ideas and sentiments, and also the fact that these always correspond to the surrounding social and other conditions, so that one may safely argue from one to the other. The existence of such a law demonstrastrates once for all the close kinship of the various social and religious phenomena in the world and disproves the systematic and exclusive divisions which, with a view to polygenistic inference, have so often been asserted with regard to man and the exercise of his activities.

In the second place the historical study of religions affords us a rational explanation of many usages and devotional customs belonging to popular forms of worship, and which to our eyes appear as superstitions or aberrations of the mind. We find in this study a

[9] Regarding this collection see article *The Sacred Books of the East in* the *Quarterly Review*, April, 1902.

reason for the existence and the solemnity of religious rites, and it explains, if it does not excuse, certain abnormal manifestations of popular piety resulting from an inferior mentality which as such is satisfied with childish religious forms—forms corresponding to the crude notions it has conceived of the divine and its relation to mankind. Thus the old accusations of superstition, paganism and sorcery brought against Catholicism by Protestants and Rationalists lose their weight because they do not really apply to, or militate against a form of religion, nor against its principes or ministers; they are to be attributed to an inferior mental stage which doubtless it would be desirable to have disappear but which it often requires many generations to eradicate. The truth of the old scholastic aphorism "Quidquid recipitur ad modum recipientis recipitur" finds here a manifest application, for however high and spiritual a religious doctrine may be, it is necessarily conditioned by the mental capacity and limitations of the subject in which it is received.

Besides these direct advantages pertaining to the sociological order, the history of religions offers others in the historical order as well as indirect advantages of a philosophical character. At the outset it may be well to explain why we class these latter advantages as indirect. It is because the science of religions does not *per se* attempt to pronounce on the objective value or truth of the various beliefs; nor does it pass any judgment on the legitimateness, on the rational or irrational character of the ritual practices, but applies itself solely to seek out and determine the laws which govern myths and the rites connected with them, the successive transformations which the notion of the deity undergoes and the complex emotions which it begets in the human soul. Thus the science of religions is independent of all metaphysical systems. But though of its nature independent, it indirectly lends not a little aid to philosophy and dogmatic theology by helping to formulate more definitely the problems which they are called upon to solve, and by affording the means of examining them with greater precision and thoroughness in order to sift out what may be of permanent value hidden beneath the confused mass of popular beliefs. And let it be remarked that this indirect aid is all the more important inasmuch as "the science of religions touches closely upon the gravest questions—questions the highest and most essential in point of practical importance. There is no religion that does not pretend to give, at least in some measure, a solution to the problem of our destiny. There is none that does not place its adherents in

presence of a world invisible yet real, and it assures them that in such a world and not in the visible world of experience, is to be found the explanation of their origin, the key of the mystery of their life, and the secret of their future weal or woe."[10] And indeed from religion alone comes an answer to the questions that rise in the human mind concerning the beginning and end of our being, the sanction of the moral law and the craving for the ideal.

Our origin eludes the grasp of all knowledge based on experimental research, and as regards philosophical speculations, taken by themselves, they are not only at variance with one another, but are moreover far from being consistent or reassuring, as plainly appears from the history of philosophic thought. And a like cloud of mystery hangs over the problem of our final destiny. Even Herbert Spencer the great philsopher of evolution confesses in a work which may be considered as his last will and testament, that in the later years of his life the idea of an infinite space without origin or cause, which has always existed and is to exist forever was a concept from which he shrank.[11] Not less in need of an explanation is the problem involved in the command of conscience, that internal voice that breatheth where it will and of which we know neither whence it comes nor whither it goes, but which nevertheless speaks to us with an imperiousness that requires prompt obedience.

Lastly we all feel within ourselves—useless to attempt to prove or define it—a vague yet powerful aspiration towards something which is not comprised within the circle of the things pertaining to our earthly existence—something which attracts the mind and the heart and which to our inner vision appears as an inaccessible source of light of which our mundane ideals are but pale reflections. Now, religion meets precisely this craving with its promise of the eternal possession of the ideal.

Since all religions profess to satisfy these aspirations of the soul, the scientific study of them reveals to us the different solutions given by humanity in its various stages to the great problems of our existence; by its means we are enabled to perceive what the religions of mankind have in common, and to hear, as it were, the fundamental, underlying note in a vast world concert made up of the most varied instruments. This fundamental note represents the quintessence

[10]Cf. A. de Broglie, *L'histoire des religions, et les problèmes de la destinée humaine* in *Le Contemporain*, May, 1883. p. 769.

[11]Herbert Spencer, *Facts and Comments*, final chapter

of the religious thought of mankind and to recognize it thus plainly is a precious advantage for the philosopher and the theologian. Moreover, the science of religions leads us, indirectly, to another important result. Comparing one with another the various beliefs the student is naturally led to arrange them in order according to an ascending scale of perfection. And it is with no little satisfaction that the Christian scholar, apart even from all apologetic preoccupation, finds unquestionably at the summit of the scale Christianity itself which embodies the best elements of all the other religions, besides possessing over and above a precious treasure of truths exclusively its own. This conclusion which is the one reached by every impartial scholar is to our mind the best apologetical argument for Christianity that could be desired. In substance it comes to this: all the different phases and stages of the religious thought of mankind unite in giving testimony in favor of Christ; to Him they incline as towards the centre of human history, the goal of all human ideals and aspirations.

* * *

There remain to be examined the direct advantages in the domain of history which the study of religions brings to the Christian cause and in particular to the history of the church. The Christian church sprang from the bosom of Judaism and often in the course of its development it has been influenced by the ideas and customs of the peoples with whom it came in contact. It is clear therefore that the historical vicissitudes of Christianity can not be understood without taking into account these influences, and consequently without a knowledge of the *milieux* whence they emanated. In like manner, no study of the theology of the Old Testament can be complete or adequate unless it takes account of the theological ideas of the Babylonians from whom the Hebrew nation sprung in the person of Abraham, and with whom they always remained in more or less habitual communication. Again, in connection with the question of angelology in the Old Testament, it is necessary to study the same topic as expounded in the religion of Persia. Similarly certain religious rites and customs of ancient Egypt throw light on analogous ones in vogue among the Israelites.

That fruitful epoch which marks the transition from the Old to the New Dispensation is much elucidated by the study of the religious conditions of the world at that time, especially from the study of the philosophico-religious speculations of the Alexandrian school, and

of the state of mind prevalent among the adherents of official paganism. More important still for him who wishes to understand Christianity is the study of the Hebrew religion from which it is derived. Gnosticism, that formidable religious epidemic which for a time threatened the life of the infant church can be comprehended only through a knowledge of the Oriental speculations of the period, and of the Hellenistic garb which they assumed, as shown, for instance, in the varied symbolism of the Orphic worship, in that of the Pythagoreans and in the Eleusinian mysteries. The great heresies of Nestorianism and Monophysitism are explained, at least with regard to their dogmatic content, by the fact that the populations imbued with Semitic culture were unable to conceive of the Supreme Being otherwise than under a personal and anthropomorphic form, while the Alexandrians, inheritors of the pantheistic Egyptian theology to which had been added Greek speculation, were accustomed to perceive the distinction of persons in the unity of substance. Manicheism should be studied in the light of the Persian religion, viz. as a derivation of Masdeism which was forced to put on a Christian garb in order to better withstand the progressive and successful spread of Christianity in Persia. The religion of Islam cannot be fully accounted for without a careful study of religious conditions in Arabia anterior to the time of Mohammed and of the influences already exerted by Judaism and Christianity on the naturalistic religion of the inhabitants.

It is a well known fact that Christian worship has borrowed many outward forms and ceremonies from the different forms of religion that it has supplanted, and so, a truly scientific study of our liturgy postulates a knowledge of these forms of worship in order to determine the character and extent of their influence. Certain popular forms assumed by the Christianity of the Middle Ages and many of the heresies of that period are inexplicable unless we admit the survival and influence of ideas and customs belonging to the ancient Celtic, Germanic and Scandinavian religions. Even the crude worship of barbarous and savage tribes is not without its modicum of instruction for the student of religions who perceives therein a spontaneous manifestation of the religious instinct which is universal in mankind, but which in this case has for some reason or other remained rudimentary and undeveloped.

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It seems therefore sufficiently evident that the historical and comparative study of religions is in many ways a valuable aid for the

better historical and philosophical understanding of Christianity. Nevertheless it cannot be denied that it does not yet enjoy on the part of orthodox Christians all the esteem that it deserves. In many quarters it is looked upon with a sort of instinctive distrust, as if its principles and conclusions were bound to clash with those of Christian belief, and its pursuit be detrimental to our faith. To the mind of the writer nothing could be less founded than this suspicion. On the contrary, if pursued in the proper spirit, with a true sense of the importance and sacredness of the questions involved, this study can not fail to yield the most beneficial results. "If he who takes it up," says de Broglie, "is in a state of doubt, if he is still sincerely seeking the truth without having yet found it, the history of religions will help him to reach the solution he so anxiously desires. If, on the other hand, he is already a believer, he will find in this study carried on with care and the proper dispositions, the confirmation of his faith, since the truth of Christianity can but be enhanced by being compared with other religions."[12] We would indeed betray a strange lack of confidence in the truth of our position if, while proclaiming our firm faith in Christianity, we were afraid to compare it scientifically with the other religions of the world.

Perhaps the principal reason that hinders many Catholic scholars from taking up or encouraging this study is the fear of meeting proof that such or such a doctrine was adopted by Judaism or by Christianity from some ethnic religion, a fact which in their esteem, would seem to discredit our belief in divine revelation. But such a fear, however commendable in itself as indicating a jealous care to safeguard the rights of the supernatural, is in reality based on an error easy to dispel. It is sufficient to bear in mind that when speaking of the derivation of ideas and customs from neighboring non-Christian religions, it is by no means intended to exclude the efficiency or narrow the field of divine revelation. It is simply affirmed that into the human elements of religion elaborated in the midst of the various peoples, God, at the moment decreed by His eternal wisdom, introduced the truly living and immortal germ of revelation which vivified and transformed these elements and made them a sacred norm or guide to humanity in its terrestrial pilgrimage. The ways of Providence in history are prepared by an omniscient intelligence which foresees and ordains events for the manifestation of the divine glory. What, in fact, is the *De Civitate Dei* of St. Augustine but the demonstration of the

[12] *Le Contemporain*, May, 1883, p. 770.

triumph of the divine plan in the history of the world—a plan involving the successive concatenation of human events until the complete manifestation of truth in the fulness of time. But we are coming to recognize ever more and more a truth which though seemingly quite obvious, has too often been lost sight of, viz. that God in the working out of this great plan is constantly making use of natural causes and agents while subordinating their efficiency to the interests of the supernatural order, and that under an all wise direction Christianity as well as Judaism has assimilated many elements from surrounding philosophical and religious systems, even as the living shoot absorbs from the ambient earth the various elements that are to become its sap and fibre while developing into a great tree. In the light of these principles the history of mankind acquires for us a luminous Christian character, and we understand better the deep sense of Christ's saying: "I came not to destroy but to fulfill." Christianity is truly the supernatural complement of all human striving after the divine, of all human religious speculation. In it all that was best in human endeavor has been sanctified by the word, the labors and the death of Christ who has put his inviolable seal upon revelation.

The poet Prudentius in one of his lyric flights which with reason have caused him to be styled the Christian Pindar, beheld the purple of the Roman emperors spread out as a carpet before the feet of the advancing Christ.

> . . . purpura supplex
> Sternitur Aeneadæ rectoris ad atria Regis.

And so we in like manner may consider not only the history of Rome, but all human history as well, especially that referring to the religious thought of mankind, as a great fabric of varied texture cast as a homage of grateful recognition before the feet of the Redeemer—homage of the best efforts of humanity along the road of its intellectual and moral progress. And as these efforts have had an active part in the preparation and development of Christianity, they thereby acquire a new value and significance in the esteem of Christian scholars and apologists.

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A NEW CATHOLIC APOLOGY*

M. D. Petre

There is a twofold interest in such a book as lies before us. Like every great critical work which has also, in virtue of the intrinsic and separate value of the critic, a philosophy of its own, independently of the philosopher who is the subject of the discussion, this book will interest some as an exposition and critique of the ideas of Newman; others will be still more occupied with the ideas and philosophy of the writer himself.

To the former class the principal question will be whether Newman is rightly understood and correctly rendered in these pages, whether the theories therein developed be really those of the great Cardinal or not. To the second class this is a point which will signify, comparatively, little; they will accept the obvious fact that, to the author at least, in the formation of his philosophy of religion, Newman has been such as he is here represented; they will not stay long to compare the portrait with the original, to disentangle the philosophy of the master from that of the critic, but they will ask themselves what is the value of the philosophy in itself.

We will state, at once, that this is the question to be dealt with in the following article. Though certain salient characteristics of Newman's teaching can be mistaken by none, yet, in their application to modern questions, there is so much variety of opinion amongst his disciples that the whole can only be known when much is made public which has not yet seen the light. But, with all that is doubtful, this much is certain, he has been a great former of minds; and if those minds have sometimes eventually developed on very various lines, this does not lessen the greatness of the teacher. That Mr. Williams owes much to Newman no one who reads his book can deny; and if some of us may think that Newman also owes something to his disciple, that in this book we have Newman, and something more than Newman besides, this is surely no disparagement to the influence of that great leader.

We will regard this work, therefore, as one of independent value in virtue of its original thought. Now original thought is not always

**Newman, Pascal, Loisy, and the Catholic Church*, W. J. Williams.

new thought, it is something much more than that. It is, perhaps, literally true that "there is nothing new under the sun;" no thought that has not already been thought, no word that has not already been uttered. But if there is nothing new there is much that is original, and this is the highest quality of any intellectual work. An original thought is one that has been begotten, and not merely repeated, by the mind from which it issues. Many works, which may even have a certain glamor of novelty, are wholly devoid of originality in this sense; they are not the real product of their supposed author. While, on the other hand, the oldest idea, that has truly been begotten afresh in the mind that brings it forth, is original, and living and fresh.

The book before us is original, in this sense, from start to finish; every word is living, every thought is the true child of its parent. It is the inner experience of one who has worked out his faith in the sweat of his brow, and to whom that faith, and the philosophy of that faith, would seem to have become the very substance of his mind. It may sound like exaggeration, and yet to the present writer it seems a sober fact, that we rarely find any intellectual position so impregnably established from within as that which is here set forth. *From within*, we say, because it is of course possible to approach the truth from so many points that, *from without*, this philosophy may non appeal to all. But what we mean is that the author has so worked out for his own mind the inmost reality of those facts of religious experience, which are not his property alone, that he would seem to have reached a basis which nothing could disturb, however much his philosophy may be further extended and amplified.

This book gives us then the religion, the beliefs and the philosophy of its author as a member of the Catholic Church; it gives what, to him, are the essential notes of Catholicism and its main ideas; it is a great apology for the Catholic as opposed to the Protestant idea of religion; it is a profound study of the innermost nature of religious authority as opposed to private judgment; of development as opposed to traditionalism; of the social and corporate life of the Church as opposed to the individualism of mere sects; of true democratic principles as opposed to tyranny on the one side, anarchy and socialism on the other. And one more great note of the book is its irresistible indictment of the spirit of departmentalism in religion, that vice of which Newman has been sometimes accused, and oftener suspected, and

from which, if the interpretation of Mr. Williams be the true one, he is completely and for ever exonerated.

But, precious as is the reputation of Newman to all who have been trained in his school, even more important than to prove that this great doctor was not departmental in his conception of religion, is it to prove that such departmentalism is, in itself, pernicious to religion, and destructive of its more spiritual conception.

By departmentalism in religion or philosophy we mean any system according to which facts of experience or knowledge, whether such facts be interior or exterior, spiritual or material, religious or scientific or historical, are isolated and kept apart from the rest of our knowledge and life.

Now we may be cognizant of many facts which make little or no difference to the whole; they are casual in so far as that term may be applied to anything at all. But, in proportion to the intellectual vigor of a nature, the realm of what may be thus called casual knowledge will be smaller, and the realm of living knowledge greater. To the man whose faculties of thinking and feeling, of willing and loving, are firmly knit together in one strong and active personality, every fact of thought and experience will affect his entire intellectual system. Just as a new discovery in any branch of science modifies, to the extent of the discovery, the whole field of that science, and may, proportionately, modify many other sciences likewise, so the reception of a living fact into a living mind will alter, to the extent of that fact, the whole complexus of knowledge and philosophy which the mind possesses. The recognition, however inadequate, of this fact is one of the merits which our author ascribes to scholastic philosophy.

"Though treating their premisses too much as 'fixed ideas,' the schoolmen did perceive and did develop the main element in philosophic progress, the necessity of its being organic; the *necessity that every truth discovered should be made to work its way through the whole mental organism.*" p. 252.

Just the opposite process is that in which a truth is cast into a cell of the mind, and allowed to settle down therein to a state of petrification.

Now if this, which we have called departmentalism, is, in every branch of life, a sign of inferior intellectual vigor, most of all does Mr. Williams deprecate it in religion, which it is the object of his book to set forth as the greatest unifying factor of all. Religion has, indeed, regarded under its special aspect, a process of its own, but it has also a peculiarly fundamental relation to the other processes of life.

"Whether man be matter or spirit, certain it is that he is suspended between the eternities and that he knows it. Deep calls into deep, and the breath of the upper and nether eternity—the eternity whence he comes, the eternity whither he goes,—blows through his fragile being from the day of his birth to his death. What can he desire then, with all the energies that being may possess, but to be at one with that which begat him, and with that which shall, at last, receive him into its arms? What is his hope but that he may have peace and be at unity with these masters of his destiny?

Whether he be matter or spirit he has desires; and his main desire must ever be the explanation and the underlying motive of all the desires he knows. To be at one with himself; to be at one with all the depths of his being; that he may rest on the eternal that is below him and that he may find room for all the complexity of his energy and all the passionate yearning of his nature in the eternity that is beyond him: this is the main desire of man." p. 184.

And earlier:

"If it be asked then, 'How can modern society, which rejects the existence of a Personal God, accept the authority of a Church the first article of whose creed proclaims His existence?' We may ask in turn 'How did ancient society, in a similar condition, accept that authority?' What converts to Christianity were in search of then was, probably, what all men who think are in search of now; not some abstractly perfect proof, not some mathematical or scholastic demonstration, not some truth behind phenomena, not some fixed idea; but life—life of a kind so central to the nature of man as to give life to all the spheres of his thought and action. If he has found this life for himself, he has found God and the absolute; the ultimately real, that which really makes to live; he has found the truth—not as an abstraction nor even as an abstract ideal—but as something that lives with his own life and joins with his own energies.

Now it is religion and morality which are concerned with the sources of life. Where then is he to look for such a life? Is he to find it without or within? He is to find it both within and without, in whatever has life and contributes to life.

On the grounds on which we have been discussing the subject hitherto, he may reject every religion whose essential characteristic fails of the notion of universal solidarity and organic unity . . . because, as humanity becomes conscious of itself as a unit in the universe, all religions that are merely national or are connected with any basis not universal become impossible." p. 22.

It is as the clearest and fullest representative of religion in this sense that the Catholic Church appeals to this school of philosophy. To her enemies, and, what is more unfortunate, to many of her friends, she will seem to stand for religion as a separate compartment of life; nay she does, at times, by her official utterances, lay herself open to the charge. None the less is her very nature opposed to such a conception. As our writer says:

"Her Catholicism is felt to be even more than she herself has claimed. It has come in the process of time, and by contact with every kind of na-

tional tradition—in morals, in religion and even in philosophy—to be a Catholicism not only of Christian tradition, but, to some extent, of the whole great religious tradition in the human family." p. 17.

This Catholicity it is which gives to a religion its right to be regarded as the deepest fact, the most pervasive factor, of life; and the Church it is which, as Mr. Williams aims at proving, most fully represents this aspect of religion. This claim has not always been made in the same way. The earlier and cruder method was to establish the universality of religion by means of its predominance rather than its pervasiveness; philosophy and science were to be the handmaidens of theology; religion was to be the sovereign, the law, of every other kind of life.

If we say all this still, we say it with a different meaning; the supremacy of religion (if such a word as supremacy can be used) is more spiritual, and likewise more irresistible than any mere priority of rank and authority could make it. Religion has sometimes struggled for this right of predominance, but she abdicates her own dignity in doing so. Science also has made stubborn efforts to obtain the sovereign rule, but these are ambitions which bring with them no worse curse than their own fulfilment; to rule in the wrong place is but to give manifest proof of weakness and inadequacy. The only justification for what religion has, in the past, attempted in this direction is that, until the sense of the one and whole was more developed she rightly attempted to give this sense of unity by means of her own predominance, to bring all other things into the universal through their subjection to herself.

"And consequently," says our author, "modern thought has very generally come to recognize the necessity for the attitude of the Church of the Middle Ages towards science. The sense of the whole, as we hear repeated so often, must come first; and with philosophy as a whole, with the moral and religious basis of life, the church of the Middle Ages was obliged to concern itself . . .

The Catholic Church in the Middle Ages was the sole, as she was the inevitable, representative of human solidarity in Europe." pp.14-15.

All the bitterness, on the other hand, of religious and philosophical and intellectual warfare has arisen from this struggle between the different departments of life for unity through predominance; a struggle in which it is as fatal to conquer as to be defeated. The battle of the future, one in which it should, on the contrary, be as good to lose as to win, should be the struggle for unity by means of mutual penetration and permeation.

From this conception of the true relations of part and whole may readily be developed the corresponding theory of authority. One of the most striking points in this work is its triumphant repudiation of the doctrine of private judgment. But private judgment, as here understood, is not the setting up of the mind of the layman against the mind of the expert, of the mind of the subject against the mind of the ruler, nor even of the mind of the individual against the mind of the many. It is something more fundamental than all this, it is the setting up of the part against the whole; of man as a private being against man as a member of the great human family; of the mind regarded from the standpoint of its limited acquired knowledge against the mind with indefinite power of expansion and instincts of infinitude; of the self in its narrow capacity against the self which is great as the universe. It is this conception of the greatness of his own being and destiny rather than the realisation of his weakness and limitations, that should cast man into the arms of religious authority. The power of the policeman is exercised for the control of his lower, material self; the force of religious authority should be exercised for the development of his highest faculties, his most spiritual aspirations, his noblest liberty. As our author tells us, it is impossible any longer for a man to

"Believe in a religion which is really his own invention and can, in no sense, stand above him, a religion judged by personal instinct and opinion alone, a religion of individual eclecticism." p. 26.

For he has learned that:

"It is not reason, but experience, which shows that the choice of things which might be tried is infinite," p. 136.

and experience can never be more than a most limited factor in the life of an individual.

And as the church, even abscinding from her divine and supernatural mission, stands thus for the catholicity of the human mind, with its reason, its experience and all its other faculties, as against its narrowness when considered it its purely private capacity, so likewise does she stand for its catholicity in regard to time, representing as she does, neither present nor past, but past, present and future blended into one progressive whole.

"If, then, Catholic writers on religion have been able to avoid the provincialism into which other religious writers have fallen, if Catholic writers have displayed a certain universality of spirit, which makes them significant for all time, and Protestant writers have been too negative,

too controversial and even too conservative, is it not because the Church secures a consistent basis, a basis of spiritual fact, a mode of continuity, *a mode of relating the present with the past, which makes a bolder progress possible* and, in the long run, a truer liberation of the mind." p. 218.

It is in this sense that development becomes one of the very notes of Catholicity, the catholicity of all the ages. Thus:

"As it had taken many ages to develop a few aspects of the Idea, before Christianity came into the world, so, according to Newman, it may take humanity many thousands of ages before it is able to discover, by the slow process of development, what the germ is as a system of truth." p. 109.

All this conception of authority is, indeed, democratic, but democratic in no party sense, rather in that sense in which the spirit of man is essentially democratic. There is here no suspicion of subserviency to mere numbers, no divinizing of the people, no setting up of an autocracy of the many over the few; such is the democracy of party and of passion, and of collective egoism. But democracy in its nobler sense is based on the conception of solidarity; we are at once the governed and the governing, the king and the people, the rulers and the faithful. To obey, then, is no indignity, for it is to bow to the God within our own souls, as well as above them, to be guided by the best lights of our own mind as well as those from a higher source. Such obedience as this is founded on a rock which can never be shaken, for its motives can only die with ourselves, and the humility which corresponds to it is as essential as itself. There is a sense in which the soul claims a certain equality even with its Maker, since it is made for Him, and can find only in Him the fulness of its own being.

Thus then the Church, taken as the completest representative of this Catholic and universal religion, which is the deepest and most unifying factor of our life, stands before us as the soul of our soul, the spiritual world in which alone each individual spirit can attain its full being and influence and significance.

"Nor does it," says our author, "detract from her majesty that she has acted as one of the forces of nature from motives which lie too deep in the heart of things to be expressed in the terminology of any particular age." p. 280.

This is a mark of her greatness and not of her limitations.

Catholicity of mind and heart, catholicity in philosophy, and, still more, in religion, as the factor of life whose special characteristic catholicity should be, this is the note and the plea of the entire work before us; and truly the theme has been nobly developed. Departmentalism, on the contrary, which is, as we we have described, the

closing up of any fact, whether religious or philosophical, or historical, in a separate cell of the mind, this is the intellectual vice from which Mr. Williams has sought to free the reputation of his great master, and which he has so effectually exposed in its own intrinsic untruthfulness.

And this is a matter of great import at the present moment, when to many it seems the easiest solution of troublesome difficulties to sort knowledge into separate compartments, where one item cannot interfere with another. If we accept the philosophy of his book such a policy will no longer be possible. To those who possess a merely national and distant acquaintance with such new facts in history, science or criticism, as are disturbing to the positions previously established, it is possible to remain in a quiescent attitude of mind, neither accepting nor denying. But this is only possible to those who are not in living contact with such facts. Others, on the contrary, to whom these new, and somewhat subversive truths are living and practical would find it both absurd and impossible to remain in this expectant or semi-resistent attitude of mind. It is true that further research will often qualify the results of that which has gone before, and this is a good reason for avoiding anything in the nature of a rapid synthesis, for not seeking finality in the midst of a process. But if to do this be to arrest the process, to pursue the other line of conduct above described is to pervert and falsify it, to condemn it to that kind of incompleteness which, being half the truth, is often the worst of lies.

So that although the Church be our home, and we look for a certain peace within her walls, it is not a peace of stillness and inaction. Everything that has ceased to grow has begun to perish, and this is true of the individual soul as of the enitre Church; finality is death, progress is life. As is so deeply and truly said in the work before us:

"For no individual, for no generation, but only for the race—and then only in aspect after aspect, immanentally and not in its transcendent completeness, can the truth be known as it lies in the bosom of the Eternal." p. 149.

But for each soul there shall be its own share in the revelation which is on its way, age by age, to its perfect unfolding, and then:

"As it is the Christ in the heart of man that was to be brought out and made to grow, so it shall be Christ himself who, when one aspect of Him after another has been set forth and developed, shall stand forth as the sum of these aspects at the end of the days." p. 237.

M. D. Petre.

STUDIES

DIVORCE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT

AN EXEGETICAL STUDY. (II)

Francis E. Gigot, D. D.

Viewed in the light of literary and historical criticism, Mk. x, 2-12 ascribes to Our Lord a doctrine concerning divorce which is the very same as the one taught by the Roman Catholic Church down to the present day. In this passage of our earliest Synoptic Gospel, Jesus affirms publicly that despite Moses' toleration of divorce the formal dismissal of a wife by her husband is unlawful. He proclaims in the hearing of all, that Israel's lawgiver regulated the practice of divorce, simply because, owing to the hardness of heart of his Jewish contemporaries, he did not see his way to suppress it altogether. On the basis of texts found in the book of Genesis, He argues that the Creator established from the first a perfect unity between husband and wife, and that consequently the man who presumes to break the marriage tie goes against God's primitive and unchanged will. To this plain declaration of Our Lord's mind concerning divorce, St. Mark's record subjoins another which Jesus made in private to His own disciples, and which is, if anything, more explicit than the former. Of His own authority, He emphatically condemns as guilty of adultery the consort, husband or wife, who dares to attempt a second union during the lifetime of the other party. Such is the obvious meaning of Mk. x, 2-12, and the Catholic apologist has a perfect right to point it out as a distinct proof that, in maintaining the absolute indissolubility of a valid and consummated Christian marriage, the Church remains faithful to the doctrine of her Divine Founder. This passage of our second Gospel, however, is not the only one in the early documents of Christianity to which the contemporary apologist can confidently appeal for such a purpose. And it is the object of the present paper to show that Lk. xvi, 18, bears witness to the same teaching of Christ concerning divorce as is set forth in Mk. x, 2-12.[1]

[1]The reader will find in parallel columns on a special page, at the end of this paper· (1) the Greek text of Lk. xvi, 18, and of its parallels in Mt. and Mk.; (2) a

The single verse which bears directly on divorce in our third Gospel, may be literally rendered as follows:

Lk. xvi, 18.
Every one who puts away his wife
and marries another
commits adultery;
and he who marries
one put away from a husband
commits adultery.

Considered in themselves, these words of Jesus to "the Pharisees" (Cfr. Luke xvi, 14, 15) convey distinctly Christ's mind regarding divorce. In Lk. xvi, 18, as in Mk. x, 2-12, Our Lord places Himself in direct opposition to the universally-received notion of His day that the formal dismissal of a woman by her husband broke the marriage tie and made it lawful for both the dismissing man and the dismissed woman to enter upon a second marriage (Cfr. Mt. v, 31; xix, 3-7; Mk. x, 2-4). In His eyes, man's dismissal of his wife releases neither consort from the bond of matrimony. Despite a man's will to set himself free from the marriage tie by putting away his wife in a legal manner, he still remains her husband before God, so that if he marries another woman, however free this woman might herself be with regard to marriage, he is guilty of adultery:

Every one who puts away his wife
and marries another
commits adultery.

Despite also a man's expressed will of releasing his wife from all marriage obligation to him, so that as far as he is concerned, she is free to contract another union, she is still before God that man's wife, and in consequence, another man, however free he might otherwise be to contract a lawful marriage, cannot marry her without incurring the guilt of adultery:

and he who marries
one put away from a husband
commits adultery.

It will be easily noticed that the terms used by Our Lord in Lk. xvi, 18 are such as to exclude any and every ground that would justify a second union. The dismissing husband, whoever he may be and whatever motive may actuate him (πᾶς ὁ ἀπολύων), is an adulterer

direct translation of these passages from the original Greek. In our rendering of the second part of Lk. xvi, 18; Mt. v, 32, and xix, 9, we have preserved the Greek construction found in the original Text.

(μοιχύει) by the very fact that knowing himself to be a divorced man, he takes another wife (καὶ γαμῶν ἑτέραν). An exactly similar consequence of the formal dismissal of a man's wife affects any man who unites himself in wedlock to the woman supplied with a document which proves to him that she has been regularly divorced; by the very fact that the second man enters upon a marriage with one whom he knows to be a divorced woman, he also commits adultery (καὶ ὁ ἀπολελυμένην ἀπὸ ἀνδρὸς γαμῶν μοιχεύει). Plainly then, according to our latest, as according to our earliest, Synoptic Gospel, there is no such a thing as a lawful divorce. Christ's words as recorded by both Evangelists are to one and the same effect: the remarriage either of a divorced man or of a divorced woman is tainted with adultery.

A strong confirmation of the meaning just set forth as the obvious sense of Lk. xvi, 18, may be drawn from the connection of that verse with the immediately preceding ones in our third Gospel. The whole passage made up of Lk. xvi, 14-18 reads as follows:

14. And the Pharisees, being lovers of money,
also heard all these things, and scoffed at Him.
15. And He said to them:
You are those who justify yourselves before men,
but God knows your hearts;
for what is exalted among men
is an abomination before God.
16. The Law and the Prophets until John.
From that time, the Kingdom of God is announced,
and every one forces his way into it.
17. But it is easier for heaven and earth to pass away,
than for one tittle of the Law to fail.
18. Every one who puts away his wife
and marries another
commits adultery,
and he who marries
one put away from a husband
commits adultery.

Whoever is familiar with St. Luke's literary methods of composition will not doubt, for a moment, that there must be a leading idea that connects the component parts of this short section of our third Gospel.[2] Bearing this in mind, he will easily make out that this idea is no other than that of setting forth Our Lord's rebuke of the hypocrisy of the Pharisees who deceived men, but not God,

[2]In point of fact, the manner in which St. Luke has *inverted* two verses of our first Gospel (Mt. xi, 12, 13), to frame out of them, one single verse of this section (Lk. xvi 16), shows that the component elements of Lk. xvi, 14-18, were not put together without any actual deliberation on the part of our third Evangelist.

by their loud professions of the highest regard for the Law in its minutest particulars. According to these conceited leaders of the Jews, the Law was ever to be maintained among the chosen people, so that, at no time, could any of its provisions be considered as antiquated. How then, argued Jesus,[3] could they without hypocrisy, treat as null and void one of the most important and clearest enactments of the Law, viz.: the primitive Divine command in Gen. ii, 24, which proclaimed the absolute indissolubility of the marriage tie? The point was all the better taken because these enemies of the Saviour often accused Him of destroying the Law. No, it was not He,—any more than John, who before Him had announced the kingdom of God and attracted crowds anxious to fit themselves to enter into it,—that did away with the ever-binding character of the Law. It was they who really went against it with regard, for instance, to the marriage bond, despite their misleading professions of a perfect attachment to the smallest regulations of the Law.[4]

Such is the general purport of Lk. xvi, 14-18; such also is the line of thought whereby St. Luke connects the last verse of that section (Lk. xvi, 18) with its immediately preceding verses (Lk. xvi, 14-17). Now, this strongly confirms the obvious meaning of Our Lord's declaration as recorded in Lk. xvi, 18:

> Every one who puts away
> his wife
> and marries another
> commits adultery,
> and he who marries
> one put away from a husband
> commits adultery.

It shows plainly that in quoting these words of Jesus, St. Luke intended to set them forth as containing a doctrine of His concerning

[3]The perennial character of the Law is plainly assumed by Our Lord in the Parable of Dives and Lazarus which follows immediately Lk. xvi, 14-18 (Cr. Lk. xvi, 29, 31).

[4]In thus recording Our Lord's words concerning divorce on the occasion of a particular rebuke of the Pharisees, and in presenting them as an instance of Christ's actual regard for the Law, St. Luke combined the circumstances which are assigned to their delivery in the other two Synoptics: in both Mk. x, 2-12 and Mt. xix, 1-9 Our Lord's words concerning divorce are recorded on the occasion of a particular attempt of the Pharisees to set Him at variance with the Law which drew upon them the stern rebuke: "For your hardness of heart, he (Moses) wrote you this commandment;" in Mt. v, they are set forth as one of the instances which illustrates the manner in which Jesus did not destroy, but fulfilled the Law (Cf. Mt. v, 17), and which, on that account, follow Christ's solemn declaration in Mt. v, 18, that "till heaven and earth pass away, one jot, or one tittle shall not pass away," with which one may compare the declaration to the same effect in Lk. xvi, 17.

divorce, which was at total variance with the view of the Pharisees of His time, and which alone was compatible with the ever-binding force of the Law. They regarded a bill of divorce, once given to a wife by her husband, as rendering two things perfectly lawful: 1) the remarriage of the dismissing husband to another woman; 2) the marriage of a dismissed woman upon her showing a regular bill of divorce. He, on the contrary, denied the lawfulness of both the one and the other, as is obviously stated in Lk. xvi, 18. The Pharisees admitted a man's full right to divorce his wife; Jesus rejected it under the pain of adultery. In regarding the marriage as actually severed by a man's will to that effect, the opponents of Jesus really assumed that God's will decreeing in the first pages of the Law a perfect, and hence unbreakable, unity between husband and wife:

Genesis ii, 24.

Wherefore a man shall leave his father and mother,
and shall cleave to his wife,
and they shall become one flesh,

had been made void by Moses' later regulation (Deuteronomy xxiv, 1-4) concerning the practice of divorce. In teaching that the marriage bond subsisted entire between the dismissing husband and the dismissed wife, Jesus held alone a position consistent with the everlasting force of the Law. Despite any and every subsequent legislation framed in view of whatever circumstances before or since John, the original Divine decree had not *failed*; it remained in full vigor and for all times to come:

16. The Law and the Prophets until John.
From that time, the Kingdom of God is announced,
and every one forces his way into it.
17. But it is easier for heaven and earth to pass away,
than for one tittle of the Law to fail.

Whoever then, interprets impartially Lk. xvi, 18, in the light of the immediately preceding verses (Lk. xvi ,14-17), must take in: their obvious sense the words of Our Lord quoted in Lk. xvi, 18: it is this obvious sense which allowed our third Evangelist to record them in a section wherein the Pharisees are charged with hypocritically setting aside the ever-binding force of the Law while they loudly professed to keep it intact. We therefore conclude that in writing Lk. xvi, 18, our third Synoptic cited the words of Jesus as ruling out every remarriage after divorce under the pain of adultery, and consequently as containing the same doctrine of Christ as is set forth in Mk. x, 2-12.

To the foregoing confirmation of the obvious meaning of Lk. xvi, 18, we may add another, and if anything, a still stronger one. It amounts to this. A careful comparison of that verse of our third Evangelist with its direct parallels in the other two Synoptics, shows that St. Luke framed it as a most distinct statement of the doctrine embodied in Mk. x, 2-12. The following is an outline of the evidence in favor of this position.

It is quite sure that the wording of Lk. xvi, 18:

Every one putting away
his wife
and marrying another
commits adultery,
and he, one put away
from a husband
marrying
commits adultery,[5]

bears a close literary relation to the two passages of our first Gospel[6] which record Our Lord's words concerning divorce:

Mt. v, 32.	Mt. xix, 9.
Every one putting away	Whoever shall put away
his wife	his wife
except because of fornication	unless for fornication
	and shall marry another
makes her commit adultery,	commits adultery,
and whoever, one put away	and he, one put away
shall marry	marrying
commits adultery.	commits adultery.

The opening lines of Lk. xvi, 18 are identical with those of Mt. v, 32:

Mt. v.	Lk. xvi.
Every one putting away	Every one putting away
his wife.	his wife.

Lk's third line: "and marrying another" (*καὶ γαμῶν ἑτέραν*) corresponds manifestly to the fourth line of Mt. xix, 9: "and shall marry another" (*καὶ γαμήσῃ ἄλλην*). Its two differences from Mt's line can be easily accounted for: (1) St. Luke has modified Mt's future tense "shall marry" (*γαμήσῃ*) into a present participle "marrying" (*γαμῶν*) consistently with his, and also Mt's, use of the present participle "putting away" (*ἀπολύων*) in the opening line of the sentence; (2) Lk's pre-

[5]The Greek of Lk. xvi, 18, is rendered here most literally to preserve all its literary features, even the inversion.

[6]In rendering these two passages of St. Matthew we have also preserved the inversion of the Greek: "he, one put away shall marry (marrying) commits adultery."

ference for ἕτερος to ἄλλος throughout his Gospel and the book of the Acts[7] has led him to write here ἑτέραν instead of Mt's ἄλλην Lk's next expression: "commits adultery" (μοιχευει) is the direct equivalent of Mt's also next expression in xix, 9: "commits adultery" (μοιχᾶται), with this sole difference that for Mt's passive form St. Luke has substituted the active as better Greek when speaking of a man. The second part of Lk. xvi, 18 is likewise closely related to the corresponding second part of Mt. xix, 9:

Lk. xvi, 18.	Mt. xix, 9.
and he, one put away	and he, one put away
from a husband	
marrying (γαμῶν)	marrying (γαμήσας)
commits adultery (μοιχεύει).	commits adultery (μοιχᾶται).

The likeness of Lk's text to that of Mt. is plainly evidenced here by the whole construction and vocabulary. The differences between the two passages are certainly of Lk's own making: he adds the clause "from a husband" in accordance with his wont of supplying what is implied in the documents at his disposal (Cfr. Cor. vii, 10); he uses the indicative "marrying" (γαμῶν) instead of Mt's aorist (γαμήσασ) in harmony with what he has done in the first part of the sentence and for a similar reason, he employs the form μοιχευει instead of Mt's μοιχᾶται in speaking of an adulterer.

Thus far our comparison of Lk. xvi, 18 with Mt. v, 32 and xix, 9, establishes the same general fact as we have repeatedly stated in our foregoing Studies on the Synoptics, viz.: that our third Evangelist has worded his text in full view of St. Matthew's Gospel. His close literary resemblances here point to his dependence on Mt's parallel texts, while his differences hitherto noticed are clearly intended variations from the same passages. Whoever bears this in mind will readily admit that the absence of Mt's restrictive clause: "except on account of fornication" from Lk's text, is no more oversight on the part of our third Evangelist. The clause is found in both Mt. v, 32 and Mt. xix, 9, and its importance is manifest in texts purporting to record Our Lord's words on the vexed question of divorce. Besides, it is a well-known fact that in Christ's time all the Jews regarded divorce as perfectly lawful in at least one case, viz.: when a wife had proved unfaithful to her marriage vow. Again, since St. Luke agrees with St. Matthew in representing the words of Jesus as addressed

[7]Cf. W. F. Moulton and A. S. Geden, *a Concordance to the Greek New Testament;* Sir John C. Hawkins, *Horae Synoptico*, p. 16.

to the Pharisees, our third Synoptic had apparently the same reason, on that score, as our first Evangelist for recording the exceptive clause. Finally it behooved all the more St. Luke to preserve Mt's clause, because he was writing for Gentile readers who might not be aware of the one cause for which the Jews admitted that a man could lawfully dismiss his wife. We must therefore regard as certain that our third Synoptist omitted deliberately Mt's exceptive clause, supposing, as can hardly be doubted, that the clause existed in the texts of St. Matthew which St. Luke was utilizing.[8]

How then shall we account for this intentional omission of Mt's exceptive clause on the part of our third Evangelist? Briefly in the following manner. In framing his text out of Mt. v, 32 and xix, 9, St. Luke had distinctly in view Mk. x, 11, 12:

11. Whoever shall put away
his wife
and shall marry another
commits adultery against her,
12. and if she having put away
her husband
shall marry another
commits adultery.

These two verses of St. Mark represent Jesus as declaring guilty of adultery any party, husband or wife, that remarries after divorce. They absolutely exclude the idea that this remarriage is an adulterous union only in the case of the man who puts away his wife for any other cause but that of unfaithfulness. They plainly make the very fact of a second marriage after divorce the actual cause of adultery. And there is no doubt that St. Luke clearly saw that such was the import of Mk. x, 11-12. There is no doubt either that bearing this in mind and examining carefully Mt. v, 32 and xix, 9:

Mt. v, 32.	Mt. xix, 9.
Every one putting away	Whoever shall put away
his wife	his wife
	unless for fornication
except because of fornication	and shall marry another
makes her commit an adultery,	commits adultery,
and whoever, one put away	and he, one put away
shall marry	marrying
commits adultery,	commits adultery,

our third Evangelist considered the wording of these two passages of St. Matthew as genuinely consistent with the presentment of

[8]This point of textual criticism will be discussed in our subsequent examination of Mt. v, 32, and xix, 9.

the matter by our second Evangelist. To his mind, a contradiction on this point naturally appeared impossible on the part of these two writers who agreed in recording how in a discussion with the Pharisees, Jesus had openly ascribed Moses' permission of divorce to "the hardness of heart" of the Jews (Mk. x, 5; Mt. xix, 8), how He had distinctly opposed to that Mosaic toleration the Divine decree which settled that husband and wife became "one flesh" by the use of marriage (Mk. x, 8; Mt. xix, 5, 6), and had solemnly declared: "What therefore God has joined together, let no man put asunder" (Mk. x, 9; Mt. xix, 6). To St. Luke's mind it naturally appeared impossible that since St. Matthew and St. Mark thus agreed in setting forth Christ's total opposition to divorce, they should in the very same passage disagree in recording our Lord's words concerning the precise action whereby a man broke the unity willed from the first by the Creator, and made himself guilty of adultery. Convinced of this, and looking closely into Mt. v, 32 and Mt. xix, 9, he easily noticed the fact that in neither of these passages is a man charged with the actual commission of adultery, except when he is expressly connected with a marriage after divorce. Thus, in the first part of Mt. v, 32:

> Every one putting away
> his wife
> except because of fornication
> makes her commit an adultery,

it is indeed stated that if a man puts away his wife for any other cause than that of fornication, he "makes her commit an adultery," that is, he is responsible for leading her to becoming an adulteress; but he is not charged with the actual commission of adultery: St. Matthew does not say that such a one "commits adultery.' On the contrary, in the first part of Mt. xix, 9:

> Whoever shall put away
> his wife
> unless for fornication
> *and shall marry another*
> commits adultery,

a man in exactly the same conditions as are described in the first part of Mt. v, 32, in so far as the putting away of his wife is concerned, is branded as an adulterer, "commits adultery," because he is now contemplated as adding a further action to the one whereby he divorced his wife, and that additional action is precisely a second marriage: "and shall marry another." That it is the remarriage of a divorced

party that stamps a union with the guilt of adultery is made plainer still, if anything, by the wording of the second part of both Mt. v, 32 and Mt. xix, 9:

Mt. v.	Mt. xix.
and whoever, one put away	and he, one put away
shall marry	marrying
commits adultery.	commits adultery.

For, in this second part of both Mt. xix, 9, a man is condemned as an adulterer solely in the event of his contracting marriage (note the tense forms in the Greek: γαμήσῃ "shall marry," γαμήσας "marrying") with a divorced woman.

Thus then, St. Luke distinctly perceived that St. Matthew was really at one with St. Mark in representing Christ as condemning every remarriage after divorce as an adultery. He clearly saw that Mt.'s restrictive clause: "except for fornication," did not make the actual commission of adultery depend on another cause besides remarriage. He therefore felt free to preserve that clause since it was found in our first Gospel, or to omit it since it was absent from the parallel passage in our second Synoptic. On the one hand, to insert it into his own redaction of Lk. xvi, 18 would cause him to utilize to its full extent Mt.'s text in v, 32 and xix, 9. On the other hand, to leave it out would enable him to transform Mt.'s record of Christ's words into a more distinct statement of an absolute condemnation of all remarriage after divorce.[9] It is the latter course which he followed, thereby supplying us with a strong proof of the fact that in framing Lk. xvi, 18, our third Evangelist deliberately conveyed the same strict doctrine of Jesus as is embodied in Mk. x, 2-12: every remarriage after divorce is forbidden under the pain of adultery.

In whatever way, then, the unbiassed interpreter examines Lk. xvi, 18, whether in the obvious meaning of its words, or in its context, or again in its form as compared with that of the parallel texts in the other two Synoptic Gospels, he is led to the general position set forth at the beginning of this paper. He cannot help admitting that St. Luke agrees with St. Mark in representing as the explicit teaching of Christ regarding divorce, the doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church

[9] In reference to the form adopted here by St. Luke (Lk. xvi, 18), Prof. H. J. Holtzmann (*die Synoptiker*, 3d edit., Leipsic, 1901; p. 389) pertinently remarks: "Ohne Zweifel gibt diesmal l.c. den Gedanken in seiner durchsischtigsten Form: *Ehe bricht, wer sein Weib entlaesst und eine andere heirathet, und wer eine Entlassene heirathet.*"

down to the present day. Well therefore may the Catholic apologist point back to both our second and our third Gospels, as to early documents of Christianity which prove that, despite all assertions to the contrary, the Church of God is simply re-echoing the voice of her Divine Founder concerning the absolute indissolubility of holy matrimony, when she proclaims that whoever avails himself or herself of a legal form of divorce and contracts a new marriage is guilty of the sin of adultery.

Francis E. Gigot.

DIVORCE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.

1. THE ORIGINAL GREEK.

Mk. x, 11-12.

11 Ὃς ἂν ἀπολύσῃ
τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ

καὶ γαμήσῃ ἄλλην
μοιχᾶται ἐπ᾽ αὐτήν,
1 καὶ ἐὰν αὐτὴ ἀπολύσασα
τὸν ἄνδρα αὐτῆς
γαμήσῃ ἄλλον
μοιχᾶται.

Mt. v, 32.

πᾶς ὁ ἀπολύων
τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ
παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας

ποιεῖ αὐτὴν μοιχευθῆναι,
καὶ ὃς ἐαν ἀπολελυμένην
γαμήσας
μοιχᾶται.

Mt. xix. 9.

Ὃς ἂν ἀπολύσῃ
τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ
μὴ ἐπὶ πορνείᾳ
καὶ γαμήσῃ ἄλλην
μοιχᾶται,
καὶ ὁ ἀπολελυμένην
γαμήσας
μοιχᾶται.

2. LITERAL RENDERING.

Mk. x, 11-12.

11. Whoever shall put away
his wife

and shall marry another
commits adultery against her,
12. and if she having put away
her husband
shall marry another
commits adultery.

Mt. v, 32.

Every one putting away
his wife
except because of fornication

makes her commit an adultery,
and whoever, one put away

shall marry
commits adultery.

Mt. xix. 9.

Whoever shall put away
his wife
unless for fornication
and shall marry another
commits adultery,
and he, one put away

marrying (*aorist*)
commits adultery.

CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA

Joseph Turmel

Life.—Born about the year 140, Clement, after long travels in Greece, Southern Italy and Palestine, settled at Alexandria in the neighborhood of Pantaenus, who was then in charge of the catechetical school of that city.[1] In 190 at the latest he became the successor of Pantaenus in the chair of catechetics,[2] a position which he occupied until the persecution of Septimius Severus forced him to flee (202). A passage of his disciple Alexander informs us that in 211 he was living in Cappadocia.[3] The date of his death is not known; we know only that it must be placed before 215.[4] St. Epiphanius reports that in his time some claimed Clement as an Alexandrian by birth while others said that he was born at Athens.[5] We have no means of settling the matter. We know only that he was a priest[6] and that he was the master of Origen. In short, the life of Clement is for the most part unknown to us;[7] we are better acquainted with his writings.

Writings. The literary activity of Clement was considerable. Several of his writings are entirely lost. The following have come down to us: the *Protrepticus* (or *Exhortation to the Greeks*), the *Paedagogus*, the *Stromata*, the Homily *Quis dives salvetur*? fragments of the *Hypotyposes*, among which are found a fairly important fragment called *Adumbrationes*, sparse pieces entitled *Excerpta ex Scriptis Theodoti* and *Eclogae ex Scriptis Propheticis*.

Until lately the *Exhortation*, the *Paedagogus* and the *Stromata* were considered as three sections of the same whole, and were often spoken of as the Trilogy of Clement. He began, it was claimed, by drawing the reader from paganism, and to this end he wrote the *Exhortation*: then he initiated him in Christian morals by means of the

[1] *Str.* I, 1, (*P. G.* VIII, 700).
[2] Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* VI, 6.
[3] *Ibid.* VI, 11
[4] This follows from the letter of Alexander to Origen in Eusebius, VI, 14.
[5] *Haer.* 32, 6.
[6] *Paed.* I, 6. p. 112, 18.
[7] Harnack, *Die Chronologie der altchr. Litteratur*, II, 3 ss. For results of recent researches see Deiber, *Clément d'Alexandrie et l'Egypte* (Paris, 1905); d'Alés, "Un fragment pseudo-clémentin" in the *Revue des Etudes Grecques*, 1905, p. 211; Houloir, "Comment Clément d'Alexandrie a connu les mystères d'Eleusis" in *Musée Belge*, Aug. 15, 1905.

Paedagogus: and finally he led him to fuller enlightenment by means of the *Stromata*. Thus the three works were successive stages to lead his reader from paganism to the Christian gnosis. This view has been attacked by de Faye, who acknowledges that Clement had the idea of making such a trilogy, but thinks that the plan was not really carried out. In his opinion the *Stromata* forms only an introduction to the third member of the trilogy, which was never brought to completion. Let us say at once that this view of de Faye is generally rejected. But Wendland and Heussi have recently presented another which has been well received, and which overthrows the old opinion still more completely. According to this new theory, the first four books of the *Stromata* were written before the *Paedagogus*. Hence the *Paedagogus* was not in the mind of Clement a preparation for the *Stromata*, and the trilogy was not the result of a preconceived plan.[8]

The Homily *Quis dives salvetur*? is a dissertation on Mark x, 17—31. Its aim is to prove that the Savior has not condemned riches; that He only wishes that a good use be made of them. It is here we find the well-known story of the robber converted by the Apostle St. John.

The *Hypotyposes*, or *Dissertations*, comprised, according to Eusebius (vi, 13, 14), eight books. Photius, who had read them, presents them as dissertations or at least commentaries on various passages of the Old and New Testaments (*Biblioth.* 109.) Zahn (*Forsch.* iii, 133) has proven that the *Adumbrationes* are a translation of a fragment of the *Hypotyposes*. The translation was made on the order of Cassiodorus, who expurgated it by cutting out certain heterodox ideas (*Institut.* I, 8.)

Zahn (*Forsch.* iii, 104) believes that the eighth book of the *Stromata* has disappeared, though some extracts remain; and that these extracts are found in the *Excerptis ex Scriptis Theodoti*, the *Eclogae ex Scriptis Propheticis*, as well as in the texts which our present editions give (following the Florentinus manuscript) as the eighth book. This opinion of Zahn is rejected; it is admitted that Clement intended to write an eighth book of the *Stromata*, but not that he ever did so. The *Excerpta*, the *Eclogae*, and the texts of the present eighth book were written by Clement, but they are only materials for a book that was never written, not remnants of a book that has disappeared.[9]

[8]DeFaye, *Clément d'Alexandrie*, pp. 78ss; Wendland, *Theologische Litteratur-Zeitung*, 1898, p. 653; Heussi, *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie*, 1902, p. 474; Harnack, *Die Chronologie der altchr. Litt.*, II, 9.

[9]*Ibid.* II, 17.

Proofs. Alexander of Jerusalem mentions Clement in his letters (Euseb. vi, 11 and 14).[10] In the former of these passages he presents him as a man of proved virtue, and says that he had made the church of Cappadocia prosper; in the latter he speaks of him as his master and as one who had rendered him service. The "*Anonymus*" of Eusebius (V, 28) who is believed to be Hippolytus, cites Clement amongst the writers who, before Pope St. Victor, proclaimed the divinity of Christ. But the first witness to the written words of Clement is Eusebius, to whom we owe the titles of all his writings, the analysis of most of them, and extracts from some, especially the *Hypotyposes*. After Eusebius, attestations are numerous. It is sufficient to mention those of St. Jerome and Photius.[11]

Transmission. The text of the *Exhortation*, the *Paedagogus* and the *Stromata* has been preserved for us in part by the Codex of Arethas (10th cent.) and partly by copies of this manuscript.[12] We know the Homily *Quis dives salvetur*? by a Vatican manuscript of the 16th century and one of the Excurial of the 11th century. The latter, which is the source of the Vatican manuscript, was first used by Bernard in his edition of the Homily in 1897. The *Excerpta* and the *Eclogae* come to us through the Florentinus manuscript, which is itself a copy of the Arethas. The *Adumbrationes* have been handed down in two manuscripts, one of the 9th, the other of the 13th century. The other fragments of the *Hypotyposes* are found in the citations made by Eusebius, by Maximus Confessor and by Moschus(cf. Harnack, l. c.)

Principal Editions. The best complete edition of the works of Clement is that of the Anglican Bishop Potter, which appeared in two folio volumes at Oxford in 1715. It was reprinted at Oberthür (Würzbourg, 1778), by Klotz (Leipzig, 1831), and by Migne (vols. viii, ix of the *Pat. Gr.*). Dindorf published at Oxford in 1869 a new edition which leaves much to be desired, and which has been made the object of severe criticism. Among the partial editions it will suffice to mention: Zahn, *Supplementum Clementinum* in Vol. III of *Forschungen zur Geschichte des neut. Kanons* (1884); Barnard, *Clement*

[10]Note also the testimony of Julius Africanus (in Cedrenus—Routh, *Reliquiae Sacrae*, II, 307), who says that Clement flourished at Alexandria under the reign of Commodus.

[11]Harnack, *Gesch. der altchr. Litt.*, First Part, I, 296.

[12]Stählin, *Beitrage zur Kenntnis der Handschriften des Clemens Al.* (1897); *Untersuchungen über die Scholien zu Clemens Al.* (1897); *Zur handschriftlichen Ueberlieferung des Cl. Al.*, in "Texte und Untersuchungen," XX (1900).

of Alexandria, Quis dives salvetur, in vol. v of "Texts and Studies" (1897); Stählin, *Clemens Alexandrinus Protrepticus und Paedagogus* (1905).

DOCTRINES.

Before enquiring into the doctrines contained in the extant writings of Clement, it will be well to examine the testimony of Photius concerning a work of which we now possess only shreds, but which he was able to read in its entirety. Here is what the author of the *Bibliotheca* has to say about the *Hypotyposes*;[13] "I have read three volumes of Clement, priest of Alexandria: the *Hypotyposes*, the *Stromata* and the *Paedagogus*. The *Hypotyposes* treat of certain passages of the Old and of the New Testament. They give a succinct commentary on these passages. The doctrine therein exposed is, here and there, orthodox, but impious and fabulous statements are also found. Clement speaks of eternal matter as well as ideas (Platonic), and he tries to base this on Scripture. He puts the Son of God in the rank of creatures. He teaches metempsychosis, and says that three were worlds before the time of Adam. He claims that Eve came from Adam not as Scripture describes it but after a manner impious and obscene. He imagines that the Angels had carnal connection with women, and that children were born of such unions. Moreover he teaches that the Word did not become incarnate in reality, but only in appearance. And in this book are found a thousand other blasphemies uttered by Clement, unless indeed it be that some unknown writer has been making use of his name." It is evident that Photius would like to believe, for the honor of Clement, that the *Hypotyposes* were not written by him or that they were interpolated. This latter hypothesis—the other is too extreme considering the testimony of Eusebius—has been well received. It has the support of the greater number of the theologians. It would deserve to be taken into consideration if the theories mentioned with reprobation by Photius had had in the centuries succeeding Clement, partisans who would be desirous of putting forward their views under the patronage of an earlier writer. But several of these opinions, and the most objectionable of them—docetism, the marriage of angels, the origin attributed to Eve—were defended by nobody, at least in the East, after the beginning of the third century. Hence their interpolation would have been an effect without a cause. We must there-

[13] *Biblioth.* 109.

fore conclude that the *Hypotyposes* were published by Clement in the shape in which Photius read them. Besides, our enquiry into the extant writings of Clement will confirm this conclusion. Let us then study these works and find the doctrine contained in them.

God. "Divine Providence manifests itself to us in an evident manner in this sensible world in the works of skill and wisdom which are seen. God, who is by nature rich in mercy, takes care of us through His Goodness, even though we are not part of Him, nor His natural sons. . . Man of whom Genesis speaks as the fruit of the divine breathing, cannot be lacking in possession of the knowledge of God. . . All men, especially those who cultivate letters, bear within them divine germs which lead them necessarily to know the existence of an immortal God who dwells above us in the heavenly regions."[14]

In the preceding texts Clement attributes to man an innate idea of God, an idea which blossoms out at the sight of the order in the world. But who is God and how far does our idea of Him give us knowledge of Him? To these problems Clement offers a solution which was later on developed by the Areopagite. He declares that God is above the categories of the human understanding and that our knowledge of the divine essence is negative. Following are the texts: "God is above space, above time, above the conditions which govern His creation. . . . He is beyond one, above unity itself . . He is invisible . . . Human speech cannot declare what He is. . . No name can be given to Him. True, we say that He is One, Good, Spirit, He who is, Father, God, Creator, Lord. But we have not here denominations in the proper sense. These expressions are used instead of the true name which escapes us . . . We cannot express God as He is in Himself. . . If by an abstraction of the mind we take dimensions from body. . . we have a point . . . If we take from the point position in space, we have unity. . . If we thus take from bodies and corporeal beings the qualities which inhere in them. . . we arrive at some knowledge of the All-powerful. However we know of Him *not what He is but what He is not.* Form and motion, or standing, or a throne, or place, or right hand or left, are not at all to be conceived as belonging to the Father of the Universe. . . The First

[14]*Str.* V, p. 16; II, 16 p. 1013; V, 13, p. 128; *Exhort.* 6, p. 52, 3. Throughout this study the citations from the *Exhortation* and the *Paedagogus* are given with references to the page and line in the edition of Stählin. For the *Quis dives* the Barnard edition has been used; and for the *Stromata* and the fragments, the Migne edition. It will be sufficient to announce once for all that the first four books of the *Stromata* are to be found in Vol. VIII and the remainder in Vol. IX of the *Greek Patrology.*

Cause is not then in space, but above both space and time and name and conception. . . Nor are any parts to be predicated of Him. For the One is indivisible. Moreover, He is infinite, not as having unlimited extension, but as being without dimensions."[15] Clement concludes from these premisses that to know God, one needs grace and the aid of the Logos.[16] We should add that he clearly affirms the unity of God against the Gnostic dualism: "Everything has been made by one only God. And no one is a stranger to the world by nature, for their essence is one and God one."[17]

Although Clement thus raises the divine essence so high above the human understanding he nevertheless holds to the doctrine of Providence, and not only of Providence in a general way but of Particular Providence.[18] He says, "The Apostle condemns not all philosophy, but the Epicurean philosophy of which he speaks in the Acts, which rejects Providence. The philosophy which is in accord with divine tradition establishes and confirms Providence. Take away Providence and the work of the Saviour appears a fable. . . The doctrine in conformity with Christ holds to a Creator and to particular Providence." And again: "God loves man, and the Logos also loves man. Now when one loves, one wishes to do good. . . God then does good. But God can do good to man only by taking care of him; and He does not take care of him unless He is interested in him. Besides, His works are there: He teaches man through His Logos, who is his lawful Assistant."

Now that we have seen the theodicy of Clement, it remains to trace out its origins. But here we shall limit ourselves to indicating the solution this question has received, leaving the more careful study of it until later. When Clement teaches the transcendence of the divine essence, he is the disciple of Plato and the neo-Pythagorean school. It is from Plato commented on by Philo that he learned that the Supreme Being is beyond the human understanding. On the other hand, when he teaches the dogma of particular Providence he is the disciple of the gospel. True Socrates, Plato, Epictetus speak of the favors which God has lavished on man, but they have not said, at least definitely, that each man is the object of divine

[15] *Str.* II, 2. p. 937; *Paed.* I, 8. p. 131, 18; *Str.* V, 6. p. 65; V, 12 p. 117; *ibid.* p. 121; II, 16. p. 1012; V, 11, p. 109; V, 12. p. 12 1.

[16] *Str.* V, 12. p. 124.

[17] *Str.* IV, 26. p. 1376.

[18] *Str.* I, 11. p. 748, 749; *Paed.* I, 8 p. 127, 9, 15. Cf. also *Paed.* I, 9. p. 133; *Str.* V, 14, p. 197.

solicitude, nor that God is concerned in the salvation of man. The Gospel gave Clement the idea of a heavenly Father who loves each member of the great human family and who sends his Logos to secure their salvation.[19]

Creation. Clement teaches that God is "the first and the oldest Principle, to whom everything that is owes its existence:" that "God has no beginning, but is Himself the beginning of all things;" that those "are in error who believe that the world is without a cause;" that God "is not good independent of will, as fire burns without knowing it. . . He does not do good of necessity." He teaches also that "the spirit which is in us is not a part of God."[20] Though they do not directly proclaim the doctrine of creation, these expressions seem to teach it, in spite of the fact that most of them are found in Philo, who upheld the theory of emanation. It may then be admitted that Clement viewed the universe as drawn from nothingness by God. Creation however is eternal, and necessarily so. Such is the conclusion from the following statements: "God being good, if He ever ceased from doing good, He would cease from being God. The creations on the different days followed in succession, so that all things brought into existence might have honor from priority, created together in thought, but not being of equal worth. . . The Creator is said to have made them at once. How could creation take place in time, seeing time was born along with things which exist." And further on: "That, then, we may be taught that the world was originated, and not suppose that God made it *in time*, prophecy adds: 'This is the book of generation; also of the things in them, when they were made.' For the expression 'when they were made' intimates a production indefinite and *outside of time*."[21] Finally, in what we have seen of his views on creation there is nothing to render improbable the statement of Photius that in the *Hypotyposes*

[19]DeFaye, *Clément d'Alexandrie*, pp. 214 ss.

[20]*Str.* V, 12. p. 121; IV, 25 p. 1372; VII, 7. p. 457; V, 13. p. 129. Clement sometimes makes use of very doubtful expressions, as for example. the following drawn from the *Paedagogus*, III, 12 and 1, 9: "All things are members of God"; "God is all and all is God." But elsewhere (*Str.* V, 12) he teaches that we cannot speak of the members of God, because the One is indivisible; and (*Str.* IV, 16) he becomes indignant with the Gnostics who dare to say that we are of the same substance as God The vigor with which he attacks the Gnostics is a proof that he was not a dualist. Cf, Denis, *La Philosophie d' Origène*, p. 140

[21]*Str.* VI, 16. pp. 369, 372, 376. LeNourry (*Dissert.* 2, viii, 1. *P. G.* IX, 1147) merely states that Clement taught the simultaneous creation of beings. There is more than that in the texts of Clement. See Denis, p. 143.

Clement taught the existence of worlds before Adam.

Pre-existence of Souls. In answer to Basilides who held (in accordance with his views that the soul was made by the good God and matter by the evil god) that the soul here below is in a foreign world, Clement declares that "the soul is not sent down from heaven into a lower world."[22] As for the question whether "the soul moves from one body to another," he promises to treat it "later on."[23] It may be that death prevented him from doing so or that the work is lost, but at any rate the seven books of the *Stromata* which have come down to us nowhere speak of the origin of the soul. We could not expect to find in the *Quis dives salvetur*? a set dissertation on this point, but in it we meet with scattered expressions which have attracted attention. He says, for example, that the Christian who is proven worthy of heaven "*returns* thither escorted by angels;" that the body is for the soul "a house in which God lodges it;" that the body is for us "an outer wrapping which allows us to enter into the world as a place of trial;" that this earth is for the soul "an *exile* and a place of pilgrimage into which it has been sent by the Father."[24] Some of these expressions can no doubt be reconciled with creationism, but others seem to be most easily explained on a theory of preexistence. Such was the view of Tillemont in the seventeenth centnry."

The Logos. "On the earth the noblest thing is man. . . in heaven the noblest thing is the angel. . . But the nature of the Son which is *nearest to* Him who is alone the Almighty One, is the most perfect, and most holy, and most potent. . . which orders all things *in accordance with the will of the Father*, and holds the helm of the universe in the best way. . . To Him is placed in subjection all the host of angels and gods—the Logos of the Father who is charged with this administration by the Father."[26] This text, in which the Logos is presented as having a nature "nearest to" that of the Father, and as acting in accordance with the commands of the First Person, seemed to Petavius to savor of Arianism.[27] It is not the only passage to leave this impression. In the writings of Clement one frequently

[22] *Str.* IV, 26. p. 1377.

[23] *Str.* IV, 12. p. 1296.

[24] *Quis dives*, 3; 26; 33; 36; p. 4, 12; p. 20, 23; p. 26, 2; p. 27, 17.

[25] *Memoires*, III, "Clément d'Alexandrie," note 8.

[26] *Str.* VII, 2. p. 408

[27] *De Trinitate*, I, iv, 1. Paris, 1865, t. II, p. 300: "quod platonici et ariani dogmatis indolem sapit. . . Videtur Filium Dei diversae a Patre esse naturae putasse Clemens."

meets with such expressions as the following: "The Logos *serves the will* of the Father; He is the author and cause of all benefits *by the will* of the Almighty Father; He is the prime minister of the universe, and governs all things *by the will* of the Father; God has created all things *by* His Logos; God *created* Wisdom to be the principle of all things."[28] The Logos would seem to be a Being intermediate between the Supreme Being and creatures, a Minister to whom God confided the task of creating and ruling the world. In one place Clement speaks of the Logos as "the instrument of God,"[29] and in another he says that God "*wished* to become Creator and Father,"[30] as if His becoming Father depended on the free disposition of His will.

Just as we owe our existence to the Logos, so to Him we owe our knowledge of God. It is He who has revealed the Father to men. "He is the goodness and the wisdom of God made manifest,"[31] and so He takes the place of God in our regard. Following the usage of Philo, Clement has therefore no difficulty in giving to the Son, equally with the Father, the title of God. "Both," he says, "make only one God."[32] He writes in the *Exhortation*: "Believe O man, in the living God who has suffered." And a little further on he adds: "The divine Logos is truly God; He is made equal to the Lord of the universe because He was His son."[33]

Believing, as he does, that the world is from eternity, he holds, on still stronger grounds, that the Logos had no beginning. He says in the *Stromata* that the Logos has always existed; and in the *Adumbrationes* he speaks of an eternal generation.[34] However, just as in his view of creation he introduces a logical order of succession based

[28] *Str.* VII, 2 p. 409, 412, 413; V, 14. p. 132. See also *Exh.* 12. p. 84, 34; *Paed.* III, 1. p. 237, 1, where the Logos is called the minister of God; and *Str.* VII, 2. p. 412, where the Son is called "the action of the Father."

[29] *Exh.* 1. p. 6, 30.

[30] *Paed.* I, 9. p. 141. 28.

[31] *Str.* V, 1. p. 16.

[32] *Paed.* I, 8. p. 127, 5.

[33] *Exh.* 10. p. 78, 13. Cf. also *Quis dives*, 29, p. 22, 33, where we are told that we should love Christ as much as God; and *Paed.* I, 7, where it is said that the Son is in the Father. Theologians rank these texts, especially that from the *Exhortation*, very high, and believe that we should make use of them in explaining the others. They forget that the most undoubted Subordinationists give the Logos the title of God, and that Clement (see below on Redemption) promises man that he will become god. The text of *Exh.* 10 and the two or three analogous texts should not serve to explain the others; on the contrary, they should be explained by the others.

[34] *Str.* VII, 2. p. 409; *Adumbr.* in Zahn, p. 87. In the former textt the Logos is said to exist; ἀνάρχως the latter speaks of a "generationem sine principio Filii."

on degree of perfection, so here too he concedes to the Logos a priority over the world, but places Him, in the same sense, after the Father. "What is oldest in origin, the timeless and unoriginated First Principle and beginning of existences —the Son—from whom we are to learn the remoter Cause, the Father of the Universe, the most ancient and the most beneficent of all."[35] The early Apologists distinguished two states in the existence of the Logos: one in which he was in the bosom of the Father (ἐνδιάθετος); the other, in which He emerges from the Father and enjoys an independent existence (προφυρικός). This second state, they tell us, began just before the creation of the world. Clement adopts this doctrine but without formulating it definitely, no doubt because he took it for granted. He says, "The Logos, issuing forth, was the cause of creation."[36]

The Trinity. Clement had the intention of speaking of the Holy Ghost in studies to be devoted to prophecy and to the soul,[37] but he never carried out his project. Those of his writings which have come down to us mention this Divine Person only in passing. We shall consider only such of these as are important in connection with the Trinity.

Commenting on the apocryphal text of Plato in which there is question of a first, a second, and a third, he says: "I understand this to mean nothing else than the Holy Trinity; for the third is the Holy Spirit, and the second is the Son of the Father, by whom all things were made according to the will of the Father."[38] In the prayer at the end of the *Paedagogus* we read: "Let us praise the Father and the Son, Son and Father, the Son Instructor and Teacher, with the Holy Ghost all in one, in whom is all, for whom is eternity, whose members we all are."[39] And in another passage of the same treatise:

[35] *Str.* VII, 1 p. 404.

[36] *Str.* V, 3. p. 33. A good deal of use has been made of *Str.* V, 1 to prove that Clement rejected this favorite theory of the Apologists. Zahn, *Forsch.* 145, claims that the passage in question should be paraphrased thus: "Thus the Word of the Father of the universe is not that which we utter when we speak."

It is easy to see that the Logos of Clement is of Philonistic origin. For a further development of this point than can be given here, see de Faye, *Clément d'Alexandrie*, pp. 231ss He acknowledges (p. 242) that the place of the Logos with regard to the universe is the same in Philo and in Clement. This destroys the force of what he says on p. 238· "L'analogie entre les deux conceptions semble complète. En fait elle ne l'est pas. Elle ne peut pas l'être parce qu'elles n'ont pas la même origine." The fact of the matter is that the Logos of Clement is just the same as the Logos of Philo, except that He is *also* a Redeemer.

[37] *Str.* V, 13. p. 129.

[38] *Str.* V, 14. p. 156.

[39] *Paed.* III, 12. p. 291, 8.

"The Universal Father is one, and one the universal Logos, and the Holy Spirit is one and the same everywhere, and one is the only virgin mother. I love to call her the Church."[40] And in the *Exhortation,* urging the Christian to turn his bark towards heaven, he says, "The Word of God will be thy pilot, and the Holy Spirit will bring thee to anchor in the haven of heaven. Then shalt thou see my God."[41] This last text seems to indicate that Clement considered the Holy Ghost as a distinct Person. A passage in the *Paedagogus* (1, 6), on the other hand, seems to identify the Holy Spirit with the Logos. The *Exhortation* (9) gives the same impression by speaking of the Holy Spirit as "the mouth of the Lord." But the *Adumbrationes* (Zahn, *Forschungen,* iii, 88) says that the Lord and the Holy Spirit are primitive powers created first of all (primo creatae) and immutable in substance (immobiles secundum substantiam).[42] The conclusion seems to be that Clement distinguished three Persons in the Trinity, but ranks the two latter as less than the Father.

Christology. Clement teaches that the Son of God who made all things "became incarnate, was conceived in the womb of the Virgin (since His material body was produced), suffered, and rose again." And he says in different places that the Son of God "took flesh," "put on man," "suffered."[43] However, we read in the *Stromata* an astonishing passage: "In the case of the Savior, it were ludicrous (to suppose) that the body, as a body, demanded the necessary aids in order to its duration. For He ate, not for the sake of the body, which was kept together by a holy energy, but in order that it might not enter into the minds of those who were with Him to entertain a different opinion of Him: in like manner as some afterwards supposed that He appeared in a phantasmal shape. But he was entirely impassible; inaccessible to any movement, whether of pleasure or pain."[44] The view that Christ was impassible is also taught in the *Paedagogus.*[45] And in the *Adumbrationes* we find: "It is related in traditions that John, touching the outward body itself (of Christ), sent his hand deep

[40] *Paed.* I, 6. p. 115, 10.

[41] *Exh.* 12. p. 83. 26. The *Quis dives,* 34, p. 26, 10, contains a text which is without bearing on the matter.

[42] This immutability of substance of these two Persons is a privilege which puts them far above other beings. All others are subject to the law of change. Angels are changed into men and men into angels. Cf. Zahn. p. 98.

[43] *Str.* VI, 15. p. 352; V, 3. p. 33; *Exh.* 11. p. 79; *Paed.* I, 8. p. 128, 32; *Quis dives,* 37. p. 27, 30.

[44] *Str.* VI, 9. p. 292.

[45] *Paed.* I, 2 p. 91, 23.

down into it, and that the solidity of the flesh offered no obstacle, but gave way to the hand of the disciple."[46] Manifestly Clement had tendencies towards Docetism.

A further idea of Clement's views concerning the body of Christ may be had from the following texts: "That the Lord Himself was uncomely in aspect, the Spirit testifies by Isaias: 'And we saw him and he had no form nor comeliness' . . . Yet who was more admirable than the Lord? But it was not the beauty of the flesh visible to the eye, but the true beauty of both soul and body which He exhibited." "He who is the head of the Church lived in bodily form without beauty in order to teach us to turn our attention towards the divine nature." "It is not for nothing that the Lord willed to have an uncomely body. It was to prevent us from having our attention so much taken up with His physical beauty as to be drawn away from His doctrine."[47] We must, therefore, understand the following passage of the *Stromata* as referring to the divine nature: "The Savior excels human nature; He is so beautiful that He alone deserves the love of those who love true beauty."[48]

Clement believes that the Savior's preaching lasted only one year. He bases this view on the passage of Isaias, "The spirit of the Lord hath sent me to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord." Concerning the day of Christ's birth and the day of his baptism he says: "There are those who have determined not only the year of our Lord's birth, but also the day: and they say it took place in the twenty-eighth year of Augustus, and on the 25th Pachon (May 20). And the followers of Basilides hold the day of His baptism as a festival, spending the night before in readings. And they say it was the fifteenth year of Tiberius Cæsar on the 15th Tubi (Jan. 12); and others the 11th Tubi (Jan. 8). . . Others say that He was born on the 24th or 25th Pharmuthi (April 19 or 20)."[49]

Clement exhorts us to love Christ. "Let us haste, let us run," he says, "let us take His yoke, let us receive, to conduct us to immortality, this good charioteer of men. Let us love Christ." "It is fitting that we should return His love who lovingly guides us to the life that is best." "We are to love Him equally with God."[50] He strikes the same note that we find in Ignatius of Antioch.

[46]Zahn, *Forsch.* III, 87. Cf. also *Str.* III, 7. p. 1161, where Clement reports without comment an assertion of Docetism by Valentinus.

[47]*Paed.* III, 1. p. 237, 19; *Str.* III, 17. p. 1208; VI, 17.

[48]*Str.* II, 5. p. 953.

[49]*Str.* I. 21. p. 888.

[50]*Exh.* 12. p. 85, p. 19; *Paed.* I, 3. p. 95, 7; *Quis dives*, 29.

Redemption. "The word of God became man that thou mayest learn from man how man may become God." "(O Lord) declare to me thy Father, God: thy utterances lead to salvation. . . Since thou leadest me to the light, O Lord, and I find God through thee, and receive the Father from thee, I become thy fellow-heir, since thou wert not ashamed of me as thy brother." "What then, is the exhortation I give you? I urge you to be saved. This Christ desires. In one word, He freely bestows life upon you. And who is He? He is the Word of truth, the Word of exemption from death, that regenerates man by bringing him back to the truth." "It has been God's fixed and constant purpose to save the flock of men; for this end the good God sent the good Shepherd. And the Word, having unfolded the truth, showed to men the height of salvation." The burden of these texts is that Christ has come to reveal truth to men, to make them know God the Father. Thus He has put them on the road to heaven; has given them a guarantee of eternal life; He has made them His fellow-heirs; He has taught them to become Gods, that is. possess life eternal with God.[51] Such has been the mission of Christ, such the purpose for which He came down upon earth. His coming was in accordance with the command of His Father. "God hath sent His Son,"[52] we read in the *Paedagogus*, and in the *Exhortation*, as we have already seen; "God sent the good shepherd" to carry out His "constant purpose to save the flock of men."

When Christ came to deify man, the latter was "in the bonds of sin," "bound by corruption." "The Lord, wishing to release him from his bonds, clothed Himself with flesh—O divine mystery!—vanquished the serpent and enslaved the tyrant death; and, most surprising of all, man that had been deceived by pleasure and bound fast by corruption, had his hands unloosed and was set free."[53] In other words, the work of deifying man which was accomplished by the incarnate Word, has been the work of salvation, of deliverance. Christ has saved men; He has delivered them from sin, and from death, which is the consequence of sin. This teaching is expressed in the following texts: "Man that had been bound fast by corruption was set free"; "He delivered us just as we were about to perish"; "He is the Word of exemption from death, that regenerates man by bring-

[51] *Exh.* 1 p. 9, 10; 11, p. 80, 8; 11, p. 82, 31, p. 81, 32
[52] *Paed.* I, 9. p. 141, 31.
[53] *Exh.* 11. p. 78, 30; 79, 3.

ing Him back to the truth"; "Let us receive the good guide of men to conduct us to exemption from death"; "He has snatched man from death"; "We have been redeemed from corruption."[54] Thus the work of Christ has been that of deliverance, of salvation, with the final purpose of the deification of man. Now let us see by what means Christ has accomplished this task. From this point of view His work appears as a sacrifice, an immolation of Himself. "On account of sin the evil spirits were our masters;"[55] that is, we were the slaves of the demons, the destined victims of death. In order to perform His work of deliverance, Christ had to undertake a combat. Concerning this point Clement is far from clear. He tells us that the Savior "vanquished the serpent and enslaved the tyrant death." In that combat "the Lord was laid low and man rose up."[56] But there he stops. Writers of a later period will tell us how the devil overreached himself by putting the Savior to death. Clement does not go into details on the matter. He does tell us, however, that Christ saved the human race at the *price* of His life, or His blood; that He *purchased* our deliverance; that His work of deification and salvation was also a work of *redemption*. "We have been purchased from corruption by the blood of the Savior"; "He(the Paedagogus) gives his life for us"; "when about to be offered up, and giving Himself as a ransom, He left for us a new testament in the words; 'My love I give unto you.' He gave for each of us His life whose worth is above all"; "By His blood and by His word, He has gathered a peaceful army to which He gives the kingdom of heaven"; "For thee I contended with death and paid thy death, which thou didst owe for thy former sins and thy unbelief towards God.[57]

[54] *Exh.* 11 p. 79, 3; 1 p. 8, 2; 11. p. 82, 33; 12. p. 85, 18; *Paed.* II, 2. p. 167, 29; 1, 5. p. 104, 1.

[55] *Ecl.* 20. Cf. also *Quis dives*, 29. p. 22, 18, where we are told that the human race had been almost put to death by the powers of darkness, and that the Savior came to heal its wounds.

[56] *Exh.* 11. p. 79, 1. Cf. *Quis dives*, 23. p. 18, 24 cited below, in which the Savior says that He contended with death. Note also *ibid.* 34. p. 26. 5: "The body cheats death and the devil." Clement refers here to the bodies of individual Christians, but his text proves that the idea of a trap set for the devil was not unknown to him.

[57] *Paed.* I, 5. p. 104, 1; I, 9. p. 140, 3; *Quis dives*, 37. p. 641; *Exh.* 11. p. 82, 7; *Quis dives*, 23. M. Rivière, *Le dogme de la redemption*, p. 132 considers that the texts of the *Quis dives* indicate "le caractère expiatoire" of the death of Christ. On p. 133 he adds: "Clément applique a la mort du Christ les principes traditionnels de l'expiation et de la substitution." This verdict can be accepted in so far as it admits of being harmonized with the theory of purchase from the devil. Although Clement never formulated this theory in a definite way, it must be acknowledged that it is behind his expressed views and that he conceives the death of the Saviour as the

Preaching in Hades. In the second book of the *Stromata*, Clement quotes the passage from the *Pastor* of Hermas where it is said that the Apostles and Doctors after having preached the Son of God on earth, preach Him also after their death to those who have fallen asleep.[58] There he leaves the matter for the time; but in the sixth book[59] he examines the question more closely. "The Lord preached the gospel to those in Hades. Accordingly the Scripture says; 'Hades says to destruction, we have not seen His form but we have heard His voice.' Plainly it is not the place which heard the voice but those who have been put in Hades. It is those that have heard the voice divine." Clement refers to the text of the *Pastor* mentioned above, and adds: "The apostles, following the Lord, preached the gospel to those in Hades, for it was requisite, in my opinion, that as here so also there, the best disciples should be imitators of the Master; so that He should bring to repentance those belonging to the Hebrews and they the Gentiles; that is, those that had lived in righteousness and true philosophy, though not perfectly, but with errors and sins. . . If then the Lord descended to Hades for no other end but to preach the gospel (and of this there can be no doubt), it was either to preach the gospel to all or to the Hebrews only. If to all, then all who believe shall be saved, even though they may be of the Gentiles, on making their profession there. . . If He preached only to the Jews, it is plain that since God is no respecter of persons, the Apostles also, as here, so there, preached to those of the Gentiles who were disposed for conversion." Here once more Clement appeals to the *Pastor*. Then taking up the argument from reason, he shows that there would be an injustice in punishing those who had died before the coming of the Savior on the earth, and were thus unable to hear the gospel and embrace the faith.

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result of a struggle to snatch the human race from the dominion of the devil. This view, though it excludes the precise idea of expiation, implies the two notions of ransom and substitution. M. Rivière is inclined to believe (p. 133) that Clement has put forth divergent views on the redemption. I believe, on the contrary, that all the texts can be reconciled if we distinguish the ultimate purpose, the immediate effects, and the means of the redemption.

In the story of the robber told in *Quis dives*, 42, the words of St. John: "I shall suffer thy death as Christ did for us" do not explain to whom Christ offered His life.

The "spiritual blood" mentioned in *Paed.* II, 2 is too allegorical to serve the ends of any theory.

[58] *Str.* II, 9. p. 980; Cf. also *Excerpta ex scriptis Theodoti*, 18.

[59] *Str.* VI, 6. p. 268.

DISCUSSION

THE DILEMMA OF EPICURUS

I beg to acknowledge my indebtedness to Father Sharpe for his further contribution towards the elucidation of this very difficult problem. His reply has been at least a help in stating the case more clearly. Whether it justifies the apologetic position taken up by him or weakens the position assumed by myself I am not qute so sure.

I am fully conscious that the difficulty has been pressed by the unbeliever as a purely intellectual one, though having grave practical consequences, and that the endeavor of Christian apologists—none more ably than Father Sharpe—has been to treat it as such. It was therefore no *ignoratio elenchi* on my part to go beyond this sphere. My explicit intention was to drag the difficulty out of its merely intellectual limitations, and to show that it could only be effectually dealt with by examining it in the sphere of reality. I accept the statement of the difficulty as proposed by Father Sharpe: "How am I to reconcile the goodness of the Creator, which I am compelled to believe in by reason and by revelation, with the existence in the world of an enormous amount of evil, the origin of which must, at least indirectly, be attributed to Him?" Then I suggest that those who insist on limiting the attempted answers to pure intellect commit a heresy against reason itself, the philosophical heresy known as "intellectualism;" and that those apologists who unreservedly accept these conditions are guilty of the same fallacy. It will be objected however that those people for whom the intellectualist answer is intended do not possess the faith and that the one insuperable obstacle to faith is precisely this intellectual difficulty. I reply that there is a kind of philosophical faith, a direct action of the will which the man may and ought to use. He can arrive at the knowledge of the existence of God through the ordinary recognized proofs. From that he can deduce firsh the simplicity, and then the goodness of God. He assents fully to the abstract proposition that God must be supremely good. Then he refers to the sphere of phenomena and there finds that God appears cruel and unjust. But reflecting that he does not see the whole universe and that possibly a complete outlook might afford him a better explanation of things, he is able to fall back with philosophical faith on the broad truth derived from other sources, that anyhow God is supremely good and cannot possibly be unjust or cruel. In this way the man's will is set working. It thus learns to ignore and despise the lesser reasons against God's goodness in favor of the greater reasons for it. And this exercise of the will in ignoring the less important reasons which tell against God and emphasising the more important reasons which tell for God, is a cultivating of the habit of mind conducive to faith.

Nor is this direct action of the will a falling into the opposite fallacy of "voluntarism." It is a perfectly rational act and is adopted as such by all our best and latest apologists. See for instance the manual of Father

Wilmers, S. J. *De Vera Religione.* (pp. 99-101); also Ign. Oettinger, *Theol. Fund.* (pp. 311, 312).

Nor yet is it a belittling of the function of the intellect, but rather a strengthening of it, since the intellect is thus placed in its proper place as an integral part of the living concrete man. As a matter of fact there is no such thing as "pure reason" in the concrete; for even the most abstract of sciences, namely pure mathematics, has to be carried on by means of little pictures called figures. But the attempt to act as if by pure reason, that is, by ignoring as much as possible the function of the will of which I have spoken, must naturally lead either to Pantheism or Deism, the excess, that is, of immanentism and transcendentalism. Intellectualism, or pure reason, in virtue of its very logicality, cannot halt between Spinoza and Socinus. We can only save our skins by bringing in the will and the feelings and the spirit in its entirety, by allowing the "whole man" to act; by striving to follow out the dictates of the illative sense.

Passing to the particulars of Father Sharpe's reply, I think the gist of everything is contained in the last one. I do not grant that the question under consideration is precisely whether God, foreseeing man's sin, could have refrained from creating him *on that account.* The question is whether God, *in the first instance,* could not have chosen some other reason than that which He actually did choose; whether, whilst foreseeing the sins of a man, He could not have abstained from creating the man without making the man's sins the cause of His abstaining. God, although He foresees the merits of the saints, yet predestines them to salvation, *ante prævisa merita.* Why could He not therefore, although He foresaw the sins of the sinners, have abstained from creating the sinners, *ante prævisa peccata*? One cannot very well pause in the middle of an article to explain the scholastic doctrine *de signo rationis.* The initiated, however, will see it underlying the foregoing lines and apply it to my arguments to which Father Sharpe takes objection; whilst for the uninitiated, I am sorry I cannot find better equivalents than the analogies which I have used, and which must share the fate of *all* analogies, namely that of being unable to conceal entirely their inherent lameness.

Before concluding I will acknowledge that in my article I failed to distinguish between philosophic faith and supernatural faith, and that owing to the pressure put upon me by Father Sharpe I am now able to make the distinction and thus strengthen my position.

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NOTES.

In our rapid review (Nov.-Dec., 1906) of the condition of clerical studies in the different parts of the Catholic world, we mentioned Spain as a country in which little was being done and from which little could be expected towards the settling of present-day difficulties. Since then we have come across what has every evidence of being a very accurate study of the situation in Spain, contributed by M. S. Torres to the *Revue Augustinienne* (Jan. 15). We are happy to present a generous abstract of this article, not because it confirms our judgment concerning the existing conditions, but because of the brighter view it gives of the future outlook. Nothing could be more encouraging than to feel that the Church of Spain which took the most prominent place in the readjustment of the ancient faith and new scientific and social views in the seventeenth century, is once more bestirring itself to grapple with the problems of the present age. That they are making a beginning we have the assurance of M. Torres; and they are beginning at the right place—the education of the clergy. But it will be better to follow that writer's exposition of the matter.

Considering the mere skeleton of the curriculum of studies we find that it does not differ much from those of colleges and seminaries in other lands. Three or four years are given to Latin, geography, history, rhetoric, etc. Greek is studied only in some places, and in many of these only by the brighter students. After the "Humanities" come three years of philosophy, mathematics, and the natural sciences. This arrangement may be open to some criticism, especially the postponement of even the easier mathematical branches to the end of the classical studies; but the time devoted to preliminary studies on the whole seems sufficient. The writer advances as the main objection the fact that many boys begin too early, so that they are unable to grasp the meaning of the classical authors, or comprehend the questions in philosophy. In the school of theology the four years course embraces the ordinary subjects. The most noteworthy point is that Scripture is studied only in the last year. There is a university in each province, but it would seem that the principal object of clerical students who frequent them is the study of Canon Law.

For a knowledge of real conditions, programs of studies are as notoriously unreliable as tables of statistics. The same subjects may be seen in various institutions, but at what different angles of vision and to what different depths of penetration! Plato conversing with his friends, or Thomas of Aquin teaching class in a hay-mow would be a better university than most that have that title. But teachers such as these are rare enough in any community; and the Church in Spain, in M. Torres' opinion, has not been particularly favored with them. Not that the poor professors should shoulder all the blame. If they do not effect the combination of "high thinking" with "plain living," it is evident that their superiors see to it that the latter of the two elements is not wanting. Among the principal of the reforms proposed is one to better the condition of the

professors by securing them stability of tenure, greater consideration, and sufficient remuneration. At present, we are told, many of them merely hear recitations of the text-book learned by rote, and look upon their professorship as a stepping-stone to other, if not higher things. Nor is this a matter to be wondered at, or sneered at. It is worth while to recognize the truth expressed in this bit of quaint American philosophy: "There's as much human nature in some folks as there is in others—if not more."

Another reform which is acknowledged as necessary is improvement in text-books and in library facilities. The former are generally antiquated, and give little knowledge of modern difficulties or of how to meet them. As for the libraries, "what is most frequently lacking in the seminaries is a well chosen library of useful and readable books. For evidently those old volumes of past centuries which cumber the shelves of Spanish libraries can hardly be called readable or useful. The ancient dog-eared, smoky chartularies which are kept as relics—sometimes fastened with a chain—are the pride of the institutions which own them. But the seminarians—if they are allowed to touch them at all—soon get tired of these antiques, and not finding at hand more recent works which treat of living questions, lose insensibly the taste for reading." Naturally enough in such circumstances even earnest professors are unable to do good work. It is no wonder that "they publish no collections, series of monographs or special studies as in France." Migne's *Patrology* is almost unknown—one professor of theology to whom the writer spoke, knew nothing of Migne—another had never heard of Newman.

To foster (or create) the spirit of study among the priests, the Spanish Church has the machinery, at least, of what could be made a very effective system. Those who are looking for advancement must face as many examinations as a Chinese mandarin. A caustic critic might push this analogy still further after reading that the questions are generally taken from Peter Lombard, and are often childish and irrelevant. Moreover, lads in seminary sometimes present themselves and carry a benefice by assault long before they are ready for ordination. After this we can hear with comparative equanimity that the Spanish clergy are not strong on Plain Chant.

So much for the dark side of the picture. We are glad to say there is a bright side to it, or rather, a patch of sunlight streaming on the darkness with fair promise of setting it all alight. "Evidently," M. Torres tells us, "numerous reforms are called for. More than one enlightened priest desires them, and the bishops are becoming interested. Spaniards have no repugnance for theological studies or for mental work. . . . The clergy cannot remain indifferent in the face of the intellectual and social needs produced by the present state of things. . . . And, we can affirm, the clergy have a very well defined idea of the needs of the situation, and are putting themselves in shape to meet them." A vigorous impulse is being given by some of the bishops and by learned reviews, such as *Razon y Fe*, *La Ciudad de Dios*, and *Espana y America*.

Here it may be well to digress for the space of a paragraph to quote from the *Annales de philosophie chrétienne* a brief note which gives one a smack of the flavor of one these Spanish reviews, the *Espana y America*. "In the August number Padre Velez, the present editor, resumes, in the main with approval, the views of Father Hummelauer on the authenticity of the inspired books. Padre Martinez, the former editor, has written a series of articles on the illustrious German apologist, Dr. Herman Schell, under the title "A Genial Apologist." In his conclusion he regrets that Spain has been so slothful and has shown such an example of inexplicable activity in social and religious matters. He would like to see it enter into the movement of apologetics which is so full of life in France, Germany, and Italy. . . In the October issue, Padre Velez gives quite a long review of the work of Padre Minocchi on the Psalms. He does not agree with all the opinions of the writer, but he acknowledges that traditional theses must be relinquished in part, since many of the Psalms were probably not written by David. Other articles treat the authenticity of the Fourth Gospel and the "Three Heavenly Witnesses" text.

In the matter of Biblical studies, which have been so much neglected in Spain, the initiative has been taken by the Bishop of Madrid-Alcala, who intends to establish a Faculty of Scripture. A report on the matter which embodies an elaborate program of studies has been prepared by the eminent Jesuit Father Murillo. It calls for a six years course, the first two years to be devoted to the study of Greek, Hebrew, and Chaldaic. To obtain a degree, some other Semitic language must also be known. The program outlines a very thorough course of studies in Oriental Languages, Biblical archæology, Biblical history, and exegesis. It certainly cannot be criticized on the score of deficiency; and it might be ungenerous to suggest that it is almost too good to be carried out in the present conditions of ecclesiastical learning. However, much may be accomplished by a prelate whose dual see comprises the capital city and a famous university town, and we may hope that the next generation may see new praises added to the honorable name of Complutum, so famous in the theological annals of the past.

And in a more directly practical field of labor, M. Torres finds not merely promise but performance amongst the priests of Spain. "A praiseworthy tendency in the clergy is their interest in social studies. Many of the priests are putting themselves at the head of the social movement, starting schemes of improvement and assistance, etc. Their interest in questions of sociology often comes from the seminary, where they are debated more and more, in accordance with the spirit of the Church and the teachings of Leo XIII. A number of prelates have distinguished themselves in these matters, among whom are the Archbishops of Valencia and Burgos, to mention only the more prominent. In the parishes the priests devote themselves to applied sociology in the works they direct and in the schools where they often assume the drudgery of teaching." And in concluding the writer pays a fine and well deserved tribute to the poor country priests who, in many a desolate village in Spain, devote themselves without earthly recompense to the work of educating the children of their flock. And who will deny his conclusion that when all

is said and done this sort of apostolate is as good as any other—and often better?

The revival of Biblical studies in Spain is acknowledged by those who are engaged in it to be due to the stimulus of the Holy Father's letter *Scripturæ Sacræ* (Feb. 23, 1904). The same zealous pontiff has very recently shown his deep interest in the spread of knowledge of the Holy Scripture amongst all classes of Christians. On Jan. 21 last, he issued a strong letter in favor of the Society of St. Jerome for the Diffusion of the Gospels. He congratulates the society on having circulated nearly half a million copies of the Gospels and Acts in Italian. To quote his own words: "It is likewise a most salutary fact, not only in itself as connected with a narrative possessing Divine force—that is to say, the account of the life of Jesus Christ, than which nothing can be conceived more eminently efficacious for leading us to sanctity—but it is also and chiefly most useful because it renders a most notable service to the magisterium of the Church, since the reading of the Gospels prepares minds to welcome the announcement of the Divine Word. . . . The increase will have good results, not to speak of the advantage of disposing of the well known prejudice that the Church does not wish to permit or hinders the reading of the Sacred Scriptures in the vulgar tongue. . . . From the moment when we proposed to ourselves to restore everything in Christ Jesus, we could desire nothing better than the introduction amongst the faithful of the custom of reading the Holy Gospels, not merely often but daily, as such reading shows and makes known clearly in what way the desired revival can and should be attained."

In Italy the movement of scholarship goes on at a slow and steady pace, as best beseems it. Against such work the central authorities of the Church have issued no word of distrust or condemnation. A few books in French and Spanish, which were too sharply critical to be helpful, have been placed on the Index of Prohibited Books. They are: *Les Conflits de la Science et de la Bible* by M. l'Abbé Lefranc; *La Question biblique au XX siècle*, by M. l'Abbé Houtin; *El Jesuitismo y suos Abusos* and *Crisis de la Compania de Jesus*, both by Sigismundo Pey-Odeix. It is a matter of grave regret that works like those of Houtin and Lafranc, of a kind which arouse difficulties rather than propose a way to settle them, are increasing in number. In this class belong Le Morin's *Verités d'hier* and an anonymous French brochure oddly entitled a "Syllabus," of which we know only through a notice in the *Rassegna Nazionale*. Father Laberthonnière expresses in his criticism of M. Le Morin the chief complaints which we have against such writers: they often intermingle matters of faith with mere questions of current belief and practice; they urge the extremest views of theologians as statements of orthodox positions; and, chief charge of all, they pile upon their backs a burden of difficulties and then go to the authorities with a demand that it be taken off. It is an easy way of shirking mental labor and responsibility. Of course the retort they make to this is an obvious one—if they venture to propose their settlement of the difficulties they may get their knuckles rapped. Well, that is not after all such a tremendous misfortune, or one that a little faith and patience would not make easy to be borne. Laberthonnière

himself has suffered reproof, and the decree of the Index from which we have quoted praises him for having loyally submitted to it. He has not gone over to the enemy, nor does he sit sulking in his tent. There is not a man in the Catholic Church who is fighting more valiantly for the truth as God gives him to see it.

We have drifted from Italy to France—an easy passage nowadays. As a natural transition back to Italy, we may mention Fogazzaro's lecture on apologetics in Paris, which naturally attracted considerable attention. Newspaper opinions concerning him vary according to the preconceptions of the writers. If we may put bluntly what we find expressed with inimitable French delicacy, those of the extreme Right look upon him as a rogue, and those of the extreme Left as a fool. A more sympathetic judgment is expressed by a writer in the *Correspondant* (Jan. 25), who lays stress upon the point that, although Fogazzaro's audience was composed largely of unbelievers whose minds were dwelling on the fact that a book of his was recently put on the Index, he asserted strongly that the fatherland of his soul is the Catholic Church, to which he intends to remain faithful. The writer reproves the tendency to discover (or manufacture) heresies in the writings of one who is primarily a poet. "If competent authority thinks it has anything to criticize in Fogazzaro, it will know how to do it, and the world has lately learned the welcome which is assured in France for its decisions. But authority, in the Catholic Church, is not 'caporalisme.'" He thinks that better ways could be found to treat one of Fogazzaro's ability and eminence than driving him out of the Church; and he has no sympathy with those who would replace *compelle intrare* by *compelle egredi*.

Fogazzaro is interested in a new monthly started in Milan under the significant title *Il Rinnovamento*. The editors are Signori Alfieri, Casati, and Gallarati Scotti (the successor of Don Romolo Murri, as head of the Christian Democracy movement in Italy). In the "Parole di Introduzione" the editors assert their allegiance to Catholic dogma, and their freedom to discuss within the limits of dogmatic belief, questions scientific, philosophical, and social. Their philosophico-religious principles seem to be drawn from the current French school of apologetics. For further information concerning their purposes they refer the reader to the pages of the magazine. Turning thither, one finds an article by Fogazzaro entitled "Per la Verita" (which is to be the first of a series of lectures on Apologetics to be given by him); the translation of a chapter of *The Evolution of Religion* by Edward Caird; an article on the parliamentary function of the Socialist party by Abbate Murri, and a study in metaphysics by Garbasso; also, by way of chronicle, an account of Father Tyrrell's difficulties; and a complete translation of the Briggs-Von Hügel letters. Articles promised include one by Paul Sabatier and one by Rudolf Eucken. Amongst the topics to be treated are Emerson and the New England Transcendental movement, the reforms of Gioberti, Leo Tolstoi, neo-Buddhism. It is premature to pronounce any judgment on the new enterprise. Its promoters can make it an efficient agency for good; but one would like to warn them against the danger of becoming Adullamitish.

It will have been noticed that the new periodical has opened its columns to the work of Protestant writers. Such a course may be advantageous or not; it all depends on what these writers have to say. We refer to the fact here merely as an introduction to the remark that a number of Protestant scholars have of late been passing comments on us which make interesting and, in spots, pleasant reading. But there is bitter mingled with the sweet. Take for instance the concluding paragraph of a review of Künstle's *Comma Johanneum* by Prof. Gregory of Leipzig in *The American Journal of Theology* (Jan. 1907): "Clearly, our Roman brothers are coming out into the light of modern science. They are immensely learned, they are numerous, they have grand libraries at their command, many of them have leisure granted them for research—if they will only say plainly what they find in their researches, without fear of ecclesiastical rebuke, Christian theology will move forward rapidly."

The name of Professor Eucken was mentioned above as on the list of contributors to the new Italian periodical. He is professor of philosophy in the University of Jena, and theists of all shades of belief have watched with delight the steady decline of Professor Haeckel's influence over the minds of the students of Jena under the power and attractiveness of Eucken's noble ideals. He in his turn recognizes good wherever he finds it; and he has shown himself deeply interested in the movement for the deepening of spiritual life in the Church. Last Summer he wrote in the *Allgemeine Zeitung* a laudatory review of Father Tyrrell's *Lex Credendi*. It concludes as follows, "The work is dominated throughout by a spirit broad and free, but at the same time deep and solid, the healthy and sincere religion of a strong personality who has reached the topmost point of the intellectual life of our times, and has taken up his position in the middle of the conflict of present-day ideas. We strongly recommend this book to kindred spirits."

In the January *Hibbert* there is an article by Paul Sabatier on "La Crise Religieuse en France et en Italie. It is a rather vague and unsatisfactory study of the tendencies of the "advanced" wing of Catholic thinkers in those two countries. We are afraid that just at present M. Sabatier's commendation of his Catholic friends will not do them any good with their more conservative brethren, as his attitude in the present political difficulties of the Church in France tends to obscure in their minds his work for the Franciscan revival. Besides, his rather nebulous views concerning what he calls "an obedience more profound, more complete, more spiritual" sound unsatisfactory to those of us who hold to the old-fashioned (and, we believe, common-sense) idea of an authority which is authoritative and a government which governs. But, considering that M. Sabatier is by way of being a Protestant, others of his statements are comforting as well as interesting. For instance: "The new Catholic school, far from being an 'infiltration protestante,' has been the first since Bossuet to completely renew Apologetics. M. Fogazzaro and M. Loisy, Father Semeria and Father Laberthonnière, the Archbishop of Albi and M. Klein are the most formidable adversaries that Protestantism has ever met."

And this concerning a man whose place in the history of Catholic theology will not be definitely settled until he and all of us are dead and gone: "Whatever may be the outward resemblance of the exegesis of M. Loisy and the Protestant exegesis, they are entirely different because their methods are opposed. The Protestant exegete starts out with a scientific conception, abstract and bare; the question with him is to find out the meaning of the author. For M. Loisy this effort to discover the meaning of the author is not secondary, but it is put in second place; he sets out with a concrete idea, the idea of a fact at once past and present, the idea of a Church, of that society so difficult to define and yet more visible and more fruitful of energy than civil society. The sacred books are indeed the expression of the thought of a man, but they are first of all the expression of the life of the Church which has gone through a process of accepting and rejecting."

A still more noteworthy utterance is a speech delivered by Professor Harnack in the Aula of the University of Berlin on the occasion of the Kaiser's birthday (Jan. 27). He deplores the religious differences which weaken the Empire, and asks the question whether there is any hope that they can be diminished or destroyed. Considering this question, he rejects first of all the mere politician's method of solving it by trying to eliminate religion from public life, as is being done in other lands. Independent of other objections to such a plan, there is the practical one that the German people will not go that road. Nor does he believe that the settlement will come by a union of churches—history is against that. No, it must come about through a broadening of mind and of sympathy. Not tolerance—that is a haughty and intolerant word—but mutual recognition. "The churches are to be guided up to such a fellowship of mind and soul, in so far as they have not yet attained it; and it is only upon this level that there can be a question of mutual *rapprochement* and fellowship. More sincerity, true Christianity and freedom inside the churches—*et cetera adjicientur vobis*."

Harnack points out that the study of history has already produced very considerable results toward the desired *rapprochement*. "It (history) has shown us that we are not as our fathers were—we may like it or not. It has taught us that we are separated from them by a long process of development, and that we do not in fact any longer understand their words, and still less use them in the sense in which they used them." The attitude of the historians of both churches has changed very much in the last generation, and this change of attitude is a factor toward reconciliation. "There have appeared in recent years in ever growing numbers studies in church history from scholars of both churches that have found widespread acceptance on both sides. They are not confined to subordinate historical problems, but treat the chief questions. Lately we received a large church history of the three first centuries, written by a Catholic priest in high position. It does not slur over any of the important problems—origin of the church's constitution, origin of the Roman primacy, of the New Testament, of Christian doctrine, of asceticism. Except in the lesser details, no Protestant scholar will be able to find fault with it; he will rather wish that he had written the work himself.

Further, the best book on the critical study of the legends of the saints is one that has been lately written by a member of the Society of Jesus. The same is the case with other periods of history. The latest investigation on the subject of Savonarola, likewise by a Catholic priest, is not to be excelled in knowledge and impartiality. Also we possess for the period of the German Reformation recent investigations from Catholic pens that enjoy in large measure the good opinion of Protestant scholars: even the latest excesses of sectarian history have been shown to be baseless and have been refuted by scholars of the same denomination . . . If the Protestant Flacius and Card. Baronius, the founders of sectarianism in history, were to come back to earth to-day, they would be astonished to see what has become of their way of looking at church history."

"But besides the science of church history, what a number of liberal movements, and what progress in the deeper grasp of Christianity meet us in the Catholic Church in Germany and America, in Italy and France! The idea that history is the study of evolutionary processes is grasped more and more clearly, and the true character of religion from this stand-point has been recognized. Take *Scripture and Tradition*—the quarrel has been bitter, but it is realized now that the two cannot be separated. Protestant scholars recognize that the formation of the Canon is a part of tradition and Catholic scholars concede that no tradition can be accepted without criticism.

"*Catholic and Protestant worship*—How irreconcilably do the two parties seem to be opposed in this case! However, a Catholic clergyman has lately treated in a paper entitled "Mensa und Confessio," the original Christian idea of sacrifice as well as the subjects, altar and mass, in a way that no Protestant can criticize, and even previously to that a Catholic theologian published the best work we have on early Christian worship. The gradual growth, foreign influences—though in small measure—and the tremendous transformations in the ceremonies of the Church are therein proven. With the conception of evolution before us, must not we Protestants ask ourselves whether the form of worship which arose in the sixteenth century in opposition to the Catholic form is sufficient and satisfactory? Is not the idea of sacrifice kept too much in the background? And are not the æsthetic elements of public worship neglected?"

Peter in Rome—The earlier Protestant historians denied the presence of Peter in Rome altogether, and put the beginnings of the Roman primacy at a late date; but it is now admitted as a well established fact that Peter was in Rome, and also that the primacy goes back to the second century. However, Catholic scholars have acknowledged that Peter's twenty-five years residence in Rome is untenable, and that the Roman primacy in the earliest times was not what it became later under the Popes. So too with regard to the monarchical episcopate and the origin of the constitution of the Church, Protestants have revised their earlier views and Catholic scholars have admitted that in the beginning we find a collegiate episcopate in each church.

Asceticism and Monasticism—A division of opinion seems to exist among Catholics at present as to the position of monasticism. "According to one view monasticism is above all other callings of life—the vocation of perfection,—a heavenly, angelic life; according to the other view perfection consists so exclusively in faith, love and hope, that in comparison with these all else is indifferent, that it is therefore also indifferent whether one lives his life in the world or outside it; in the latter case he can practise these virtues the more easily and securely." On the other hand we see in the establishment by Protestants of houses for deaconesses an acknowledgment of the right to follow the evangelical counsels for the more ardent.

These are only a few of the points that show a drawing together of the two confessions in the matter of religious practice and teaching. What then, he asks, is the duty of the present generation? The first duty is to wage war aganist the union of politics to sectarianism. Here he considers the Catholics to be the offenders. Furthermore, "Strict justice must be exercised everywhere; give each one his own; do not interfere with the inner life of the churches; all unnecessary quarrels and all unfairness should be avoided. Unfairness consists in comparing the good theory of one's own church with the bad practices of the other; we should rather compare theory with theory and practice with practice. Unnecessary conflicts are those in which the points at issue are the errors and sins of the past." We should try to understand our opponents' position better. It would be well if Catholic theologians could hear the lectures of evangelical theologians and *vice versa*, and if theologians of both creeds could meet for the discussion of historical questions. Lastly, it is most desirable that both churches themselves allow freedom to the movement for liberty and higher unity which is manifested in their midst; for the hopes for the future rest upon this movement and not upon strict adherence to the past.

But the article that is bound to attract the widest attention amongst us is that of Dr. Briggs in the *North American Review* of February 15th on "The Real and the Ideal in the Papacy." It is an article that deserves much fuller treatment than can be afforded it in a gossipy chronicle such as this; it merits an article longer than itself; it could easily be made the subject matter for a volume There are in it two distinct parts which we think are not clearly indicated by the title. They are the essential and the accidental (or the acknowledged and the debatable) powers of the Pope: acknowledged, as well as debatable, be it remembered, by Dr. Briggs himself.

Consider first what is acknowledged. Take the opening paragraph: "The Papacy is one of the greatest institutions that have ever existed in the world; it is much the greatest now existing, and it looks forward with calm assurance to a still greater future. Its dominion extends throughout the world over the only ecumenical church. All other churches are national or provincial in their organization. It reaches back in unbroken succession through more than eighteen centuries to St. Peter, appointed by the Saviour of the world to be the Primate of the Apostles.

It commands the greatest central body of Christianity, which has ever remained the same organism since Apostolic times. All other Christian organizations, however separate they may be from the parent stock, have their share in the Papacy as a part of the Christian heritage and are regarded by the Papacy as subject to its jurisdiction. The authority of the Papacy is recognized as supreme in all ecclesiastical affairs, by the most compact and the best organized body of mankind, and as infallible in determination of doctrines of faith and morals when it speaks *ex cathedra.*"

And consider further such sentences as these: "The Papacy has a much firmer basis in a number of texts of the New Testament and in Christian history than most Protestants have been willing to recognize." "All attempts to explain the 'rock' in any other sense than as referring to Peter have ignominiously failed." "Peter was certainly the chief of the Apostles, according to all the Gospels, during the earthly life of our Lord. The early chapters of the Acts represent him as chief of the apostolic community down to the Council of Jerusalem. If we had the continuation of the narrative of St. Peter's work in Antioch, western Asia, and finally in Rome, in all probability the same undisputed leadership would appear." "It is evident that Jesus, in speaking of St. Peter, had the whole history of his kingdom in view." "We must admit that there must be a sense in which the successors of St. Peter are the rock of the Church, and have the authority of the keys in ecclesiastical government discipline, and the determination of faith and morals." "If the flock continues, the chief shepherd must be the successor of St. Peter, to carry on his work as shepherd." "We shall have to admit that the Christian Church from the earliest times recognized the primacy of the Roman bishop; and that all other great sees at times recognized the supreme jurisdiction of Rome in matters of doctrine, government and discipline." "When Protestants went so far as to deny all the historic rights of the Papacy, Protestantism set itself in a false position which must ultimately be abandoned."

Now for what Dr. Briggs considers unessential or at least debatable concerning the Papacy. It is quite certain that the Pope need not be an Italian; nor need he reside in Rome, though history shows that his residence outside of Rome may lead to grave difficulties. That the successor of St. Peter need not be bishop of Rome is, from a Catholic point of view, a very debatable proposition. The statement that "the primacy of the Pope does not depend on any particular theory as to the extent of his jurisdiction" may be allowed within the limits of dogmatic decisions. In the same way may be granted the proposition that "the primacy of the Popes does not depend upon any particular theory as to the subject-matter of their jurisdiction," but here we think Dr. Briggs will find few Catholics in complete agreement with him on particulars. The other propositions—to settle more definitely the scope of Papal prerogatives; to entrust legislative functions to frequently recurring Councils of the bishops; to make the Cardinalate more widely representative; to extend the power of the laity; and to create special bodies to exercise judicial functions—are all, theoretically at least, open for discussion.

Indeed, there can be little doubt that in the slow process of time these changes will come to pass—and others too, of which to-day we do not even dream. But we can scarcely expect to live to see them.

All in all, it is a remarkable article, and one which we heartily wish we could consider as representative of a widespread state of mind in Christians outside the Church. True, Dr. Briggs at times uses his olive branch as a switch; but after all it would do no good to the cause we have at heart if those behind him should think that he is merely hoisting a flag of surrender. And, without the slightest tendency to criticize, but just looking at the matter from an historical point of view, who can prophesy, within the limits of dogma, just what will be the rôle of the Papacy a thousand years from now? If any man is ready to be positive about the matter, let him look honestly over the history of the past. Of course we must not lose sight of the present practical duty of jealously preserving unity and all that safeguards it. Whatever theologians may grant in the abstract concerning limitations in the jurisdiction of the central authority, the Church as a body will move very slowly in any direction which seems to lead even remotely to Photian ideas. One must pay a price for belonging to a strong organization, "the most compact and best-organized body of mankind" as Dr. Briggs calls it; and, we think he would also agree, the stoutest defender of revealed religion. The bond of unity is at once so essential and so easily broken that one must not tug recklessly at it wherever it is felt to chafe. On the other hand it must be acknowledged that some would draw it so taut that it is in danger of snapping, and others seem to think that it is intended as a rope to keep out people who are anxious to come in. If due importance be granted to all the practical phases of the problem, we may concede that there are points in our present system of government which are open to discussion and modification. The essential requisites of Catholic belief are found in the dogmatic decisions of the Church and the unanimous teaching of the Fathers. Few Catholics, if any, actually restrict their own beliefs to these necessary points. And Dr Briggs may find some critics who wish to impose as obligatory, points which are merely of theological opinion or of current practice. But, for that matter, it would not be hard to find men who seem so believe: "Es konnte auch der liebe Gott ein bischen mehr Katholisch sein."

We have to chronicle the deaths of several American Catholics whose loss will be felt by religion and learning. John A. Creighton, Count of the Holy Roman Empire, was a generous benefactor of education in Omaha, especially of Creighton University, which is under the charge of the Jesuit Fathers. Bishop Stang, of Fall River, was the author of a number of works on various topics: the history of the Reformation, pastoral theology, moral theology, religious controversy, and Socialism. Archbishop Montgomery, coadjutor of San Francisco, did very efficient work on the Pacific Coast for the advancement of Catholic education and the diffusion of correct information concerning the doctrines and practices of the Church.

In the death [January 20] of Miss Agnes May Clerke, the gifted author of several works on astronomical subjects, the scientific world has suffered a real loss. Miss Clerke was a shining example of what is best in the scientific woman. She was not a mere amateur, but a woman of science, who read widely, and who was able to gather up all the threads of investigation of such a difficult subject as astrophysics, for example, and weave them into a complete whole,—witness her *Problems of Astrophysics*. The scientific habit did not with her crowd out the higher interests of life, as is shown by the fact that she was a faithful daughter of the Church. She was born in Ireland in 1842. In her youth she spent seven years in Italy. Returning to England, she began at the age of thirty-five to contribute to the *Edinburgh*. Later in 1888, she made a trip to the Cape of Good Hope, where she performed considerable scientific work in the Observatory. She was awarded the Actonian Prize for her writings on astronomy, and was also honored by the Royal Astronomical Society, being elected a member. Her chief publications are: *A Popular History of Astronomy during the Nineteenth Century* ('85), in its fourth edition; *The System of the Stars* ('90), in its second edition; *The Herschels and Modern Astronomy* ('95); the above mentioned *Problems in Astrophysics* ('03); and *Modern Cosmogonies* ('05).

BOOK REVIEWS.

The Philosophy of Religion: A Critical and Speculative Treatise of Man's Religious Experience and Development in the Light of Modern Science and Reflective Thinking—By GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD, LL. D. 2 Volumes, Scribners, New York, 1905.

America has produced few scholars of the type of Professor Ladd. In the breadth of scope of his scholarly interests and in synthetic power of generalizing on a wide and varied mass of facts, he resembles Herbert Spencer. And though we cannot claim for him the boldness and originality of the English thinker, he excels him in acquaintance with the history of philosophic thought, in exactness of knowledge in the important fields of physiology and psychology, and in appreciation of the evidences and worth of religion. Professor Ladd began his career as an author with works on the Biblical question. His studies on distinctly religious topics were interrupted by his call to take up what was at the time the new subject of Physiological Psychology. In this branch he produced a work which is until to-day the most complete treatise on it written in English—and this is all the more gratifying because he rejects the materialistic inferences which narrower intellects so frequently draw from the data which he handles. Since then he has taken up the fundamental philosophical problems of soul, thought, and conduct. The strongest influence discernible in this portion of his work is that of Hermann Lotze, a writer with whose work Catholics, we fear, are less familiar than they should be.

Now, after nearly thirty years devoted to philosophy, Dr. Ladd takes up once more a problem which in one form occupied his earlier energies, and which, as he tells us, never ceased to be prominent in his mind. In some sense, indeed, the long years he spent on fundamental studies may be considered as a preparation for the present work. Not, however, that it has led him to consider the Philosophy of Religion as a mere branch of metaphysics—his protracted studies in positive science save him from this view, which renders so many of our Catholic presentations of the matter so inadequate. Nor, on the other hand, is he content with a history of opinions, or a mere collection of anthropological data, as if definite religious truth could not be found, or were not worth the seeking. "The method of the

history of religion," he says, "like that of the pursuit of all philosophical problems, must be *speculative on a basis of experience.*"

The scope of the work can be best illustrated by giving its divisions. After three introductory chapters on methods, standard of values, etc., he discusses in Part I "Religion: An Historical Development"—its nature, origin, and growth. Part II treats "Man: A Religious Being"—the psychological factors of religion, emotions, rationality, freedom, etc.; also the relation of religion to society, science, philosophy, art, morality. In Part III, "Religion: A Life," he discussses faith and dogma, worship, salvation, and the collective and individual phases of religion. Parts IV, V and VI, which comprise Volume II, are more philosophical: "God; the Object of Religious Faith" being a treatment of the arguments for theism: "God and the World" a discussion of special questions such as Pantheism, creation, Providence, redemption, revelation; and "The Destiny of Man" mainly occupied with the problem of immortality. The whole matter occupies 1,200 of the large and well-filled pages with which readers of Professor Ladd's other works are familiar.

But what is the attitude of the author in his treatment of these numerous and varied problems? On practically all of the questions which are concerned with the philosophical bases of religion in general, —God, freedom, immortality, the universality of religion, etc., while faithful to his resolve to accord fair treatment to all views, he defends the positions generally held by believers. This applies to the whole of Vol. II and to Part II of Vol. I. In these sections strict theologians would reject his statement of the nature of redemption and revelation, and would perhaps consider his attitude towards miracles and prayer somewhat unsatisfactory, but on the whole they would welcome him as a powerful ally.

He thinks it well in his Preface to explain his method of dealing with Christianity in comparison with other religions. "This religion is treated in essentially the same way as are all the other religions . . . Its data, as given in the particular experiences which it represents, are collected, surveyed critically, and tested for the truth that is in them by application of such criteria as are applied to man's spiritual life in general. . . . The Christian faith is, indeed, our faith. But for this reason are we all the more sympathetic toward the good and true in all other religions." The criteria which he applies are value-judgments which have reference to four aspects of human experience. These are truth, beauty, morality, and happiness. Making use of

these standards in a scientific rather than an apologetic spirit, he establishes in many different connections the transcendence of Christianity.

On Catholicism as a special system he seldom touches directly. He has no prejudice against dogma; he considers speculation on the content of religious experience and the consequent formulation of dogmas unavoidable. But he is inclined towards an ethical evaluation of such formulae, and rejects their claims to final infallibility. (Chap. xx). And in his chapter on "The Standard of Religious Values" (p. 71), he says: "It was a mistake, which cannot easily be committed again in the same way, when the orthodoxy of the Catholic Church of the third century based its tests upon three conceptions, each of which is not only disputable but also lacking in clearness and even largely untrue. These were (1) the claim that exactness of definition and minuteness of analysis are everywhere necessary as grounds for a reasonable faith; (2) the belief in a majority of a meeting, the theory 'that God never speaks to man except through the voice of the majority' (a conception that comes from politics rather than from either religion or philosophy); and (3) the assumption that 'the definitions of primary beliefs as made by the majority are not only true but final.'"

He believes that the powerful social element in religion renders the formation of church organizations natural and necessary, and he makes a fine comparative study of the great religions of the world to show the superior fitness of Christianity as a world-religion. But he does not ascribe the foundation of the Church as an organization to the will of Christ; nor does he seem to consider any special form of ecclesiastical institution as being essential to Christianity.

In spite of points in it to which we cannot subscribe, it is a work to be recommended. The philosophical portions, which con stitute the main bu'k of it, are, on the whole, admirable. For the rest, this question of comparative religion is one which is being more and more widely studied, and it is gratifying to have it treated so ably by one who possesses the strong religious and Christian views of the author. Catholics will find themselves in agreement with nearly all he has to say; and the points of divergence can do little harm, since they belong to the one section of comparative religion which Catholics have studied thoroughly—the claims of Catholicism as compared with other forms of Christianity.

Francis P. Duffy.

A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on The Book of Psalms, (Volume 1)—by CHARLES AUGUSTUS BRIGGS, D. D. Lit. D. and EMILIE GRACE BRIGGS, B. D., New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1906.

This is the latest volume of "The International Critical Commentary" series, and has been prepared by the veteran scholar Dr. Briggs assisted by his daughter who is already well known as an adept in the field of Old Testament study. To say that it is a very important contribution to critical literature on the Scriptures, in a field too, where thorough scholarship, sound judgment and painstaking labor are imperative, is but just praise to its distinguished author. Certainly very few critics could be better equipped for a scientific treatment of the Psalms than Dr. Briggs.

This present volume, he tells us in his Preface, is the fruit of forty years of labor. He began a critical commentary on the Psalms in 1867, at Berlin under Dr. Emil Rödiger. In 1872, he translated, annotated and edited a considerable portion of Moll's *Commentary on the Psalms*, a bulky volume, in Lange's *Bibelwerk* series, (edited in English by P. Schaff). From 1874 to 1890, he lectured on the psalter every year as Professor of Hebrew and cognate languages in Union Theological Seminary. Since 1890, he has continued his studies on the text, higher criticism, and theology of the Psalms. This preparation alone, not to mention the evidence of high scholarship evinced in his previous works, gives his commentary an authority which will carry great weight among all classes of Biblical students. His general freedom from bias and religious partisanship will make his work of value not only to Protestants, but to Catholics as well. This spirit of reverence and fair-mindedness is shown by the remarks in his Preface, that "Catholic commentators have rendered valuable service which has been too often neglected by modern Protestants," and again: "I cannot explain either gospel or Psalms except as books of God, as products of human religious experience inspired and guided by the Divine Spirit."

The work comprises two volumes.

Volume I, is divided into two sections. The Introduction, pp. xix--cix, and Commentary on the first fifty Psalms (1-422). The introduction treats of the Text, Higher Criticism, Canonicity, and Interpretation of the Psalms.

In dealing with the Text he treats succinctly yet with sufficient fulness, a number of subjects necessary for a scholarly understanding

of the Psalms, such as their position in the canon, the genealogy of the text, the various versions, the nature and character of Psalm structure, the origin and development of the primitive psalters, date of composition, textual errors, textual and editorial glosses, etc., etc.

The chapter on Hebrew poetry is by far the most complete in the introduction. It contains a summary of the views previously published in his "Messianic Prophecy" and numerous magazine articles since 1881. This chapter is worthy of special study, for perhaps no one since the time of Bishop Lowth has contributed more to the better understanding of Hebrew poetry than Dr. Briggs.

Regarding the dates of the composition of the various psalms, the author is not so extreme as some critics who deny that any of them were pre-exilic as Olshausen, Duhm, and Cheyne. He assigns seven psalms to the early Hebrew monarchy before Jehosaphat; seven to the middle monarchy, and thirteen to the late monarchy. During the exile he supposes thirteen to have been written. The rest he places as Post-exilic. "The present psalter," he says, "after going through the hands of various editors and redactors, was prepared, appropriate for use in the synagogue and temple, after the re-dedication of the temple." In its preparation all the previous psalters were used. "The collection was (at that time) divided into three books. Toward the close of the second century the final editor divided it into five books and one hundred and fifty psalms, in accordance with the same division of the Laws allowing for variation, in usage." (p. xcii).

Speaking of the canonicity of the Psalter, he says that it was the first of the "Hagiographa" or "Writings" to win canonical recognition on account of the high standard of its religious teachings which give evidence of coming from God and leading to God. "The only objections to the canonicity of the Psalter," he writes, "seriously entertained, are based on a number of imprecations upon enemies, and protestations of righteousness on the part of suffering servants of God. These objections are invalid because they fail to apprehend that these imprecations and protestations belong necessarily to earlier stages of religion, and to certain historic situations, where they have their essential propriety." (p. xcvii).

In the last division of the Introduction, an outline of the history of Psalm-interpretation is given.

It includes the interpretations of Jesus and the Apostles, of the early Greek and Latin Fathers, of Medieval Jewish scholars, of the

Reformation period, and of scholars from the seventeenth Century to the present time. His last word is about the English versions. He says that the first version of the Psalms in English began with Wycliffe in 1382. Perhaps it was an oversight not to have mentioned the Prose versions of William of Shoreham and of Richard Rolle, both published about 1320. He points out the weakness of the various English versions, and urges that "there is no sound reason why Roman Catholics, Protestants and Jews should not unite and agree on a version far better than any that has yet been made."

The plan followed in the commentary is a) Synopsis of contents, and nature of Psalms; b) Text; c) General introductory matter e. g. date of composition, versions containing it, position in psalter, etc., etc.; d) Interpretation and exegesis; e) Special criticism of the text, e. g. Philology, Grammar, literary Analysis, etc.

All of the Psalms have been arranged in measured lines, and the great majority of them in equal strophes, thus enhancing, as the author himself says, their literary character, and making more evident their historical propriety. He has based his translation on the English official versions, but he has not hesitated to forsake them in order to conform to the original as he has determined it in accordance with the principles of textual criticism.

It is gratifying to notice that a scholar like Dr. Briggs is not disposed on "a priori" grounds to exclude the Messianic idea from the Psalms. In reference to Psalm ii, he says: "It is not so important to determine when the Psalm was written, for in any case the Messianic dynasty is in view." And again: "The Psalm is Messianic because it presents a world-wide dominion of the son of David, such as was not an historical reality in the time of the poet, or in any previous or subsequent time in history, but remains an ideal at the goal of history. Jesus of Nazareth is represented in the New Testament as the Son of David and heir of this ideal, etc." (p. 13). This interpretation is in harmony with Jewish and Christian tradition, and differs radically from the views of such critics as Cheyne and Dalman, who refer the Psalm not to the Messianic King, but to the People of Israel.

Concerning Psalm xxii, he has this to say:

"The reference to a historical situation (i. e. in this Psalm) is unmistakable. But inasmuch as the poet, like the author of the conception of the suffering of the servant of Isaiah 53, idealizes the sufferings of Israel and gives his sufferer a mediatorial relation to the

nations, and does this in order to hold up to the pious a comforting conception of a divine purpose in their sufferings, we may suppose that this ideal was designed to prepare the minds of the people of God for the ultimate realization of that purpose of redemption in a sufferer who first summed up in his historical experience this ideal of suffering. In this sense the Psalm is Messianic." (p. 192).

The exegetical notes are fuller and more comprehensive than have yet been given in a commentary on the Psalms. They will prove of great value to the general Bible student as well as to the specialist. His interpretation is reverent throughout, and great pains are taken to point out the religious and liturgical bearing of each Psalm.

The literary notes are copious; they manifest the erudition of the author, and represent a colossal labor, many years of patient study. The main principle which guides him in determining the text seems to be the standard of poetic structure. If the received text is not in harmony with symmetry of metre and parallelism as he understands them, some gloss or error is indicated. These notes are replete with such phrases as "a gloss," "explanation not needed," "impairs measure." It is on this head doubtless more than on any other that the work will, in some quarters, be made the object of adverse criticism. Many scholars, both of the advanced as well as of the more conservative schools, are rather sceptical with regard to textual reconstructions based solely or principally on the supposed exigencies of Hebrew versification, particularly as those who have made a special study of the matter differ widely in their conclusions. It can be freely granted however, that among these specialists in the obscure field of Hebrew metre, few, if any have made so exhaustive a study of the matter, or have worked out and applied their theories so consistently as Dr. Briggs.

From a literary standpoint, the translation of the Psalms is a worthy achievement. The preservation of the parallelism and division into strophes, while it has the advantage of maintaining the poetic structure of the original, does not seem to have been an obstacle to a happy rendering into English. In the first line of Psalm xxii, however, it is somewhat of a surprise to read. "My El why dost thou forsake me?" and in Psalm xlvii, "For Elyon is awe inspiring." El is the ancient poetic name of God, and Elyon is the poetic name of Yahweh. There seems hardly to be a sufficient reason for retaining

these Hebrew words in an English translation, especially in view of their infrequent occurrence in the original text.

The general make-up of the volume is in keeping with the excellence of the others in the same series; a slight improvement would be made, however, if the text of the Psalms were printed in larger type.

It will not depreciate the value of Dr. Briggs' earlier works to say that he has achieved his masterpiece in this Commentary on the Book of Psalms; it is a fitting monument to his deep and painstaking scholarship, and a classical addition to Biblical studies. Needless to say Volume II will he eagerly awaited by all students of the Bible.

J. F. MURPHY.

Les Origines Liturgiques: Conférences données à l'Institut Catholique de Paris en 1906—par le T. R. PERE DOM FERNAND CABROL.

The abundance of valuable literature published in recent years on the subject of primitive liturgy gives evidence of an increased interest on the part of Catholic scholars in what was formerly a much neglected phase of early Christian history The number of learned works now appearing affords improved facilities for knowledge in this subject, and investigation is almost daily bringing to light new and interesting features of our early worship. To the Benedictines of Farnborough is due no little credit for their share in this work, and eminent among them is Dom Fernand Cabrol, editor of the *Dictionnaire d'Archéologie Chrétienne et de Liturgie*, and author of the present volume. Most works on this subject are written for those who have a special scientific interest in the matter, but the present work is an effort at a popular presentation. To become acquainted with the history of the liturgy is to add fresh beauties to our worship; so this work is one which will not fail to interest intelligent Catholics. Here they will find the historical explanation of many rites and ceremonies, the real significance of which must hitherto have been lost to them. A perusal of this volume will also prove that the Christian liturgy is supremely a *rationale obsequium.*

The name of the author, who has made so many valuable contributions on the subject, is a sufficient guarantee of the character of the work. It is a series of conferences delivered at the Catholic Institute of Paris. The nature of the work, as well as the character of the audience, compelled the author to choose topics of general interest and to treat them in a popular rather than in a scientific

manner. He has exercised a wise discrimination in his choice of subjects, and his treatment of them is interesting and instructive. Technical questions unsuited to a public conference are briefly explained or reserved for more thorough treatment in an appendix.

The introductory conference is an admirable exposition of the esthetic in liturgy. It is the contention of the author that to appreciate fully the beauty of divine worship one must study it in its historical development, and not be content with magnificent descriptions which do not touch the soul of the subject. To aid in this he formulates two principles: (1) Every rite has its stages of development and decay; and to appreciate its full beauty, we must take it not at its origin nor in its state of simplicity, but at that stage in its development when it fully corresponds with its object and has the most complete significance. (2) Every rite has its logical reason for existence, and when this is removed, a part of its significance, and consequently of its beauty, is lost. The author affirms and proves that the Christian liturgy is the most perfect expression of man's worship of God. His demonstration of the beauty of the Christian rites forms an excellent apologetic argument of, at least, relative value.

The second conference views liturgy as a science. The third discusses the sources of liturgy. The fourth and fifth have for their object the liturgical literature in its origin, development, and divisions. The last three conferences deal respectively with the Mass, Baptism, and Holy Week. The chapter on the Mass is particularly worthy of note. The mass of the catechumens and the mass of the faithful are explained, as well as the dependence of the former on the worship of the synagogue, and the strictly Christian character of the latter.

The work is enriched by a series of appendices which occupy more than half of the volume. Here are discussed, in scholarly and scientific fashion, such questions as the author was forced to exclude from his conferences. Among the questions treated are the Gallican, Mozarabic, and Celtic liturgies, the Mass of St. Augustine, the origin of the Roman Mass and canon, the book of Cerne, and the *Liber Ordinum*. The author, knowing that in their printed form the conferences would become accessible to all classes of readers, added these appendices for the benefit of those who might require a more thorough treatment than was possible in a popular conference. They have the advantage of making the book a valuable one for the student of liturgy without detracting from its value as a popular presentation, which was the original purpose of the work.

D. W. Sheeran.

The Scientific Temper in Religion, and Other Addresses—by the Rev. P. N. Waggett, M. A. Longmans, Green and Co 1905, xii, 286.

This book, with the exception of one chapter, comprises a series of conferences delivered during Lent and May, 1903, in St. Mary's Church, Marylebourne, "upon subjects and points in which religious faith and practice are supposed to touch most closely upon natural science." The author gives a picture of the alteration of the world of thought to-day in regard to these matters. "People are not so much troubled by special criticisms urged against special doctrines of the Faith as beset by a general feeling of discouragement. . . A great many people have the sense that with regard to religion *the whole thing has gone* for themselves" (2, 3). This state of mind has been caused by a strange truce between the avowed representatives of religion and those misrepresentatives of science who have made a philosophy out of science. It is a "truce of men who despairing of one another as unreasonable have turned their backs upon those who disagree with them; who feel that there is no possibility of coming to terms with certain other forms of thought and are going froward with their own work." It has also been produced in this way. Being too much occupied with details, with weighing antecedent objections against religion and positive proofs for religion, men's souls are gradually brought into a condition in which they are unable to be aware of and to appreciate the great world of life—of spiritual life, experience, struggle, duty and victory—which lies around them." (p. 10).

The remedy of course is not to be found in the old methods of controversy. They have failed to build up "a soul which is oppressed with a sense of blankness in the whole spiritual outlook and has lost sight of the wider world of moral and spiritual realities" (3). And so the author devotes himself to the task of finding some other remedy. After telling what part science has to play to fulfill its mission perfectly—namely to recognize that its field is limited—he outlines the duty of religion; it must take on *a scientific temper*. What this term here means, the author is at great pains to make clear. Before beginning his constructive work, he tells us quite plainly *what it does not mean*. First it does not merely mean the spirit of profound respect for the labors, results and methods of science. Nor secondly is it coextensive with the effort to arrive at a detailed conciliation between the statements of religion and of science; this is a false expectation; "we ought to recognize a necessary want of continuity,

an inevitable gap between the knowledge attained in both" (26;) and "we ought to be positively alarmed at any appearance of unbroken agreement between them" (24). The reason is that both are growing and developing, which is another way of saying that both are imperfect and far from their end. This same statement holds true with regard to continuity between the different parts of our knowledge in each. We would do well to bear this in mind more frequently in our study of religion. Nor in the third place does the scientific temper mean an attempt to base our religion upon the gaps in the completeness of our scientific knowledge—to support our religion on the ground that certain occult inquiries or psychical research cannot be explained physically. To do so would be to leave one's religion open to the terrible risk of being undermined by some fresh discovery in science that would explain our previous ignorance.

What the scientific temper in religion means is none of these, though they are severally good and important. The Rev. Mr. Waggett sums up the content of this phrase as follows. What we need in religion is to follow "that which is good in the spirit of science: to have what science has at its best, a wide outlook upon all the facts; to have what science has, a generous willingness to adventure into regions yet unknown; to have what science has, a contented spirit under the scorn which comes both upon science and upon religion from the region of merely critical thought: to cultivate, that is to say, what is fine in science—the positive temper." (41, 42).

The author then proceeds to show how religion can imitate and utilize the various adventures of science "in speculation," "in special discoveries," "in the ordinary discipline of teaching" and "in the power of action."

Having clearly defined and exemplified his meaning of the Scientific temper, the author turns to the consideration of some special difficulties. Evolution and Natural selection, their effect upon Theism and Dogmatic Religion, Agnosticism and Determinism, Biology and our View of Human Nature, the connexion between the inwardly possessed experiences of Communion and Kinship with God (mere subjective religion) and Dogmatic Religion—all these he recognises as questions that have reached the popular press and are causing astonishment and distress to the man in the street. It is the duty of the educated—those who have satisfied their minds about these still insoluble questions—to reassure and build up the faith of their younger brothers. And so the author hastens to apply his principles to these

difficulties in the succeeding chapters. And here we meet with some clever and convincing, if novel, arguments, put in a popular style that make the reading of this volume a rare treat for the student of apologetics. It would expand this review to too great a length to discuss these chapters further. Suffice it to say that the author has succeeded in presenting these questions candidly and sincerely, and that the defence of Religion has not thereby lost but gained. He does not claim that his method will restore faith and peace and prayer to the stricken soul. All he claims—and he repeats this time and again—is that such a process of argument will disencumber the mind of the objections against religion, will clear a space where life may act again. It is beyond the function of argument to grant renewed religion. When its work is done, there is still a long labor of doubt and difficulty; the soul must pass through great and dark chambers of search before it discovers the gift of God in its own heart. That work is primarily and necessarily the work of the individual.

One word more. From the fact that this book is made up of spoken conferences, we should expect that at times the treatment would not be thorough, and many topics capable of wider development are barely outlined. Such suggestive subjects crop out continually and if space would allow we might point some out. But enough has been said to show the value of this small volume as a real contribution to an apologetic Library. JOHN J. MITTY.

Catholic Churchmen in Science. Sketches of the Lives of Catholic Ecclesiastics who were among the Great Founders of Science. By JAMES J. WALSH, M. D., Ph. D., LL. D. Phila. Dolphin Press. 1906.

The book under review is a collection of essays that have already appeared in various magazines, but are now brought together by the author "on the advice of his friends" so as to be "more effective for the cause which they uphold." The collection consists of the following sketches: *Copernicus and His Times;* Basil Valentine: *Founder of Modern Chemistry;* Linacre: *Scholar, Physician, Priest;* Father Kircher, S. J.: *Scientist, Orientalist,* and *Collector;* Bishop Stensen: *Anatomist* and *Father of Geology;* Abbé Haüy: *Father of Crystallography;* Abbot Mendel: *A new Outlook in Heredity.*

These are prefaced by a short chapter on "The Supposed Opposition of Science and Religion."

The purpose of the book may be indicated by quoting from the author's first chapter.

"Now, it so happens that a number of prominent original investigators in modern science were not only thoroughly orthodox in their religious beliefs, but were even faithful clergymen and guiding spirits for others in the path of Christianity. The names of those who are included in the present volume is the best proof of this. The series of sketches was written at various times, and yet there was a central thought guiding the selection of the various scientific workers. Most of them lived at about the time when, according to an unfortunate tradition that has been very generally accepted, the church dominated human thinking so tyrannously as practically to preclude all notion of original investigation in any line of thought, but especially in matters relating to physical science. Most of the men whose lives are sketched lived during the fifteenth, sixteenth, and first half of the seventeenth centuries. All of them were Catholic clergymen of high standing, and none of them suffered anything like persecution for his opinions; all remained faithful adherents of the Church through long lives."

Dr. Walsh has rendered a service to the Catholic reading public by bringing out these essays in book-form. The work will serve as an antidote for books of the Warfare between Religion and Science type. Whether everyone will agree with the author in appending the title "father" or "founder" to so many of the names remains a question, but that the men whose lives and scientific work are here sketched made valuable, and in some cases, fundamental contributions to science—thereof no doubt can be entertained. There is one more point to which exception might be taken as indicating that the work is not entirely free from obscurantism and special pleading. In speaking of the Galileo case, Dr. Walsh uses the words: (p. 137) —"when Galileo was tried and condemned at Rome, because of his abuse of Scripture for the demonstration of scientific thesis," etc. The decree of the congregation hardly supports the statement, if it be intended that this was the real cause for the condemnation.

J. C. Herrick.

Jesus-Christ. Sa Vie, Son Temps (Leçons d'Ecriture Sainte, Prêchées au Gesu de Paris et de Bruxelles) Par le Père Hippolyte Leroy S. J. Année 1906, Paris, Gabriel Beauchesne et Cie Editeurs.

The present volume is the twelfth annual consecutive series of discourses preached by Father Leroy in Paris and Brussels, on the same subject, viz. the life and times of Our Lord. The discourses are not sermons in the ordinary acceptation, but consist of a free running commentary on the Gospel narrative. This method of preaching is not in very common use amongst us, but it might well be more generally employed than it is, as it has some distinct advantages of its own. It is, at all events, a change from the ordinary mode of preaching from a text, and it affords the faithful an opportunity of acquiring an intelligent acquaintance with the sacred writings, not otherwise likely to be obtained by the greater number. Father Leroy seems to possess the gift of using this method in an interesting manner and we can well imagine that these discourses were followed with great attention and profit by the congregations that heard them. The style is simple, flowing and quiet, though here and there are passages marked by that fervor and unction which we expect from the French pulpit. The feelings naturally aroused by the sad condition of the French Church at the present moment find expression now and again, some of these utterances being hardly such as we can suppose the preacher addressing to his Paris audience with entire safety to himself, Such a description, for instance as the following—"Ces odieux sectaires, persécuteurs acharnés du Christ et de son Eglise, ennemis de tout bien, assassins des ames, pourvoyeurs de l'enfer etc."—evidently intended to apply to the present ruling powers in France, was probably addressed to the Brussels congregation and not to that in the French capital. We do not quarrel with the truth of the description, but remembering the strict surveillance exercised over pulpit utterances in France, we can hardly imagine the preacher proclaiming it in Paris without securing some unfriendly attentions to himself on the part of the authorities Such passages however are rare and for the most part the lessons drawn from the sacred narrative are such as are suitable to ordinary conditions and calculated to provide good devotional reading at all times.

S. P. Macpherson.

Short Sermons—by Rev. F. P. Hickey, O. S. B., Benziger Bros., New York.

In a volume of two hundred and seventy pages, Father Hickey gives the busy priest a series of short sermons for the Sundays and some of the principal feasts of the year. "Five Minute Sermons" are frequently too long, while some of our "Skeleton Sermons" are too bare, but Father Hickey seems to strike a happy medium.

His sermons are indeed short but not too short. The preacher will find them useful, instructive and above all, practical. They speak to the people not at them. The language, though plain, is clear and direct.

The subjects, as a rule, are well chosen and there is a freshness about them that shows much thought and feeling.

Each sermon is well put together with order, unity and a generous supply of scripture texts. The author displays the knack of driving home the same truth in various ways. A brief synopsis is placed at the head of each sermon giving the points which are afterwards developed. These little plans alone are valuable and will enable the hard-worked priest to build a short or even a set sermon independent of the text. This is a fair example.

Septuagesima Sunday
Work

"Why stand you here all the day idle." Matthew XX. 6.

1. We are called to work as the parable shows.
2. We must work, and the work of God's service is prayer.
3. If we work we are secure of the reward.
4. How apathetic in spiritual life, how keen in things of this world.
5. Lent is the summons once again .

So competent a judge as Bishop Hedley in the introduction, which is a bit of sound advice to priests on "Short Sermons," says, "It is a pleasant task to introduce to priests and the Catholic public generally a volume of useful and thoughtful short sermons. . . . . To me it appears that the sermons in this volume are fair specimens of what would really catch the attention and do good." This book of short sermons deserves to be popular.

T. W. T.

The Church and Kindness To Animals. BURNS & OATES, London; Benziger Bros., New York.

This little book is partly a translation, partly an adaptation, of a French work, *L'Eglise etla Pitié envers les Animaux.* Its appearance is doubtless a sign of the increasing attention paid in these days to the subject of animal suffering and to measures for its prevention; partly, also, it may be intended as an answer to a feeling which prevails and occasionally finds expression in non-Catholic quarters that the Catholic Church has been on the whole rather indifferent on this subject. If the latter supposition is correct, the book would have been more effective if it had presented more examples than it has of official condemnations by the Church of cruelty to animals, or encouragement of efforts looking to its abatement. The prevalence of bull-fighting in certain Catholic countries will naturally occur to the mind of the reader in connection with this matter, but the only official pronouncements presented under this head are a decree of Pope Pius V. and a pastoral of the late Bishop of Nimes in condemnation of the cruel sport. It is a pity the compilers did not include some pronouncements by Spanish Bishops on the subject or can it be that none such are to be had? The greater part of the book is taken up with extracts from lives and legends of the saints showing the intimate and kindly relations between them and the lower animals. Another section devotes attention to the subject of vivisection quoting vigorous speeches of Cardinal Manning and others in condemnation of the indiscriminate use of this practice. The book is illustrated with reproductions of some beautiful medieval pictures of the saints and animals.

S. P. MACPHERSON.

The Golden Sayings of the Blessed Giles of Assisi—Newly trans'ated and edited together with a sketch of his life—by the REV. PASCHAL ROBINSON, of the Order of Friars Minor. Philadelphia. The Dolphin Press. 1907. pp, lxiii and 141.

Those who are aweary with the consideration of the various panaceas that are being offered for the world's unrest, shou'd take up this little book. Blessed Giles was of that band that composed the Round Table of St. Francis. He was of the fi st to join the Poor Man of Assisi and he has ever "remained the ideal type of the F.anciscan Friar." This simple monk, who lived six centuries ago, believed that men could be made pure and true and noble if they fol-

lowed the counsels of the Lord who loved them. There was no subtlety in his writings—they draw their inspiration chiefly from the crucifixion. The Blessed Giles had meditated on the words of his Master and he studied his own heart. He knew human nature and how it needed God. The ideals of the twentieth century are different from those of the thirteenth, but perhaps after all, humanity is about the same as it ever was and it needs its Lord though it may deny its need. And so, not as a souvenir of "far-off things and battles long ago" but as a little book of permanent value do we welcome the Golden Sayings. Father Robinson, who did into exquisite English "The Writings of St. Francis" last year, has made us again his debtors.

J. W.

The Profit of Love: Studies in Altruism,—by A. A. McGinley, with preface by Rev. George Tyrrell, Author of *Lex Orandi*, etc. Longmans, Green & Co., New York, London and Bombay.

Miss McGinley has written a stimulating and, in many ways, remarkable book. In a series of some fifteen chapters, so admirably arranged that nearly every one of them may be read understandingly apart from the general context, she has sketched an analysis of the idea of love as it tends to reveal itself to an essentially reflective and religious mind in certain present day forms of utilitarian altruism. Her book, in consequence, has a modern note about it that may ruffle the temper of those elderly orthodox who are accustomed to a more obvious and scholastic approach to the ever recurring problems of Christian perfection. Whether the general reader will be tempted to "sit down comfortably and read these pages in a spirit of blind uncritical docility," as Father Tyrrell, who contributes an admirable preface to the work, seems to fear will be the case, we are not prepared to affirm. Speaking for ourselves only and with some experience of the kind of religious mind that eagerly turns to books of this sort, especially when bearing such a promise of spiritual emolument as the author discreetly hints at in the title she has chosen, we are disposed to think that the danger will be all the other way. The treatment of the idea of "perfection," for instance, is so fresh, so candidly searching, so sincere, and the notion of the "religious life" as a means to that "perfection," is handled with such an evident knowledge of poor human nature in its heroic moods, that the book is sure to give us-

brage to those who "are for Cephas, for Apollo or for Paul" in these matters rather than for Christ.

Apart, too, from the author's peculiarities of style, which are few, indeed, but well marked—as witness her preference for the "American genitive" and an occasional weakness for the purple patch—objection might be made to a curious lack of proportion which leads her, sometimes at the height of her most convincing and most Catholic thought, to "confirm the doctrines" she has established not by appeals to "Scripture and the Fathers," or to the great authors of all time, as the old ascetic masters are wont to do, but by copious citations from writers like the late Professor Henry Drummond, the late Professor Fiske and Mr. Hamilton Mabie who is still happily very much with us. The net result of the various spiritual emotions excited in the reader by this method is apt to interfere with the deeper lessons which the author is quite capable of imparting in her own right. Juxtaposition is a hazardous matter sometimes; and there is as much need for insight in marshalling one's authorities in the pages of a book as in arranging—let us say—one's guests at a dinner table. There are some people whom we do not like to see "cheek by jowl." Yet much may be forgiven to a writer, who, if she does find point in Professor Fiske, finds it no less appositely also in the unassailable and saintly Father Baker. By that preference alone, if by no other, might she be said almost to prove her uncommonness. "Sancta Sophia" is food only for the sane.

But having hinted so much, not by way of dislike, but rather as endeavoring candidly to point out the likeliest grounds of misunderstanding in the case of a book, which, as Father Tyrrell somewhat drily observes, is too "helpful," too "full of ventures and suggestions" not to awaken opposition, we should like to call attention to what is positive and constructive in Miss McGinley's argument. The book is divided into two parts; the first part, which comprises nine chapters, deals with what may be described as the personal and religious aspect of the author's idea of love considered as the motive force of the modern instinct for altruism; the second part, which consists in turn of six chapters, touches freshly and illuminatingly upon those activities of the modern spirit that manifest themselves, sometimes wisely, sometimes unwisely, as feminism, educationalism and social reform. Under the author's inspiring touch Catholics may learn how the whole of our rushing modern life may be vivified by their religion. We do not believe that Miss McGinley meant to write a complete treatise. So

far as her own personal intention may be gathered from those chapters in which she has ventured to re-handle old truths in a new way, as for instance in the admirably written essays of the first part of the book to which she has given such suggestive titles, as "The Perfect Way," "The Call of the Perfect," and "Souls, not Systems," we should say that her scope was to recall her readers to a sense of fundamental values, or to what old fashioned people would call first principles. She has done this with a sureness of aim and a courage that set her apart from the "great company of preachers" whose aim is rather to edify in the modern apostolic sense, than to compel men to think. She is evidently one who has learned to think for herself even while she strives from first to last, and successfully, we should say, to think always in loyal sympathy with the Church. To give an instance of what we mean. Speaklng of the modern tendency among Catholics to confound a time-honored but human means with an evangelical end, she says:

"The precedent for setting apart that small number of souls who have chosen the better way is based upon the Gospel teaching of counsel and precept. Narrowly construed, the common interpretation of this teaching is that to choose to live by precept exempts a soul from living by counsel; and that a "call" to live by the counsels essentially differentiates a soul, both in the motive and the condition of its life, from those who live by precept only. This arbitrary classification of the life of counsel and the life of precept has created some strange misapprehensions in regard to the essential character of a call to the perfect life." (pp. 26, 27).

That is well put; and we believe that when the matter comes to be treated historically by some scientific exponent of latter day asceticism, it will be found that the post-Tridentine casuists have been largely responsible for the gradual change of heart which seems to have come over no inconsiderable portion of Western Catholicism on the point.

The book is full of suggestive thoughts and throws out many a hint for those who think, instead of running while they read; and we hope it will receive the regardful attention of those who are called upon to instruct others unto righteousness whether in the cloister or in the world.

CORNELIUS CLIFFORD.

Mary in the Gospels: Lectures on the History of Our Blessed Lady as recorded by the Evangelists—by the VERY REV. SPENCER NORTHCOTE, D. D., New York. Benziger Brothers. 1906. pp. 308.

This is a new edition of a series of Lectures that came out in 1866, in connection with the controversy which arose after the publication of Dr. Newman's answer to the Eirenicon of Dr. Pusey. A certain review of Dr. Newman's letter tried to escape from its keen logic and unanswerable argument by saying that he had wasted his labor in dealing with the patristic difficulties of his subject while the Scriptural difficulties yet remained unsolved. The Lecture deals with the objection urged against our devotion to the Blessed Virgin on the ground that nothing is more certain or more remarkable in the Gospel narrative than the profound silence and obscurity in which her history is involved. Having declared that the real greatness and glory of Mary is contained in this—that she is the Mother of the Word Incarnate, and that no apparent silence could ever obscure this fact, he goes on to show that the Gospels give Our Lady a high place: the silence is but partial and the obscurity but seeming. We are glad that these Lectures have been printed.

J. W.

At the Parting of the Ways. Considerations and Meditations for Boys. By HERBERT LUCAS, S. J. Sands & Co., London and Edinburgh; B. Herder, St. Louis, Mo.

Father Lucas has already given us, in his volume of sermons entitled *In the Morning of Life* a sample of what he can do in the way of providing religious instruction for schoolboys. The present publication follows along the same lines as the former and, like it, is a good example of the kind of religious teaching suitable to an audience composed of boys. The sermons are, for the most part, short, which is certainly a desideratum in preaching to young people; they abound in illustrations taken from boy life, and while they are solidly pious, they avoid anything like sugariness and mawkish sentiment, which manly boys are so quick to detect and despise. Many of them, it is true, are such as could only be appreciated by boys of a more advanced age, but such as could at all understand the appeals here made to them could not fail to be braced and strengthened by them for the battle of life. Not every good preacher can succeed with boys; it needs some peculiar qualifications, and of these Father Lucas seems to have a not inconsiderable share. S. P. MACPHERSON.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The Sins of Society, by BERNARD VAUGHAN, S. J., London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. B. Herder, St. Louis.

A Tuscan Penitent: the Life and Legend of St. Margaret of Crotona, by FATHER CUTHBERT, of the Order of St. Francis, Capuchin. London, Burns & Oates

The Garden of Roses of Our Lady: The Excellency of the Rosary and the Best Method of reciting it, by FATHER M. MESCHLER, S. J. London, Burns & Oates.

Indulgences: Their Origin, Nature and Development, by REV. FATHER ALEXIUS M. LEPICIER, O. S. M. New York, Benziger Brothers.

History of Ireland: From the earliest times to the present day, by REV. E. A. D'ALTON, M. R. I. A. Three vols. New York, Benziger Brothers.

Her Faith Against the World, by WILFRID WILBERFORCE. London, Burns & Oates.

The Mother of Jesus in the First Age and After, by J. HERBERT WILLIAMS. New York, Benziger Brothers

Lectures on the Holy Eucharist, by CHARLES COUPE, S. J. London, R. & T. Washbourne; New York Benziger Brothers.

Politique Religieuse et Separation, by HIPPOLYTE HEMMER. Paris, Alphonse Picard et Fils.

Die Briefe Des Heiligen Johannes: Uebersetzt und Erklaert von DR JOHANNES EVANGELIST BELSER. Freiburg im Breisgau. Herder.

Kurgefastes Handbuch der Katholischen Religion, von W. WILMERS. New York, Friedrich Pustet.

Hrabanus Maurus: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Mittelalterlichen Exegese, von DR. JOH. BAPTIST HABLITZEL. Freiburg im Breisgau, Herder.

The Crux of Pastoral Medicine, by REV. ANDREW KLARMANN. New York. Pustet.